VOL. 6 NO. 3 1943

THE

JOURNAL

OF THE

SINDH HISTORICAL SOCIETY

EDITED BY

N. M. BILLIMORIA

Digitized by M. H. Panhwar Institute of Sindh Studies, Jamshoro.

DEVASTATION OF INDUS FLOODS.

(1826, 1837, 1841, 1858 and 1861.)

By N. M. BILLIMORIA.

RIG VEDA sings of the Indus:

Flashing and whitely-gleaming in her mightiness she moves

Along her ample volumes through the realms

Most active of the active, Sindhu unrestrained, like a dappled mare, beautiful, fair to see. X. 76.7.

But when she gets angry she plays the mother-in-law—or a step-mother. A flood such as now and then the mighty Hymalaya send down, in course of a year, floods that may change the face of the map washing away towns and villages, as a woman wipes away ants with a cloth; so writes an old chronicler of one such flood.

The Indus takes her rise in cold and lofty regions where almost every ravine is filled with glaciers. The rivers are spanned by them; the pressure of water from behind is too great for the resistance, the icy dam suddenly gives way, the river bursts, and torrents deluge the plains. The earliest of these glacier-created flood happened in 1825, of which we have very few particulars.

The next flood we read of happened in 1833; about this Vigne G.T (Travels in Kashmir) writes "the protecting glacier gave way and the highty flood, no longer restrained, rushed down the valley of the Shayok, destroying every village within its reach. From Nubra to Sharda, a distance of 120 miles the flood descended in a day, or at the rate of ten miles an hour."

In the end of 1840 and beginning of 1841, the Indus was unusually low; in February, March and April it was formidable just above Atok; early in June the barrier burst, and the flood rushed forth at the rate of 12 miles an hour; the wall of water was 20 to 30 feet high. Early in the afternoon a murmuring was heard amongst the mountains;

Digitized by M. H. Panhwar Institute of Sindh Studies, Jamshoro.

پاران ايم ايڇ پنهور انسٽيٽيوٽ آف سنڌ اسٽڊيز، ڄامشورو.

this was supposed to be thunder at first—then the cry was raised "the river is upon us." The dry channels of the tributaries were filled in a moment, "and a moving mass of water, stones, mud, carcases of animals, of men, women, and children, soldiers and their war steeds, guns and tumbrils, came rolling and thundering on. A portion of Gulab Singh's army encamped on the river bank were, with their tents, baggage and artillery, swept away; and the novel fact of 24 pounder guns carried off by a torrent of water, was for the first time presented to us. Hundreds of acres of arable land were literally licked up, while forests were uprooted or prostrated like reeds or rushes."

When the Punjab was annexed, cantonments were established between Attock and Peshawar; and Nowshera was selected on the banks of the Cabul River. The flood in 1841 was caused by an extensive double land slip in the Khagan Hills, where the bed of the Indus is narrow and the current was proportionately strong. The Indus rose at Attock in 10 minutes, and in all 50 feet above its usual level; all the bridge boats and their sheds timber and all the stores on the Khyrabad bank were swept away. The Indus rushed up the Cabul River. Every minute the waters rose Gehangeerpoora, Akora and all the villages on the bank were totally destroyed, and the stream swept up to Nowshera. Not one Bungalow was left standing; in the Barracks the water rose to a height of 8 or 10 feet. All passed the nights on the sand hills in front of the parade ground; the next morning the floods had subsided, and the station of Nowshera had also subsided. In Nowshera some people placed their property on the top of their houses, when the flood rose above their calculations, both their houses and property were destroyed.

We have two reports on the great flood of the river Indus which reached Attock on the 10th August, 1858. (1) by Capt. T. G. Montgomerie, Bengal Engineers, F.R.G.S. 1st Asst. G. T. Survey of India; and (2) by Capt. W. Henderson, Engineers.

At 5 p.m. on the 10th August 1858, the Indus at Attock was very low. At 7 a. m. it had risen 10 feet, By 0.30 p. m. it had risen 50 feet, and it continued to rise till it stood 90 feet higher than it did in the morning. The Cabul River continued to flow upwards for ten hours. The flood destroyed a

large amount of property in British territory both above and below Attock; and the back water on the Cabul River destroyed the greater part of the private property in the Nowshera Cantonment.. Enquiries were made whether any damage had been done in the Kashmir territories by a flood on the Indus, especially mentioning the Shayok River; the answers were in the negative except that from Boonjee, the Maharaja's most northerly fort and cantonment on the Gilgit frontier, the report was that a great flood (bura sailab) was noticed by the sepoys at Boonjee; shortly afterwards the sepoys saw a mass of timbers floating down the stream, which they recognised as belonging to the gateway of the Fort of Nimbul. This fort is said to be on the Gilgit river below the point where the Naggar river joins the Gilgit river. The flood noticed at Boonjee should have been on the 9th of August about 9 or 10 a.m.

The average flow of the Indus in ordinary times is seven miles an hour. The distance between Boonjee and Attock is about 220 miles; so the flood travelled at the rate of 10¾ miles per hour; it is a fair rate for the Ganges when it issues from the hills opposite Hardwar flows in ordinary times at 9 miles an hour, and its pace looks slow compared with that of the Jhelum below Baramoola. It is certain that the flood came from Skardo, the capital of Little Thibet, situated on the River Indus.

The first information of the obstruction of the glaciers was received near Attock about the middle of July 1858, giving a general warning by a letter from the Syuds of Kangra or Kangri a place near the Nubra and Shayok Valleys. The boatmen of Attock declared that the warning received in 1841 came from the same place; they recognised the style and stated that the same form of adjuration was employed; and that the signatures were the same, except that 2 or 3 persons were omitted, possibly they may be dead. A search of the former letter of 1841 was made in the house of Bulloo, the oldest of the Mullicks of the boatmen, but the search proved unsuccessful.

The glaciers are in constant motion; the length of time the obstacle remained seems to be three months. The letter stated that the river had been closed for three months; that would be beginning of April, as the outburst took place on the 8th of August; that would give the whole duration four months; but it is not likely that so long an interval elapsed.

The velocity of the flood from Attock to Kallabagh was 15 miles per hour. The velocity of the flood of 1841 calculated by Col. Cunningham was 11 or 12 miles per hour; but this seems to be underestimated, for it must be nearly 23 miles per hour.

With regard to the "effects of the flood," there had been no extensive loss of life or property, as the people had received warning about a month before the occurrence. At Attock many of the houses in the Mullah Tollah or boatmen's village were demolished, also part of the opposing village of Khairabad; but in both cases the property was almost entirely saved. In the Chuch valley lying between Torbela and Attock a few villages were wholly or partially destroyed, and in the valley of the Cabul River all those near the water as far as Nowshera; but in both cases the principal losses were in grain and other produce of the field, and in cattle. Heavy loss was sustained principally by landlords at Nowshera, and by Government in the destruction of roads and bridges and stores collected at Khairabad, near Attock. Below Attock most of the villages are placed on high banks so that no damage was done there; but at Mokadd, 80 miles below Attock 100 houses were destroyed. Marree also suffered and Kallabagh lost some 10 or 15 houses. Nowshera Barracks were not seriously injured. Fresh channels were opened in different parts of the course of the river. The most noteworthy was at Attock. Silt deposit has taken place to a large extent particularly in the Chuch Valley above Attock, the valley of the Cabul River, and every nullah and stream opening into the river. In constructing the Road Trans Indus, several miles of silt deposited by the flood of 1841 was observed. It was not seen where cultivation had been carried over, but where the land was left unused it was still found in the shape of fine grey mixture of sand and clay about 15 inches thick. The total length so covered was 12 miles and one foot deep. This silt is very injurious to garden ground. The effect on the Cabul River was that the flood reached about 30 miles up the river, but stopped short by about 5 miles off the point where that of 1841 was distinctly to be traced to.

During the morning of the 11th household furniture in considerable quantity from Nowshera was seen to pass Attock and stacks of straw, Persian wheels, and such things in large numbers from the Valley of the Cabul River.

OVERFLOW OF THE INDUS WHICH ENDANGERED SHIKARPUR & JACOBABAD IN 1861.

Captain Frederick Phillips was collector at Shikarpur; he reports on the 24th September 1861 that two flood streams burst over the country from the Indus. The first from above Kushmore, flowed about 29th July, 1861, and after flooding vast tracts in the Jacobabad Districts north of the Bigaree Canal, burst the spoil banks of that larger feeder, and passed on south into the Shikarpur Taluka, meeting the second flood stream from a place called "Moramaree" close to the mouth of and north of the Sind Canal. This second stream commenced flowing on 9th August.

The two streams combined, formed a volume of water five miles in breadth, and varying from three to five feet in depth; then swept across the country in SSE direction.

The flood about the 18th August did not get sufficient passage through the bridges on the Jacobabad road, between the villages of Lodra and Kote Sultan, between which the roadway is carried over low ground on a Bund with certain waterways, burst through in three places and destroyed three bridges. The Jacobabad road was flooded for about 12 miles, and boats were placed for conveyance of the mails; all other traffic was cut off.

It was estimated that Rs. 12,000 would be required to repair this road.

The flood approached within five miles of Shikarpur. Two bunds existed for its protection; *viz.* the "Mirza Bund" near and north of the city; the "Lodra Bund" five miles north. These bunds had fallen into disrepair, as no such flood had ever occurred before; for three days there was great danger that the flood would break through these bunds, in that case the whole station and the lower part of the city would have been destroyed. But the danger was averted by keeping both the bunds intact by employing gangs of men working day and night.

The flood streams have gone into low land in the Nowshera Taluka near Khyree-ka-Ghurree. About 14,500 beegas of kurreef were destroyed, but 65,000 begas of good land were submerged and would be available for rabi crops.

Damage to the value of Rs. 500 was done in the village of Abad Tuppa Tairo, and the Thanna Dharamsala and the old fort were destroyed. Cattle and sheep valued at Rs. fifty were destroyed at night in Abdal Tuppa Kote Sooltan. In the Nowshera Taluka damage had been done in three small villages to the value of Rs. two hundred.

The roads from Shikarpur to the mouth of the Sind, to Jacobabad to Kushmore and to Jaghun were closed to all traffic (Septr. 1861) except those who went on horseback. Travellers from Jacobabad were obliged to make a detour *via* Ruttadhera.

The Collector reports on 24th September, 1861, that the flood is still flowing though with less violence; he adds that the Indus is, however, unprecedently full for the late period of the season, and the whole of the canals are still running.

Major W. L. Merewether C.B., Political Superintendent and Commandant in the Frontier District, Sind, submitted a report on the flood of the Indus on 2nd November, 1861, to Mr. J. D. Inverarity, the then Commissioner-in-Sind.

He reports about the high and low level of the Indus at the guage at Bukkur; In 1860 the highest rise above low water level was on the 16th August, 12 feet 3 inches. In 1859, the highest was about the same; but in July having gradually inceased from the 1st, when it was 11 feet 8 inches; after the 16th the river began to fall, till on the 31st it was 11 feet 3 inches only. In 1861, the highest rise was on the 3rd September, 12 feet 4 inches, having been 11 feet 6 inches on the 16th August. The water fell rapidly attaining the maximum.

About the extensive erosion made by the river on the right bank, *viz.* between Kushmore and Gehilpoor, Gehilpoor and Budanee, and Khae and Gobla. He says large almost semi-circular pieces with radii of from 2 to 3 miles have been cut out. The new town of Budanee, laid out in 1855, then considered safe, has long been carried away. New Gobla formed the following year, has also gone.

The description of the flood is given; the flood began to show itself about the end of June, when the river, by the Bukkur guage, had risen about 10 feet. It filled the Sind hollow, itself an old branch of the Indus, and overflowing its

banks from Hybut and Kundkote down to Ghowspoor and Shereghur, passed steadily and quietly on its westward course, till on the 28th July it met and was checked by the Sonewah, a canal running from the Biggaree due north, having high and strong banks. The pressure, however, was so great, it soon crossed this, reached Meerpoor, six miles further west, on the 3rd August, and by the 20th of that month, had come as far as the Noorwah, only 3 miles to the eastward of Jacobabad. Had the western bank given way, and if the flood had lasted much longer, it must have done so, the water would have continued its course with great force, much increased by the temporary restraint and the cantonment and the town of Jacobabad would have been in great peril. Extensive bunds would have saved it, but there was little time to prepare them.

The pressure on the western bank near Jacobabad was lessened by judicious measures adopted by Captain Briggs, Asst. Political Superintendent, who was on the spot. Openings were made on both the sides of the Noorwah, where it crossed a large natural hollow to the north of Jacobabad This lessened the water in the canal. The mouth of the Noor wah was then closed, shutting it off from the Biggarree, and only the flood water admitted into the canal.

Previously two openings were made in the west bank of the upper portion of the Noorwah near Beloochabad to let the flood cross into low land about Abad and Janeedera, to divert it from Jacobabad. The former of these two villages was nearly washed away, the latter was not injured.

At that time all to the eastward of the Noorwah from the bridge on the Ooch road to the Biggaree, some 16 miles, was one large sheet of water, 2 to 3 feet deep, and this extended the whole way to Gobla and Budanee, on the Indus 60 and 58 miles distant respectively. The river began to fall after the 3rd September, it was not till the 8th any perceptible difference occurred in the level of the flood near Jacobabad.

Injury to crops.—Little injury was done to the Kurreef crops, but the more extensive and profitable Rabi crops will amply repay the Zamindars. The damage to fields occurred in the Meerpoor and Moobarickpoor Tuppahs.

13 villages and hamlets have been washed away in the same Tuppahs, the loss is very small, *viz.* Rs. 1,803-4-0, the details will be given below. There will be a larger crop of Rabi crop that year, and grants of land for one year had been given to applicants. Near Noorwah, wheat and mustard fields were standing where the villages of Alipoor and Sukey-ke-joo were standing.

The outposts of Kundkote and Tungwanee were again surrounded with water, but the bunds stood the test.

Great damage was made to roads and bridges. The bridge over the Baggarree near Turt-ke-Musjid was so much injured that it required to be rebuilt. The banks of the Sonewah and Noorwah required extra repairs.

A sanction for Rs. 2,800 was asked for repairs:

1.	For extra repairs to trunk and cross roads	Rs. 1,000
2.	Rebuilding bridge at Turt-ke-Musjid over Biggaree	„ 800
3.	Extra repairs to Noorwah and Sonewah canals Rs. 500 each	„ 1,000
	Total Rs.	**2,800**

In addition to the overflowing of Frontier Districts the river also broke into the Shikarpoor Districts below, between the Baggarree and the Sind canal. This flood was at first entirely distinct from the upper one, leaving the river near Tegha-ke-Ghurree, and following the Mora Maree Dund. A large broad natural hollow extended from this, passing between Soorja-ke-Gote and Khanpoor, by Sooltan-ke-Ghote and Yasseen-ke-Ghurree, eight miles to the westward of Shikarpoor. Between Mora and Soojra this hollow reached up to the Biggaree on the north, and close to the Sind Canal on the south. During August, when the floods were highest on either side, the banks of the Biggaree were not seen and the waters joined. Passing westward they came with tremendous force on the bund near Sooltan-ke-Ghote, where the Jacobabad and Shikarpoor road crossed the hollow mentioned above. Though this bund was well consolidated, 45 feet

broad at top, and 51 at base, having openings at intervals to pass the water through, it could not bear the pressure, but burst at the southern and near Lodra-ki-Bustee. This bursting was fortunate, for had the water not found a passage but been forced south, Shikarpoor, which was at a distance of 5 miles, would have been submerged.

The Sooltan-ke-Ghote bund was commenced by the late General Jacob in the cold season of 1853-54; the direct communication between Jacobabad and Shikarpoor was cut off by the overflow from the river. It was not properly finished in 1854, when the flood returned. By the inundation of 1855 it was completed; there was no overflow that season; from that time till 1861 no water has ever been near it. The entire length of the raised piece of road is more than 2½ miles. Ten pucca masonry openings were made in this, 12 span each, one having two arches and another three arches, each 16 feet span.

Statement showing the villages and hamlets washed away by the 1861 *flood in the Frontier Districts.*

Name of Village.	Value of property.	Remarks.
	Rs. as. p.	
Chandan	150 0 0	Near Mirpoor.
Hajeepoor	264 12 0	Near Meerzawah.
Dhowpoor	546 8 0	Do.
Bumbalabad	42 0 0	Do.
Sullimanpoor	nil	Jangewah branch from Meerzawah.
Shobdarpoor	405 0 0	Do.
Bagaypoor	103 0 0	Do.
Futtiahpoor	112 0 0	Do.
Tooshallpoor	35 0 0	Jellallwah from Meerzawah.
Kurreemabad	60 0 0	Do.
Surkee	15 0 0	Noorwah.
Jellallpoor	nil	Jellallwah.
Alipoor	70 0 0	Noorwah.
Total Rs. ..	1,803 4 0	

DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE SEVERE EARTHQUAKE FELT ON THE FRONTIER OF UPPER SIND ON 4th JANUARY, 1852.

By N. M. Billimoria.

Read before the Sind Historical Society on 24-9-1942.

It may be of interest to give a list of earthquakes that were felt in the year 1851:

17th January, 1851. A slight shock felt at many places in the Punjab.

2nd February, 1851. At Phooljee, near Sehwan.

4th February, 1851. At Lahore and Wazeerabad.

19th April, 1851. At 5 in the evening, three shocks were felt at Gwadir in Mekran; several houses were destroyed.

22nd and 27th April, 1851. Earthquakes felt at Oothul and Syaree in Sup-Beila.

Beloochistan, 13th December, 1851. At Shapoor in Cutchee, at the foot of the Muree Hills.

24th January, 1852, which destroyed Kahun, the chief town of the Murrees.

Lt. W. Merewether had reported to Major John Jacob that the shock was felt at Khanghur, early in the morning at 3-45. The direction was east and west, and the day succeeding it was cloudy. The shock was slight and did not affect the buildings in the neighbourhood.

On the 24th January at 4 early in the morning a very severe shock was felt at Kahun, the principal Fort in the Murree Hills and the residence of the chief and main portion of that tribe. The effect was that one side of the Fort-wall was thrown down, the remainder much shattered, and the greater number of houses inside overthrown, burying beneath the ruins many men, women and children, with some cattle and property. Deen Mahomed the chief of the tribe appears

to have had a miraculous escape; the house in which he lived fell with the others; men being killed on either side of him; he was saved because the portion of the house immediately above him remained firm till the quake ceased, when he was found half buried under the ruins. Most of the private houses, shops of Banias within the Fort either fell to the ground or were so shaken that it was considered unsafe to remain any longer therein. Deen Mahomed, his family and other residents of Kahun left the place and went to a small fort, not far distant, called Dost Ali's Kotela. Kahun was considered unlucky and the people were so superstitious that it will never again be inhabited by them. At the same time another even more fearful calamity overtook the tribe, who were living in a large cave with their cattle at a little distance to the north. The hill in which the cave was violently shaken, fell burying every living being within it. By the fall of the hill the road by Nuffoosk to Kahun was completely closed. A considerable increase in the flow of water in the Lahree river had taken place; so much so that water came where it had never come before. About 260 Mussalmans, men, women and children had been killed, also more than 80 Hindus with a large amount of cattle. The disastrous effects from this earthquake had been confined to the Murree Hills.

The Murree chiefs had assembled to proceed to Gundava to make their submission to H. H. the Khan of Kelat; they had proceeded some distance, but on hearing of this disaster they returned. They wanted to abandon the hills to which a curse seemed attached, and to apply to the Khan of Kelat for permission to reside in the plains near Gundava, Dadur, or Lahree. Two persons of note have lost their lives in this quake:—A son of Gonim Khan (cousin of Deen Mahomed), and an influential Syed named Lall Shah. The earthquake appears to have been felt throughout Cutchee; at Gundava, Dadur, Dhagh, Lahree, Pooljee, Chuttur etc. at the same time as it was at Khanghur and Kahun, at 4 in the morning on the 24th January. A resident of Chuttur, who was fully awake at the time the earthquake took place, declared that there were three perfectly distinct shocks perceptible, a few seconds intervening between each.

The shock was not felt anywhere in the South, nor at Kelat or Western Baluchistan.

The word "Kahun" reminds of the able article written by Mr. Lambrick "The Marri Rising," reported in the Journal of "The Sind Historical Society, Vol. II., part 2, pages 1 to 70." I quote two paras from this article: "Official recognition of Brown's services came in his removal to staff employ. He was made Brigade Major to the force of Sind—"appointment which however inadequate it may be considered, as the result of your meritorious conduct will, His Excellency hopes, be viewed by you as a testimony of his approbation." Subsequently on April 5th, 1841, he became Brigade Major at Poona, where many who now pass every day down 'Kahun road' may wonder idly what was the origin of its strange name. We last hear of him as Political Agent, Palanpur in 1842-43.

The kettle-drums captured by the Bugtis from a Sikh army still hang in the shrine of Sori Khushtak, but the Maris can now show no trophies of the most memorable day in their history. The small-arms and equipment stripped from the dead of Clibborn's force were stored in a cave on the Kodi plateau to the north-West of the battlefield, together with much gunpowder. Tradition says that the '*chokidar*' died without passing on the secret of the entrance. It is more probable that the earthquake which on the 24th January, 1852, laid Brown's Kuhan in ruins blocked up the cave. And successive Sardars of the tribe have searched for it in vain.

THE MIRS AND THE INDUS TOLLS.

BY H. T. LAMBRICK, I.C.S.

Read before the Sind Historical Society on 22-10-1942.

The levy of tolls by the Mirs of Hyderabad on boats plying on the Indus, in alleged contravention of the treaty of 1839, though not one of the main grounds on which Lord Ellenborough sought to impose a further and penal treaty on them, was one of the complaints preferred against them by Sir Charles Napier when he visited Hyderabad in September 1842: and being connected with the policy of stimulating trade on the River which, inherited from Bentinck, was the underplot of Lord Auckland's Afghanistan venture, may be considered as directly linking the exclamation of the Syed who witnessed Burnes' survey in 1831—

"Alas, Sind is now gone, for the English have seen the river"—with the Governor-General's notification of March 5th, 1843. "Thus has victory placed at the disposal of the British Government the country on both banks of the Indus, from Sukkur to the sea.....it will be the first object of the Governor-General to use the power victory has placed in his hands in the manner most conducive to the freedom of trade, and to the prosperity of the people of Scind, so long misgoverned."

The state of affairs on the River, as Napier found it, had prevailed ever since the treaty of 1839 was signed: the Mirs interpreting its XIth clause in one sense, and the British Political authorities in another. The following correspondence extracted from the records of the Commissioner-in-Sind, describes the first open clash between the two, and deserves record also as illustrating the characters of those who held the stage in the last troublous years of the Talpurs' rule.

From Captain J. Outram, Political Agent, Lower Scinde to T. Maddock, Esquire, Secretary to the Government of India.

HYDERABAD, 11th May, 1840.

"Sir—The representation of Meer Sher Mahomed alluded to, in my diary of the 4th instant, regarding subjects of Scinde-evading his dues, obliges me to solicit the instructions of the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General of India in Council, as to how far that Chief is to be restricted by the provisions of the new treaty with the four Ameers of Hyderabad, of 14 articles, to which he is not a party although, as a subject or member of the former General Government of Scinde, he was I presume bound by the former commercial treaties of 1832 and 1834; that chief's separation from and independence of the others being now virtually admitted by my predecessor having tendered a separate treaty to him, at the same as to the other Ameers. (2) The former treaties by which the Meerpoor chief considers himself bound relate only to foreign merchants, the British Government having requested "a passage for the merchants and traders of Hindustan by the rivers and roads of Scinde, by which they may transport their merchandize from one country to another," and Meer Sher Mahomed states, that he scrupulously abstains from interfering with foreign merchants, but that he never agreed to exempt Scinde merchants from what they had always been accustomed to pay, and which in fact is the principal source of his revenue. (3) Within the last few days Jethanand, my Native agent, has made known to me that the Ameers of Hyderabad also consider, that the same right they have always heretofore exercised, still continues to them, of levying duties from their own subjects transporting merchandise by the *Indus*. He says, that the Ameers have always understood, that the 11th and 12th Articles of the New treaty, merely confirmed the former Commercial treaty which applied to foreign merchants alone; for that they never understood the new treaty to interfere in any way with the transit duties they have always been accustomed to exact from their own subjects, and that besides, they read the 11th article as only applying to Merchants entering the river "from the Sea," or from beyond their own territory "from the northward."

(4) I might have been deceived by this, seeing that the same right over their subjects is exercised by the Khyrpoor and Bhawulpur Chiefs, and believing, that it could not have been the intention of the Right Honourable the Governor-General to enforce harsher terms on the Hyderabad Government—or at least, on Meer Sobdar, who suffers equally with

the other Ameers by the measure in question, than what are *exacted* from the above mentioned states, similarly situated in their relations to the British Government, had I not found that the late Resident took a very different view of the question and peremptorily directed through Lieut. Eastwick (by private letter of instructions dated 29th November last) that "no Custom duties or fines are to be levied on any goods, *no matter who the owners are*, going or coming by the Indus" which, that gentleman must have communicated through the Native Agent, he being then too unwell to visit the Durbar personally.

(5) On my questioning the Native Agent, as to the practice that prevails and what messages he had delivered to their Highnesses, relating to the exaction of duties from their own subjects, he informed me, that the Ameers have continued to levy them as heretofore, although *advised* by him that it would ultimately tend to their own advantage to abolish these altogether: this he told me, he had been instructed to do, but he purposely concealed from me that besides the orders from the late Resident, to Lieut. Eastwick above alluded to (which I assume to have been, of course, communicated to Jethanand) he had received *repeated* and *positive* orders from Colonel Pottinger *direct*, to prohibit the levy of *any duties* from *any person*, and on *any property* whatsoever, in boats plying up and down the river, which I have ascertained to be the case on examining the Native records, since led to suspect the integrity of the Native Agent.

(6) It is evident that the Native Agent endeavoured to deceive me, to benefit the Ameers, or he has deceived their Highnesses by omitting to deliver Colonel Pottinger's prohibition to levy duties from their own subjects, which they have continued to do uninterruptedly. The former is most probably the case, as more likely to secure advantage to himself, but in either case, it shows that he is no longer to be depended upon, and the probability that my predecessor's suspicions (which Colonel Pottinger communicated to me) that Jethanand has been tampered with, and gained over to Meer Noor Mahomed's interests, are well grounded. Under such circumstance I can no longer place confidence in this person, or employ him as a medium of intercourse with their Highnesses. I shall consider it my duty therefore to suspend Jethanand from his office of Native Agent, pending His Lordship's

instructions, after having confronted him with the Ameers, which I shall have an oppertunity of doing on joining their Highnesses at a hunting party on the 15th instant.'

(7) It is with much diffidence, but from an imperative sense of duty, that I now beg most respectfully and submissively to offer my opinion on the subject in question. It appears to me very possible that the Ameer may have understood the 11th and 12th Articles of the new treaty to be merely confirmatory of the *former* commercial treaties, and that they really never did contemplate that these articles had any reference to subjects of Scinde, especially as the 5th article provides for the "absolute" rule of the Ameers over their own subjects; otherwise I do not think it possible they would have omitted to protest against such an arrangement, which deprives them of their principal source of revenue, besides in a great measure undermining their authority over their own subjects, when they so pertinaciously persisted in objecting to other, and these—to them—far less important provisions of the new treaty: and as far as I can ascertain either from the Native Agent, or from Pitambar the Residency Moonshee, through whom, or in whose presence, all Colonel Pottinger's discussions were carried on, it does not appear that this question was ever mooted even, as if it was never suspected by the Hyderabad Government that such could be the intention of those clauses of the treaty.

(8) Were Commerce on the Indus likely to be much impeded or injured by the same unrestrained control of the Ameers of Hyderabad over their own subjects, which the other states on the Indus maintain, I should be loath to concede this point; but I believe that it would not prove detrimental in the slightest degree, and that on the contrary it would by throwing the whole commerce into the hands of foreign merchants be the means of encouraging the latter and enticing them into this channel, which is the great object to effect in the first instance; afterwards, the evil would correct itself, as the Scinde Government could not long remain blind to the loss of revenue, which must soon become apparent, from excluding its own people from participation in the benefits of the trade, which such exactions must effectually do.

(9) The chief objection, to the exercise by the Ameers of the power to taxing their own boats, appears to me, that, pointed out in the 7th para of my letter to your address dated

3rd March last (No. 74)—*i.e.*, the practice I understand to prevail, of taxing empty boats after discharging the cargoes of foreign merchants; but this, I find, could easily be guarded against, and pledges to abstain from the practice might be exacted from the Ameers, as the price of the concession, which I beg most respectfully to recommend as just, and politic:—Just, because it would place them on a footing with those of Upper Scinde and other States on the Indus similarly situated: and Politic, because the interference between the Ameers and their subjects, which I deprecate, must at all times be a source of heart-burning to them, especially as they see other and in their opinion inferior States in their immediate neighbourhood exempted from such interference; because it must appear to them an immediate and very serious pecuniary sacrifice for which *they* cannot be made to comprehend the possibility of any prospective compensation: because Meer Sobdar Khan, whom it is the object of the British Government to benefit by its protection, will consider himself injured on the contrary, and an equal sufferer with the rest; and because his ally, Sher Mahomed of Meerpoor, whom it is an object to conciliate, must be compelled to the same relinquishment of his dues from subjects of Scinde as the Ameers of Hyderabad have literally bound themselves to, should His Lordship the Governor-General so understand the spirit of the new Treaty, and direct its enforcement accordingly, which I am convinced would cause extreme discontent, much bickering, and frequent disturbances, more than counterbalancing any advantages that would accrue from granting the freedom of the river to the subjects of Scinde.

(10) In conclusion, and in support of these views, which I consider myself bound in duty to submit for the consideration of the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General of India in Council, I may be permitted to quote the words of the enlightened statesman Franklin:—

"To me, it seems, that neither the obtaining nor retaining of any trade, however valuable, is an object for which men may justly spill each other's blood, that the true and sure means of extending and securing commerce is the goodness and cheapness of commodities, and that the profit of no trade can ever be equal to the expense of compelling it, and of holding it by fleets and armies."—I have, etc.,

J. Outram, P.-A Lower Scinde.

P. S.—I beg leave to hand up on this occasion, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, copies of recent correspondence with the P. A., Cutch, displaying a system of illiberality towards commerce in what are here considered British Ports, which cannot fail to be contrasted with the very liberal conceptions in favour of commerce required from themselves by the British Government."

J. O.

The case referred to by Outram was as follows:—

He had sent to the Political Agent, Cutch a petition received from the Gumashta of a merchant named Mahomed Rahim, requesting the restoration of property taken from him at Cutch Mandvi under peculiar circumstances.

Colonel Melvill, the Political Agent, replied on the 30th April 1840, that the boat in question, bound from Bombay to Shahbandar, had put into Mandvi under stress of weather, and remained there for three or four days. The supercargo took the papers to the Karbari of the Port, expressing his desire to leave as soon as possible without landing any goods. The karbari however said that Port and other dues must first be paid, and the super-cargo was compelled to pay them, which he did in bags of sugar at a valuation by local mashirs.

By the laws of Cutch, every boat coming into a Cutch port because liable for Port *and Customs* duties on cargo, whencesoever coming, and wheresoever going. Bombay Merchants had petitioned Government in September 1839, and the Resident had been directed to inform the Rao that charging duties on vessels bound for Sind, and entering his ports under stress or weather, "would be considered at variance with the usual liberality of His Highness"; but the Rao, considering the injury to his revenues involved, declined to make any alteration in the ancient land of his country. Melvill therefore expressed his inability to interfere.

Outram to Maddock, Hyderabad, 22nd May, 1840.

"Sir.—I have now the honour to report for the information of the Rt. Hon: the Governor-General of India in Council, the substance of my conference with Meers Noor Mahomed and Nusseer Khan, on board their Highnesses' state barge on the 17th instant, alluded to in my diary of that date.

2. On my presenting His Lordship's letters to the Ameers transmitted with yours dated 13th ultimo, I intimated my wish to converse with their Highnesses for a few minutes, if not inconvenient, to which they most readily assented, and requested me to retire with them to the rear cabin, that we might be more private, and allowing no person to accompany us except Meer Shadad. I desired, however, that the Native Agent Jethanand might be admitted, and he was called in accordingly. I commenced by informing their Highnesses, "that notwithstanding their agreement by Treaty, to exact no duties whatever on boats and goods passing up and down the Indus, that I was well aware that they had continued to do so, as heretofore, ever since the treaty was signed." Meer Noor Mahomed, who acted as spokesman throughout was, or pretended to be, surprised at this accusation, declaring that he had scrupulously adhered to the terms of the treaty in permitting all foreign goods, belonging to foreign merchants, to pass free, whether entering the river from above or from below.

P. *A.*—Yes! but the Treaty pledges you to exact no Tolls *whatever*, from any one, passing up or down the River; but your officers do so to this day from all natives of Scinde carrying the products of Scinde.

Ameer.—Certainly, it was never agreed that any alteration should take place regarding our own subjects—on the contrary, the treaty stipulates that we shall exercise absolute control over our own people.

P. *A.*—Article XI of the treaty specifies that no toll will be levied on trading boats passing up or down the river, without any exemption being specified to natives of Scinde, which would have been, had such been intended.

Ameers.—The present treaty merely confirms the former commercial treaties, the new treaty was not caused by these matters calling for any change, on the contrary, not one word was ever said by Colonel Pottinger regarding any alterations being required in the river arrangement, and we certainly never unerstood that there was to be any alteration—if so, we certainly should have complained against what would deprive us of all our revenues, for if our own people also are allowed to carry goods up or down the river without payment, what will become of our land duties on camels and donkies

carrying merchandise, for they will never be used in that case, and we should be great sufferers.

P. A.—The benefit will soon be seen, of opening the river to your own people as well as foreigners, otherwise they will be shut out from the benefit of the trade altogether, for they will be undersold by foreign merchants landing goods, and paying the customary tolls, which would still be much cheaper than what the Scindian merchants could afford to sell it, who is subject to land transit duties besides."

Ameer.—That may be, but in the meantime how are we to live? We desire no advantage from foreign commerce, and if what we always got from our own subjects is taken away, how can we exist, for the taxes on Scinde boats, and produce is all our revenue.

P. *A.*—At first, there might be apparent loss, but ultimate benefit will be great, and is certain."

(4) This their Highnesses did not appear at all to believe, and turning to Jethanand, I asked him, "how he understood the treaty with regard to this point?" He answered most readily, as applying only to foreign merchants, and property coming in from the sea, or down from above.

P. A.—"How was it in that case that Colonel Pottinger called upon you to recover, and you *did* so, the duties which had been levied on indigo by Sher Mahomed some time ago.

Native Agent.—That was Mooltan indigo, and therefore foreign.

P. A.—Have the Ameers continued always to levy duties from Scinde people as before ?

Native Agent.—No Scinde cargoes of any value are brought down the river, they generally go by land.

P. A.—But if they can come free by the river, why should they go by land?

N. A.—They have not been allowed to come free.

P. A.—Who has hindered them?

N. A.—I suppose the Ameers.

P. A.—Did you ever report this to Col. Pottinger?

N. A.—There was no occasion.

P. A.—Are Scinde boats always taxed as heretofore?

N. A.—There has been no alteration regarding the Scinde people.

P. A.—Did you never convey any positive prohibition from Col. Pottinger to the Ameers against their taxing any boats whatever?

N. A.—I advised them that it would be ultimately for their benefit to make the river free to their own subjects."

(5) I then turned to their Highness and asked them, if they were not aware from Jethanand that Colonel Pottinger had positively prohibited their levying any duties on *any* boats passing up or down the river, no matter *who their owners are*?

Ameer:—Most certainly not, had he told me so, I would have written to Col. Pottinger about it."

I then said to Jethanand: "How do you account for this? I find letters in the daftar, addressed by Col. Pottinger to you, through Petamber Moonshee, reiterating orders previously given to *you* personally, to the above effect, dated 26th April, and 27th September last year. Again, the Col. sent some such orders to Mr. Leckie, who must have communicated them to you, and, I see in a letter to Mr. Eastwick, dated 29th November, when that gentleman was at Hyderabad, the same positive prohibition, which he certainly must have mentioned to you. How is it, therefore, that in your daily intercourse with their Highnesses, you never made this known to them and how is it, that when I asked you on several occasions what practice prevailed, that you suppressed your knowledge that it continued, in opposition to Col. Pottinger's orders to you to call on their Highnesses to *discontinue* it? and, that you endeavoured to lead me to suppose that such had never been intended? How is this?

Native Agent.—You say Col. Pottinger wrote the same to Mr. Eastwick; why did *he* not tell the Ameers?

P. A.—I believe that gentleman had no personal interview with their Highnesses, after that date, as he was obliged to go away sick shortly afterwards, and if he had occasion to communicate such a message, he must have done it through you: but Col. Pottinger's letter to Lieutenant Eastwick was merely an answer to a question from that gentleman, whom you may not have made acquainted with the prevailing practice, regarding which you ardently wished to blind me,—and who therefore may not have seen occasion to discuss the matter: but that does not alter *your* case, who had repeated and positive orders direct from Col. Pottinger on the above subject, as well as through Lieuts. Leckie and Eastwick—what your motive may have been for withholding these orders, and endeavouring to deceive me, is immaterial: Such is the fact."

Then turning to the Ameers, I said: "Your Highnesses, who are now aware of these circumstances, must see, that I can never hereafter place sufficient confidence in this man, to allow him to be the medium of communication between us, consequently I am compelled in justice to you, as well as in duty to my superiors, to suspend Jethanand from all employment, until the orders of the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General are received. In future, I shall always communicate whatever is of importance in person to Your Highnesses, and I request you will have no scruple to send for me, whenever you have doubts on any subject, or wish to consult me, it will give me pleasure to visit you at all times, and there can be no occasion to employ third person to pass between us, except in trifling matters—these sort of people too often thrive by making mischief, to render themselves of *consequence* and necessary: but I trust that Your Highnesses will always place your confidence in me freely, and without reserve declare your sentiments on all occasions, which I will make known to His Lordship if proper; if not, will candidly give you my opinion to the contrary. In this particular case I shall inform His Lordship all that has passed, but I will not conceal from you that the treaty most certainly, as it now stands, clearly exempts all boats from tolls; that continuing to exact from your own people will throw them out of the market, and eventually prove injurious to your revenues, whereas they by throwing the river open to them, you will secure after advantages. The very letters which I have today delivered to you imply His Lordship's sense of the advantage of total exemption, but your Highnesses' ideas on the subject shall be fully communicated, under the impression, that you have been wilfully kept in ignorance by the Native Agent of the view of

the British Government on the subject, which may excuse you now at this late hour referring the point for the consideration of the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General, although His Lordship will be surprised that the meaning of the article could ever have been doubtful."

(6) That Meer Nur Mahomed, if not the other Ameers, was fully aware of the real meaning of the treaty I have little doubt, but ascertaining from Jethanand that there was no chance of Col. Pottinger ever conceding the point in question, he had purposely abstained from pushing the matter to issue, aided by the Native Agent who, (I find in looking over his letters to Col. Pottinger) studiously avoided any mention of the prevalence of the practice or the sentiments of the Ameers on the subject, after one futile *attempt* to advocate non-interference with subjects of Scinde, in a letter not dated but received by Col. Pottinger on the 26th April last year, although that gentleman's reiterated orders on the subject ought to have elicited an explicit disclosure of the Ameers' object, had not Jethanand been bribed to their interests; as he could not possibly have been ignorant of it.

(7) Notwithstanding my conviction that the Ameers' assertion, that they never understood the treaty, is false, although such is possible—I am still nevertheless of the opinion which I formerly expressed, and respectfully beg leave here to repeat, that no good can arise from the *literal* application of the XIth article, as exempting *all* merchandise and properly from tolls or the river, throughout Lower Scinde, that it is impolitic to bind these chiefs to different terms to what have been required from the other States similarly situated, (with) which treaties were made at the same time, that, no check to general commerce will be the effect of allowing these Ameers to tax their own subjects trading on the river, in the same manner as is allowed to the other chiefs above alluded to, but that by insisting on adhering to the strict wording of the article in question, we should render utterly hopeless the task of reconciling this Government to its connection with the British Power.

(8) Should the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General of India be of opinion that this point should be conceded, I would respectfully suggest that it be granted only as a gracious boon, and on certain conditions calculated to prevent the exercise of the control of the Ameers over their own boats in any way interfering with foreign merchandise embarked thereon.

(9) In conclusion I beg to recommend that the office of Native Agent at Hyderabad be *abolished*, which I consider may be dispensed with advantage, being of opinion that no verbal intercourse with the Ameers should be carried on except by the P. A. or his Assistants personally, and that where this is not practicable, written "Yads" should be interchanged between the Agent, and their Highnesses' to prevent the possibility of misunderstandings and after denials."

I have etc.,—J. Outram, P.A. Lower Scinde.

From H. Torrens, Secretary to the Government of India, to J. Outram, P. A. Lower Sind—No. 382, Confidential Dept:

FORT WILLIAM, 22nd June.

(Acknowledges letters of 11th and 22nd May *re*: Tolls, and Native Agents' affairs.)

"On the former question, it is necesary in the first instance to remark that the Ameers of Hyderabad are not as a mattee of *right* to be considered as being, in respect to duties on the Indus, in any degree in the same position as the Ameers of Khyrpore or the Nawab of Bahawalpore, and it is of importance to explain the distinction which exists on the subject, as you illustrate your view of the fair pretensions of the Ameers by comparing them with the privileges said to be exercised by the other Rulers referred to; the Khyrpore Chiefs relinquished such duties within their dominions by a voluntary concession, and their intention in the relinquishment may be fairly to be judged from the manner in which the local British authorities have allowed practical effect to be given to the boon.

The Nuwab of Buhawalpore retains his right to levy duties on the river within his limits, as it was declared by the treaties of 1833 and 1835, with the modifications to which, for the greater encouragement of trade, he may, it is confidently hoped, now agree.

But the Ameers of Hyderabad had, by their conduct, compelled the British Government to regard them as having forfeited its friendship, and one of the conditions on which they were admitted to reconciliation was that the navigation of the Indus in its course through their country, should be rendered prefectly free. Undoubtedly, the understanding of

Digitized by M. H. Panhwar Institute of Sindh Studies, Jamshoro.

the British Government, in laying down that condition, was that no duty should be levied upon any goods or persons whatever, passing on the Indus. Such also was, as you state, the clear understanding and intention of Sir Henry Pottinger, who negotiated the new Treaty. And such, too, is the explicit declaration of the eleventh article of the treaty which is in these words.—"No duty will be levied on trading boats passing up or down the river Indus, from the sea to the northern most point of that stream within the territories of the Ameers of Hyderabad."

(3) It might be apprehended that if the British Government were to concede to the Ameers the indulgence of taxing the products of lower Sinde, room would be afforded for the most vexatious impediments being interposed to the free transit of Foreign goods. For those goods could scarcely otherwise be loaded than on boats owned by subjects of the country, and if the privilege claimed be admitted, these boats will necessarily be liable to detention and search with a view to discover whether any portion of their cargo consists of country goods.

(4) On the whole, the Governor-General in Council is satisfied that such taxes as the Ameers may think it expedient to impose on the property of their own subjects should be levied as the Treaty permits, on shore, and before embarking their goods, or after their disembarkation—and it is especially requisite that the practice mentioned by you, of taxing empty boats after the discharge of foreign cargoes, which is a plain evasion of the most distinct and important agreement of the commercial part of the new treaty, should be wholly abandoned. You will also take every favourable opportunity for pointing out to the Ameers the mischievous consequences to their subjects and territories which must arise from hampering the commercial transactions of their own people by imposts from which those of Foreigners are exempted.

(5) The practice, on the point under consideration, of the Khyrpore Government, is not material to the question which has been decided by the preceding instructions. But copies of the correspondence will be sent to the P.A. in Upper Scinde in order that an authentic report may be obtained of the nature and effects of that practice.

(6) With Meer Sher Mahomed, who is not expressly included as a party to the New Treaty of Hyderabad, the case may appear to be in some respects different, and His Lordship in Council would desire, in the first instance, to be informed of the exact limits within which this Chief exercises authority on both banks of the main course of the River, or any of its Branches, and whether any portion of the rights which he claims may be conceded to him, without the same general inconvenience to traffic which would be caused by such a concession to the other Ameers: yet his Lordship in Council is not inclined to admit the validity of claim even in his case.

The agreement with Sir Henry Pottinger, on which the treaty was founded, was made by those who had previously exercised the Collective Government of Lower Sinde. The condition of the Treaty is that no toll shall be levied from the sea upwards within the territories of the Ameers of Hyderabad, and it could ill be borne that a subordinate chief who at the date of the agreement, was, as you remark, regarded as a subject or member of the General Government of Sinde—should now stand upon his supposed independence, and separating himself from the Ameers, impede and impair the beneficial effects of this great public measure.

The subsequent tender to Meer Sher Mahomed of a separate treaty can scarcely be construed as affecting his position in regard to this general emancipation of the river from Toll:—for it was only under the Treaty of March 1839, by which tolls were intended to be altogether abolished, that the separate independence of the Chiefs of Sinde was established. You will with these considerations before you bear in mind the very great importance which His Lordship in Council attaches to this navigation, and you will endeavour at once to maintain its freedom, and to reconcile the Chiefs of Scinde to conditions which are required for the security of general commerce, and will be most conducive to their own real interests.

(7) The conduct of the Native Agent Jethanand, as described by you, appears open to much suspicion. But before finally sanctioning his dismissal as unworthy of confidence, the Governor-General in Council would think it right that you should require and submit from that person, a written reply to the specific allegations of neglects and violations of duty which you mention. His Lordship in Council agrees that the Office of Native Agent is not now necessary, a British Resident being permanently fixed at Hyderabad."

H. Torrens.

But it does not appear that any serious effort was made by the Government of India to induce the rulers of Bahawalpur and Khairpur to discontinue the levy of river tolls in their territories during the next two years and more.

Exactly a century ago, Sir Charles Napier, in the course of his historic review of the situation in Sind, wrote to Lord Ellenborough:

"The second point to which Major Outram has drawn my attention is a very strong one. He tells me, the tribes on the river, above that part possessed by the Ameers of Scinde, do levy tolls, and that there is no treaty or public document forthcoming in virtue of which we can call on the Ameers even of Upper Scinde not to levy tolls on their own subjects. It is evident therefore that to call on the Ameers of Hyderabad to desist from levying tolls, and to allow the tribes above them on the river to do so, would be unjust; that is to say, it would be unjust to allow the others to levy tolls, but not unjust to prevent the Ameers from doing so. The answer to the argument 'that tolls are levied on the Northern Indus' is just this. Say to those Northern tribes 'We have, with great trouble, secured to your boats a free passage on the river through Scinde; we are resolved to open the commerce of that great highway of nations; and you, who receive benefit thereby, must join in this measure leading to the good of all, and to the loss of none.' Wherefore to excuse the Ameers upon the ground that others are not equally coerced, is answered by coercing the others."

But long before such consistency was introduced in this policy, of coercion to enforce freedom of trade on a river in which the real obstacles to traffic are ever shifting sand banks, whirlpools, and the hidden snags of uprooted babul trees, the Mirs' regime had been subverted. In the century which has all but passed since that event, the efforts of Sind's rulers have been directed not to the freeing of the Indus, but its coercion, for irrigation : and though the mighty stream may still occasionally burst free from guidance, as we have seen to our cost this year, the collar of the Sukkur Barrage is firmly about its neck, and the taming of the "Mitho Darya," which has so benefitted the people of Sind, may be held to justify the means by which the power over it was acquired.

Hyderabad,

October 1st 1942.

THE INDIAN NAVY—A REVIEW OF ITS ACTIVITIES IN SIND AND ON THE ADJACENT COASTS 1615-1863.

By Commander R. D. MERRIMAN, R.I.N.

Read before the Sind Historical Society on 26-11-1942.

The approaching centenary of the Battle of Meanee, Feb. 17th, 1843, which virtually settled the conquest of Sind, suggests a review of the part played by the H.E.I.C.'s Navy not only on that occasion, but over a period of more than 200 years beforehand.

It is perhaps inevitable in India, where the Military element so greatly outnumbers the Naval, the work of the latter, performed as so much of it must needs be, out of sight of the landsman, tends to be unnoticed or forgotten.

This is the more to be regretted when the ultimate dependence of India on Sea Power is realised. The British Empire in India was founded and maintained as the result of supremacy at sea and it is hardly too much to say that the Conquest of Sind depended very largely on this supremacy, for, neither could the troops have been safely transported from Bombay to the scene of operations nor maintained in the field, had not the navy (both Royal and Company's) provided ships and guaranteed the safety of the sea communications.

Before a landing on an enemy coast can be achieved, the area must be surveyed, and before the survey can be effectively carried out, the neighbouring waters must be cleared of the enemy. It will therefore be convenient for purposes of this review, to consider Naval activities in Sind under these three headings.

I. Suppression of Piracy.

From the earliest days of the British connection with India, one of the principal pre-occupations of the H. E. I. C. was the protection of the sea-borne trade against pirates. From the early 17th to the first quarter of the 19th century the menace recurrs again and again, being perhaps at its worst in the late 17th and the early 18th centuries, when the depre-

dations of European renegades and freebooters such as Kidd, Teach and Avery added to that of the local variety rendered peaceful trade in Indian waters well-nigh impossible.

The ships of the Royal Navy were rarely seen in these waters in those early days, and it was to counter the menace of piracy that the H. E. I. C. almost as soon as the first Factory was established at Surat, formed a small squadron of country craft, armed them and manned them with crews, partly British and partly Indian, and set them to escort the coastwise traffic in the Cutch, Sind and Cambay areas. (1)

With the growth of the H. E. I. C. and its rapidly expanding sphere of influence came the need for better and more numerous naval vessels, until, at the time of its disbandment in 1863 the Service which had begun in 1615 with 10 grabs and gallivats, showed a total strength of some 50 to 60 vessels ranging from Frigates to River gunboats. Its Flag had been seen from the Persian Gulf to China, its ships had been engaged in action with the Dutch, Portuguese and French, and with Arab, Sanganian and Malabar Pirates and the marine surveys carried out by its officers are still commemorated on almost every chart in Indian Waters.

Operations against pirates frequently took the form of encounters between a single ship of the H. C. and a swarm of hostile country craft, for the pirates seldom attacked unless they were in overwhelming majority. Low, in his "History of the Indian Navy" recounts many such actions. One, which occurred in the vicinity of the Gulf of Cutch in 1797 may suitably be referred to here.

A British trading vessel had been seized by the Hakim of Sonmeanee who refused to deliver it up. A small vessel of the H. C.'s Marine called the *Vigilant* mounting 6 guns and commanded by Lieut. Hayes, I. N. was therefore sent up from Bombay with orders to effect her release.

On the way, while crossing the entrance to the Gulf of Cutch, the *Vigilant* was attacked by four large and heavily manned sail of Sanganian Pirates. Adopting their usual tactics, the pirates laid their craft alongside the *Vigilant* two on each side, and attempted to board, but without success, for, after a spirited resistance which lasted for three hours the pirates cut their craft free and made off considerably the worst for their reception.

The strength of the H. C's Navy, however, was seldom commensurate with its needs. No sooner had an immediate threat been successfully dealt with, than a cold fit of economy resulted in a reduction off the Naval Establishment, with the inevitable result that the danger cropped up again.

This proved to be the case in 1811, when the Pirates at Beyt again became troublesome, necessitating a combined Naval and Military expedition to Kathyawar (1).

The Naval Squadron consisted of:—

H. C.'s Schooner *Zephyr*, Lieut. Blast, 8 guns.
H. C.'s Schooner *Sylph*, Lieut. Hardy, 8 guns.
H. C's Pattamar *Bhowany*, Midshipman Grant, 6 twelve-pounders, and 4 other armed Pattamars, each carrying 6 twelve-pounders.

While the military forces were employed at Beyt, the Naval Squadron carried out a highly successful operation at Lakhpat Creek, on the North side of the Gulf of Cutch, near Mandvi.

The pirates had taken up a strong position at the Fort of Nuranseer, under the guns of which they had ranged their craft. It was decided to attempt a "cutting out" operation, which was brilliantly carried out. The ships were stationed at the entrance to the Khori Creek (up which the pirates had withdrawn) to prevent the enemy escaping, and the boats of the squadron, with Midshipman Grant in command, rowed up the Creek and, after a determined dash under heavy fire from the pirate craft and the Fort, boarded and captured the three baghallas which were sheltering there. For this exploit, Midshipman Grant received the thanks of the Government of Bombay.

The campaign was brought to an end by an attack on the Fort of Navanagar by the Military, assisted by the Naval Forces (1).

It is impossible to mention piracy and the measures taken to suppress it in Sind, Cutch and Kathyawar without noticing the activities of the Joasmis. This Arb tribe had its stronghold at Ras-al-Khayma in the Persian Gulf, and from about 1797 until 1820 when it took a combined Naval and Military Force of considerable strength finally to crush it, remained, a thorn in the flesh of the trading community.

The Joasmi Fleet in the year 1809 was estimated to consist of some 63 large vessels and *eight hundred and thirteen* of smaller size; the whole manned by 19,000 men. (1)

The entire trade route from Basra to Bombay was harassed by these ruthless marauders, and harmless merchantmen on the Coasts of Sind and Cutch were frequent sufferers at their hands.

To quote Low...."What may be described as a reign of terror ensued upon the sea, and merchant vessels feared to leave any port without the escort of a ship of war, for the pirates had become so bloodthirsty from long immunity that, not satisfied with plundering ships, they massacred the crews. A shocking instance of this occurred on the Okhamandel Coast, whien some piratical craft boarded a pilgrim vessel having eighty souls on board, of whom forty were ruthlessly butchered, and the remainder, after being hacked about with a wanton barbarity, were permitted, with the exception of some women, to sink in the ship, which was scuttled; however, the poor wretches managed to keep the craft afloat and navigated her into Beyt, where they were duly cared for by the English Agent, but few of the survivors recovered from their wunds."

The pirates by no means had things all their own way, and shortly after the incident recounted above, they attempted to cut off a large baghala laden with treasure which was under convoy of the H. C.'s cruiser *Aurora* of 14 guns, but were beaten off and the convoy saved.

The measures taken by the H. C. to suppress the Joasmi, were intermittant and the force employed inadequate, so that a great deal of individual gallantry was displayed and innumerable single ship actions were fought to little permanent effect until the Supreme Government could be brought to the point of countenancing the expense necessary for the provision of a full scale expeditionary force which finally and for ever stamped out the pirates' haunt at Ras-al-Khayma in 1820. The story of this operation is well worth reading for its own sake as evidencing the strength of the pirate stronghold, and the ferocity with which it was defended, but is outside the scope of this paper.

There is one more episode affecting the area in which we are interested to be mentioned before we conclude this section on the suppression of piracy.

In the year 1825, owing to dissentions among the Amirs at Hyderabad, large bands of marauders from Sind proper, were believed to have received direct encouragement from Hyderabad to invade Cutch. A horde of about 3,000 including Sindhis, Meeanas, Kholis and others, crossed the Rann and threatened Bhuj (4). They sacked Anjar, but were eventually beaten off with the loss of their Chief, Tahar Lunai. It was necessary to reinforce our troops at Bhuj and also to provide a naval force to prevent a recrudescence of piracy among the seafaring populace on the neighbouring coast. The Cutch Field Force, consisting of 7,000 men under Brigadier M. Napier of H. M.'s 6th Foot was therefore landed at Mandvi from 4 transports, under the guns of the H. C.'s sloop-of-war *Amherst* 18 guns, and the H. C.'s brig. *Palinurus*, 8 guns. This timely demonstration had the effect of restoring order and a clash was avoided. (1).

II. THE MARITIME SURVEY.

With the expansion of British influence in Eastern waters came the need for more accurate charting of the coastline and the approaches thereto, the examination of new harbours and the detailed survey which is necessary before these can be developed for the use of shipping.

Throughout its long history and many vicissitudes the Survey Branch of the I.N. is the one activity which has continued unbroken from 1772 (when Lieuts. Blair and McClure were sent, with two ships to survey the Andaman Islands) to the present day. The achievements of the Surveying Branch are commemorated in the title plates of many Admiralty charts used by mariners today and range from Suez to New Zealand and from the Persian Gulf to the South Coast of China.

The earliest reference I have been able to find in connection with this neighbourhood is the survey of Karachi Harbour and the Mekran Coast carried out by Lieut. S. B. Haines, I.N., and the officers of the H. C.'s sloop *Benares*, 14 guns, in the season 1828-29. Though satisfactory results were achieved along the coast line, the survey of the Harbour of Karachi was a hurried and imperfect affair, owing to the hostility shown by the local authorities, who, possibly seeing in these activities the prelude to annexation did all they could to obstruct Haines. (1)

During the seasons of 1836, 1837, and 1838, however, the survey of the Mouths of the Indus, especially of the Khedywari and Hajamri Branches and of the main river itself were thoroughly carried out by Lieuts. Wood, Carless, Kempthorne, Grieve, Whitburn and others.

In 1836 Wood was appointed an assistant to the commercial mission of Sir Alexander Burns (then Capt. Burns) to Cabul. One of the objects of the mission was to examine and report on the state of the Indus and the prospects of opening it to navigation from its mouth to Attock. Wood not only carried out a careful survey of the River, but continued far beyond Attock on an adventurous and interesting journey to the Sources of the Oxus. After suffering much hardship and intense cold he achieved the ascent of the Bam-i-Dunniah, a 15,000 foot peak on the Pamir Plateau, on 19th February, 1838, whence he saw the frozen lake from the end of which issues the infant Oxus. Wood named this Lake Victoria in honour of the young Sovereign who had succeeded to the Throne in the preceding year. (6)

It may be of interest here to note that Wood's connection with Sind lasted for many years. He appears to have left the H. E. I. C.'s Service shortly after the expedition to the Oxus, and it seems possible that he had in some way incurred the displeasure of the Authorities, for when in 1849, Sir Charles Napier about to take up his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, India, aware of his unrivalled knowledge of Sind and of the Indus, asked for Wood's services, he was curtly refused. In 1858, however, when the Indus Flotilla ceased to exist as a Naval force, and the ships were handed over to be run by a commercial organisation, Wood was appointed as Superintendent, in which situation he was conspicuously successful. He died in 1871 after an illness in India as the result of overwork.

III. THE FINAL PHASE 1838-1863.

The surveys of the Mouths of the Indus proved of inestimable value in facilitating the landing of the Army of the Indus, under Sir John Keane in November 1838, for, as has been previously mentioned, the Harbour of Karachi was not yet in our hands, though its capture took place some three months later.

The portion of the Army intended for the march through Sind left Bombay on 17th November 1838, in several transports. A number of country craft were also engaged for the purpose of transferring the troops from the larger vessels to the shore on arrival. The whole convoy was escorted by the H. C.'s ships-of-war *Euphrates*, *Constance* and *Taptee*, the *Constance* having on board Sir J. Keane and Staff. The Convoy arrived off the Hajamree mouth on 23rd November and disembarked at Vikkur into the country craft, in which they were carried 28 miles upstream to Baminacote where a Camp was formed. (7)

From this time onward, until 1858, a Naval Flotilla was maintained on the Indus, with Head Quarters at Khotri. In 1843, during Sir Charles Napier's Campaign, the Flotilla consisted of the gunboats *Planet*, *Comet*, *Satellite*, *Meteor* and *Nimrod* together with a few "flats" or houseboats which could be towed alongside.. The Indian Navy List for 1858 shows the strength of the Indus Flotilla as 17 river gunboats and 9 flats.

The gunboats were shallow draft, paddle wheel craft, ranging from 150 tons and 40 horse power to 610 tons and 120 horse power, and each mounting two guns. Their war-time complements appear to have consisted of two officers and a ships company of sixteen European and twenty-two Indian ratings. In addition, during the 1843 campaign, each vessel carried a small detachment of 5 sepoys of the Marine Battalion. This Battalion, which was formed in 1777 served continuously in the H. C's ships-of-war and was an integral part of the Naval Service in which it had a long and distinguished record.

The vessels of the Indus Flotilla, apart from active participation in warlike operations, was entrusted with the maintainance of communications by River, the transport of troops and stores, and the evacuation of the wounded to the base.

This brief digression has been necessary in order to outline the formation, scope and service of the Indus Flotilla, but we must now cast back to the year 1838 at the conclusion of which, it will be remembered, the Army of the Indus had been transported to and disembarked at the Hajamree Mouth.

The vastly superior facilities of Karachi as a harbour were, by this time, fully recognised, and, on the 1st February, 1839, H.M.S. *Wellesley* wearing the Flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland, Commander-in-Chief East Indies Station, appeared off Manora in company with the H. C.'s Ships-of-war: —*Constance*, *Berenice*, and *Euphrates* and H.M's brig. *Algerine*, and demanded the surrender of the Fort. This was refused, but after a short bombardment a military force was landed and found the place deserted. The local Governor was persuaded to surrender shortly afterwards, and the Town and Harbour of Karachi became British.

It may be of interest to record here that the *Wellesley*, 74 guns, was built for the Royal Navy in the Naval Dockyard in Bombay, being completed in 1815. She was built of Burma teak and so solid was her construction that it is recounted of her (with possibly some slight exaggeration) that on one occasion she collided with a stone breakwater and that the only damage that resulted was to the breakwater. Be that as it may, she was still afloat, to the present writer's personal knowledge, in the year 1908 as a training ship for boys in the Rivor Tyne.

A further interesting historical fact in connection with this ship is that Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland had had the distinction, as Captain of H.M.S. *Bellerophon*, in the year 1815, of receiving on board his ship, Napoleon Bonaparte, who had come to surrender himself after his final defeat at Waterloo.

During Sir C. Napier's campaign in 1843, with Karachi as the sea base at which troops and stores could be landed in safety at all seasons of the year, the line of communication up the Indus was comparatively easily secured, and the Naval Flotilla under Commander Nott, I.N., was kept fully occupied.

The *Planet* took part in the defence of the Residency at Hyderabad, under Outram, being stationed on the River side and covering with her guns the withdrawal of the garrison which was finally evacuated upstream with the assistance of the *Sattelite* which had arrived on the scene too late to take part in the defence.

Both these vessels were then detailed to transport a body of sepoys under Outram, to set fire to a wood which, it was thought was affording cover to the enemy's left flank at Meanee.

On the following day, February 17th, the Battle of Meance was fought. At this decisive action, the Navy, though not present on the field, was represented by the *Comet* under the personal command of Nott to whom was assigned the task of preventing the crossing at Sehwan of a large body of the enemy who were endeavouring to reinforce the remainder of the Belooch Army. This important duty was effectively carried out, though it seems to have received scant acknowledgment from the Military Commander-in-Chief. Although generous tribute to the services of the two vessels at Hyderabad was paid by Outram, the work of the Indus Flotilla throughout rhe campaign appears whether by design or inadvertance, to have received little or no attention from Sir C. Napier. The real reason is probably that the Indian Navy then, as it remained up to a much later date was "nobody's child." The Military high command affected to look upon it as floating appanage to the Army Transport; the Royal Navy regarded it as an irregularly constituted Force, and the Court of Directors, while ultimately directly responsible for its constitution and administration, showed complete indifference to the welfare of its personnel. The wonder is that the efficiency and esprit de corps of the Service remained at so high a level.

Before concluding this brief survey of the Indian Navy s part in the conquest of Sind, it may be of interest to note that Commander Nott and a party of seamen had the distinction of hoisting the British Flag over the Fort at Hyderabad on the 20th February, 1843.

During the years immediately succeeding the conquest, the Indian Navy was chiefly concerned in the development and administration of the Karachi Harbour as a seaport and in organising the Indus Flotilla, not only as a means of policing the areas through which the River flows, but in opening up navigation toward the Punjab, where, shortly, war was again to break out.

Lieut. Giles was appointed as the first Master Attendant at Karachi in 1839 and was succeeded by Lieut. Carless, I.N., whose careful surveys and well-thought out projects speedily resulted in the Harbour being rendered capable of accommodating sea-going vessels.

During the First Sikh War, the Indian Navy furnished and manned a battery at the siege of Multan. The Flotilla provided the transport and succeeded in reaching a landing place within six miles of Multan.

General Whish in his despatch of 22nd January 1849, says:—

"The services of Captain Powell of the Indian Navy with the steamers under his command have been of much value to the expedition, and a detail of seamen from the vessels have afforded relief at the batteries on several occasions" (1). (N.B. This was *in addition to* the battery provided and manned entirely by the Indian Navy).

The last occasion on which the Indus Flotilla saw active service was during the Mutiny of 1857, when it was fully occupied in transporting troops and stores between Karachi and the Punjab. In 1858, it was decided that no further reason existed for maintaining a naval force on the Indus. As has already been mentioned, the vesels were handed over to a newly formed commercial organisation, in which Government itself took shares, and the Indus Flotilla therefore ceases to interest us as a naval subject.

With the events which brought the Indian Mutiny to an end, there ends also the record of the H. E. I. C's Navy, for the Company itself ceased to exist. Its land forces were merged into the Services of the Crown and became the Indian Army. The Company's Navy, however (except as regards its Marine Battalion) did not share that good fortune. The Supreme Government in India and the Court of Directors at Home had never, throughout the whole period of the Company's rule, been remarkable for either appreciation or encouragement of the officers and seamen who served them so well throughout the Eastern Seas and for over 200 years. It was decided to disband the Indian Navy and to pay a subsidy to the Admiralty to maintain in Indian Waters a squadron of the Royal Navy, and so, on April 30th, 1863, the Broad Pendant of Commodore Frushard was saluted with 11 guns from Bombay Castle as he came ashore for the last time. The Ensign of the H. E. I. C.'s Navy was hauled down, and the Service ceased to exist.

It seemed almost as though there existed a malignant determination that that should be forgotten, for, when Mr. (later Sir Clements) Markham the historian, called at the India Office and asked to be given access to the records of the Indian Navy for the purpose of compiling its history, he was told that orders had been given for pulping them, and that the major portion were already destroyed.

One last quotation from Low, who quotes the *Bombay Times* on the occasion of the disbandment of the Indian Navy:

"Though the *esprit de corps* of the Indian Navy has been severely tried during the last two years by the uncertainty of its fate, the Service has maintained its discipline to the last. But not alone in its combatant glory has it covered itself with honour, in the advancement of every branch of naval science, in arduous and minute surveys, the Indian Navy has been unrivalled. The Officers have done more, in proportion to their numbers, than any other service in the world. Many of them, from their intimate knowledge of native affairs and character, particularly in Persia and Arabia, have rendered important political services and filled important political appointments.....The hauling down of the Indian Jack closes an era in our Indian Empire.....The Service expires too soon for the interest of science; perhaps for the interest of our country, but not too soon for its honourable and lasting mention in our national annals."

Though it is outside the scope of this paper, the present writer feels it impossible to conclude without mention of the fact that this was not the end. The H. C's Navy indeed, existed no more, but a Service under the Crown, bearing the title of Bombay Marine was instituted in its place. Though shorn of all combatant status, it still maintained the Indian Navy traditions, gradually enlarging its cadre and scope of its duties it became Her Majesty's Indian Marine, and, later, the Royal Indian Marine. On November 11th, 1934, it became the Royal Indian Navy.

THE INDIAN NAVY.

A review of its activities in Sind and on the adjacent Coasts 1615—1863.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

(1) Low's "History of the Indian Navy."

(2) "The Pirates of Malabar." Lt.-Colonel Biddulph.

(3) Gazeteer of the Province of Sind 1876. (Hughes).

(4) "Memoir on the Cutch State." Lieut. Raikes (Bombay Government Records XV New Series Miscellaneous Information connected with the Province of Cutch).

(5) "Brief Sketch of the History of Cutch." Captain Waters (Bombay Government Record XV see above).

(6) "A personal Narrative of a Journey to the Source of the Oxus." Lieut. John Wood, I.N.

(7) "With Sir John Keane through Sind" (Marriwalla) Sind Historical Society's Journal. Volume V. No. 1.

(8) "Medals Awarded to the Indian Navy for the Sind Campaign 1843." Lt.-Colonel Bullock F. R. Hist. Soc. Journal of the Sind Historical Society. Volume V. No. 1.

COMMERCIAL NAVIGATION OF THE INDUS, 1820-1832 A.D.

By C. L. MARIWALLA, B.A.

Read before the Sind Historical Society on 10th December, 1942.

The 18th century saw the establishment of the British Empire in India and by the time the century was out the British had successfully become the masters of the major portion of the Indian sub-continent. But along with territorial acquisitions in India the British aroused the anxious jealousy of powers both Asiatic and European. By the time the new century had dawned the dread of a foreign aggression on the British Empire in India was like the sword of Democles hanging over the heads of British Administrators in India. And different men at the helm of Indian affairs tried to keep off the sword. But there was a uniformity in the diverse policies pursued by the different Governors General. An active British interest in the countries beyond the Indus was the main feature of the policy to stem the tide of foreign aggression. Till the coming of Lord William Bentinck as the Governor General of India, a policy of active watchfulness was pursued. But Bentinck found the policy of his predecessors unsuited for the task and hence initiated a more progressive policy with peculiar and far-reaching results. His policy necessitated a prior prying into the affairs of other's dominions which finally resulted in some concrete good for safeguarding British interests in India. One such result was the opening of the Indus for purposes of commercial navigation, with ulterior political motives. And the co-operation of the Court of Sind was an important factor in this direction. In this paper an attempt will be made to trace the incidents leading to the Ameers of Sind agreeing to open up their treasure trove—the Indus—for purposes of commercial navigation.

Inspite of the two treaties of eternal friendship between the British Government and the Ameers of Sind in 1809 and 1820 respectively there had been practically a complete lull in the political relationship of the two powers. Both of them were anxious to treat the Treaties as a dead letter the day they were signed. The English never wished to cultivate friendship with the semi-barbarous rulers of Sind, as not much useful purpose could be served by their continued friendship. The Ameers

on the other hand were ever anxious to shake off the friendship of the Feringee as he was known for his encroaching aptitude. Mere exigencies of circumstances had compelled both sides to enter into friendly alliances. Upto 1820 the British had never paid much attention to Sind whether from the point of view of their North-West Frontier Policy or its importance as a source of wealth. Hence they avoided every hostility against Sind, (1) as that might entail its conquest and subsequent management. Sind was considered a barren land completely devoid of yielding much profit. But border raids had compelled the British to collect armed forces on the Kutch border to over-awe the Ameers into orderly behaviour, specially during the time the British were occupied in Bhurtpore and Burma operations in 1825. (2) It was in the period of this lull that on a fine morning in October 1827 the British Resident in Kutch received a pressing requisition from the Ameers of Sind for a Doctor to attend on the ailing Ameer, Murad Alikhan. (3) Private reports did not represent the disease of His Highness as dangerous. And therefore every one began to speculate regarding the motive behind the immediate summons. Some at the Kutch Residency maintained that as the Russians had entered Persia, the Ameers had taken this mode of prudently making friendly advances to the British Government. (4) But that was the British point of view. The British themselves were alarmed at the news of Persia joining Russia in an unholy alliance, which was likely to affect their interests in India. Inspite of the British professing friendship with Persia through treaties, they had failed to aid their ally against its enemy, Russia, though there was a definite provision for this kind of emergency in the treaty. This non-compliance was the result of the diplomatic policy pursued by the British at home. When in 1826 Russia attacked Persia, the British could not help the Persians as they did not like to antogonise the Russians. Such a conduct would have adverse effect on them in the Greek question which was pending solution at the time. The Persians having learnt a lesson from past experience decided to make up with their arch enemy on any terms. It was a war for the annihilation of Persia which the Persians sought to avoid. Hence the dread to British India from the west by the combined forces of Russia and Persia. And the English thought that the danger to their dominions in India from this combined effort must affect the Ameers of Sind first. But there is no evidence that the British surmise was correct. In reality the Ameers had an enemy nearer home who had been threatening them. Maharaja

Ranjitsing of the Punjab had an eye on Sind and on the trade mart of Shikarpur in particular. By 1809 the British put a stop to the expansion of territory towards the Jumna by the Maharaja by taking the Cis-Sutlej States under their protection. Soon after, it appeared to the Sikh Maharaja that the only fruitful acquisition which remained worth coveting, under the peculiar circumstances due to the effective British interference in his policy of expansion and the sporadic rise of Sayed Ahmed in the north against him, was the territory of the Sind Ameers. Sind was indeed the only direction in which the territories of the ambitious Sikh Monarch could possibly be extended. (5) His regular contact with Sind began after his conquest of Mooltan in 1818. (6) The connection began with the usual exchange of presents and civilities annually. The Ameers at first were not conscious of the coming danger. It was only when the Maharaja came as far down as Sultan Shahr and sent Allard and Ventura to Mithan-Kote in 1823 that it became a point of anxious concern for the Sind Rulers to check the advance of the Sikh Chief. During the latter part of the same year and the next two years Ranjitsingh was engaged in making extensive military preparations under the guidance of the French Officers he had recently employed under him. The object of these preparations in the opinion of Captain Wade, the British Agent at Ludhiana, was the conquest of Upper Sind and Shikarpur. (7) The ostensible reason assigned for this expedition against the Ameers of Sind was to punish the Baluchee tribes of Upper Sind for attacking Sikh troops near Mooltan. Though the Maharaja had advanced towards Sind in right earnest in 1825 he had to defer his conquest of the new territory due to the occurrence of scarcity in Sind. (8) The next year provided Ranjitsing with a fresh pretext for falling on the territories of the Sind Rulers. During this year he made a demand on the Vakils of the Ameers at his Court for the tribute which Sind formerly paid to Kabul since he had succeeded to the rights of the major portion of the Afghan Empire in India. As was natural the Ameers' Vakils disputed the demand though there had been a precedent for such a claim only recently. (9) The British had claimed such a right in the Cis-Sutlej territory as the successors of the Marahatas. Yet Ranjitsing kept quiet and did not force the demand on the Ameers due to a political exigency. The fanatic Sayed Ahmed had once again started his armed interference in the direction of Peshawar in the Sikh territory and Ranjitsing felt that it was expedient not to rouse the Ameers from their quietude. The information regarding the demand

for the tribute made by the Sikh Ruler supplied by their Vakils to the Ameers of Sind made them nervous though no actual hostilities had yet taken place. And the only solution for the Ameers lay in reviving their dormant friendship with the British. On the other hand the British felt that the opportunity afforded by the Ameers' invitation must be utilised fully to obtain an insight into the Ameers' dominions as it would facilitate the furtherence of their frontier policy against Russian aggression. At the same time compliance with the wishes of the Ameers would to a great extent minimise the doubts the Sind Rulers entertained about the English. So Doctor James Burnes, Surgeon to the Residency at Bhooj got ready to proceed to the Sind Court. He was rather anxious to see the classic river—the Indus—and the people inhabiting its valley. He left Bhooj on 25th October 1827 along with Gopaldas, the Ameers' Vakil at the Kutch Residency, with an escort provided by a small detachment of the 21st N. I., a few troopers of the Poona Auxiliary Horse and a dozen horse-men of H. H. the Rao of Kutch, the choicest of Indian soldiers. (10) The party crossed into the Sind Territory on 3rd November. At Ruree the doctor was received by two Special Officers appointed by the Ameers namely, Nawab Hyderkhan Lagharee, the Governor of Jatee, and nephew to the Chief Vazir of the Hyderabad Court and Bahadur Khan. Fifty camels were sent by the Ameers to be in attendance on the party and the honourable guest and his men were to receive everything free of all cost thence forward. None of them were even allowed to set foot on bare ground. The party received the best of treatment in every respect. The Ameers' nominees fully catered to the needs of the Doctor and his party, Nothing in fact seemed to be spared that could add to the Doctor's comfort or that of his followers. This is how Burnes himself describes the treatment he received from the Ameers' Officers, "nothing could exceed the attention I experienced on the route from my Mihmandars who themselves frequently sat up to watch me during the night. A large cotton mattress, covered with crimson silk was always carried near me in case I should feel disposed to alight; flaggons of cooled sherbet and other luxuries were also liberally supplied. The Ameers had sent several hawks, which afforded an attractive sport on the road and supplied my table with every species of winged game." (11) When the Doctor was nearing the capital he was met by the Chief Vazir of the Hyderabad Court, Nawab Wulee Mahomed Khan Lagharee, himself, being deputed by his masters as an additional mark of respect to the honourable guest. The Doctor had been met by Ma

homed Khan Thora, a relative of the Ameers and Moosa Cabitan, an officer of rank only 30 miles from Hyderabad to compliment him on his safe arrival. At long last the Doctor and his retinue reached Hyderabad on 10th November, early in the morning. (12) All this extraordinary treatment to Doctor Burnes, an Englishman, stood in contrast to the one meted out to the British Missions to Sind in 1808, 1809 and 1820. The reason for this extraordinary hospitality is not far to seek. Mahomedkhan Thora had made known to Doctor Burnes the reason why unusual preparations were being made for his reception at the capital. It was because other Europeans had come into Sind on their own affairs but he had come by an express invitation from the Ameers themselves and would therefore be made welcome in a different manner from them. (13) He was very cordially received by the Ameers at Court and he was much impressed by the scene before him. The Chief Vazir was appointed the host to Doctor Burnes so long he was in Sind. After the first interview was over the Doctor proceeded to his camp situated a quarter of a mile from the town, in a shady grove. His camp was indeed a haven of repose. He was the recepiant of the best care which the host could show to a guest any where in the world. For his breakfast alone came a dozen silver dishes filled with prepared viands of different descriptions, all ornamented with gold leaf; other trays with baked meats were meant for his muslim servants and yet others bearing profusion of fruits, sweatmeats and articles of food for his Hindu followers. (14) A lot of waste was occasioned due to this super-abundance. The Doctor remonstrated with his host on the point and to please the honourable guest this extravagance was partially discontinued. On the evening of the day of his arrival Doctor Burnes was summoned to a private interview with the Ameers. Mir Mooradali's illness was the main topic discussed on this occasion. The Ameer had been ailing for the last five months and all Sindhian Medical men had been consulted till now the Ameer had himself despaired of recovery and had written down his will. The Doctor examined his patient and prescribed medicine. And lo! within ten days all the dangerous symptoms of the disease had disappeared. This was mainly effected through the benign effects of the sulphate of quinine. (15) From this sudden recovery of Muradali, Burnes secured a confidence of the Ameers which no Englishman could ever secure at their Court. Many more of royal blood sought his advice for their own ailments apart from the hundreds of common men he cured. But he did not succeed in all cases. Meer Noor Mahomed, son of Meer Muradali, was disappointed, for writes Burnes, "I did not possess the lamp of Alladin or the wand of Prosprero to trans-

form his mean and contemptible figure into the stately form of his brother Nasirkhan." (16) Though Muradali was out of danger in so short a time he did not regain his health perfectly till January 1828. And so Doctor Burnes had to be at the Sind Court for nearly three months. During this period he utilised his time in studying the rulers of the land, without prejudice. He studied their temperaments, and abilities, their tastes and aptitudes, their character in general and above all their attitude towards the British. He also paid attention to the organisation of the Sind Court and the administration of the country; the wealth of the rulers and the lot of the common man. He was afforded the best opportunity to study Sind since he enjoyed the utmost confidence of its chiefs. Hence his account of the country, its people and the men at the helm of affairs is as sympathetic as it is correct. It is indeed a highly commendable performance. All other foreign writers were greatly prejudiced as they could only gain a partial view of the actual state of affairs due to their limited opportunities for studying their subject. When for example Doctor Burnes explains the main defect of Talpur administration as underlying in their ignorance of the true notions of policy and their being mislaid by the delusions of prejudice than by their being wantonly cruel and inequitous in their proceedings, he shows an insight into the affairs of Sind at this period of its history which makes it evident that all other writers were drawing conclusions from the things as they stood on the surface and could not probe sufficiently deep into the matter to know the exact state of affairs as Doctor Burnes could do. (17) At long last after much reluctance the Ameers gave Doctor Burnes his audience of leave on 21st January 1828 and he flowed down the Indus in a State barge flooded with many worthy presents. The Doctor proceeded by land from Tatta and reached the Kutch Territory on 28th January. (18) By the visit of Doctor Burnes to the Court of Sind the British were not only afforded a pleasant and realistic account of Sind but at the same time they won that confidence of the rulers of the land which was of the utmost importance to them in their exploits in the land of the Indus undertaken during the following few years.

This favourable account of Sind was preceded by a favourable opinion of the Indus as a channel of Commerce. The Commercial advantages had been brought out prominently by the famous traveller Moorcraft (19) and they had sounded so well that the Government of India were induced to ascertain for themselves the commercial value of the classic stream. But it was

not mere trade that lured the English to estimate its usefulness. It was something more. The British Empire in India was threatened from the north-west as has been noticed earlier. An English army could easily go up the Indus and check the on-coming enemy only if the Indus were really navigable. The Sikh Ruler had been casting a covetous eye on the lower valley of the Indus. The English administrators in India felt that at some time it would be necessary to oppose the foe at the North-West frontier of India. And in case Sind became a part of the Sikh territory, British troops would never be allowed to proceed north by the Indus. The Sikh Chief was bound to actively oppose the advance of a British army through his territory. So if now the capabilities of the Indus could be ascertained, the Sindhian territory could be annexed and all would be well. So the ball was set rolling. Moorcraft suggested commerce and Malcolm, the Governor of Bombay, thought of defence. The suggestion of Moorcraft could easily answer Malcolm's desire as well. At Malcolm's suggestion the "Memoranda on the North-West frontier of British India and on the importance of the river Indus as connected with its defence" were drawn up. These Memoranda clearly hinted at the annexation of Sind. (20) And it was favourably considered both at home and in India. The Home Government were highly enamoured of the scheme. But Charles Metcalfe, a member of the Governor-General's Council deprecated the steps to be taken rather vehemently. He wrote, "It is stated in a late despatch from the Secret Committee that we must not permit the rulers to obstruct our measures, in other words, that we are to go to war with them to compell submission to our wishes. With deference I should remark that such an assumption does not seem to be warranted by the law of nations. But the assumption is an amplification of what I have often observed in our conduct towards the Native States, and what appears to me the greatest blot in our character of our Indian policy. However much we may profess moderation and non-interference when we have no particular interests of our own concerned, the moment we discover an object of pursuit we become impatient and over-bearing, insist on what we require and cannot brook denial or hesitation. We disregard the rights of others and think only of our own convenience. Submission or war is the alternative which the other party has to choose. Thus at the present time we have taken alarm at the supposed designs of Russia. It would seem we are to compell the intermediate states to enter into our views or submit to our projects, although they cannot comprehend them and instead

of entertaining any apprehension of Russian designs, are more apprehensive of our own, our character for encroachment being worse than that of the Russians, because the States concerned have a more proximate sense of it from the result which they see in actual operation among the realms of India." (21) Metcalfe honestly felt that the Russian aggression was yet remote and vague and therefore urged a policy of wait and watch for, 'there is nothing that we can do in our present blind state that would be of any certain benefit on the approach of that event.' (22) He suggested the cultivation of a friendly disposition with the intermediary States rather than antogonising them. The suggestion of Malcolm, inspite of the opposition of Metcalfe, particularly impressed Lord William Bentinck the Governor General. "The obvious advantages which Great Britain would derive from an extension of her commercial relations in the hitherto almost unknown regions in the vicinity of the Indus; and also the opening which it offered of cultivating friendly feelings with the different nations in this quarter, and which might hereafter be of importance to our interests, could not escape the observation of the eminent individual at the head of the Supreme Government." (23) He wanted to initiate a progressive policy of saving the British Empire in India even if it involved armed interference. For this purpose 'a survey of the Indus and a knowledge of the countries contiguous to that noble stream were vitally important; indeed more important than any other acquisition.' (23A) So the Indus was to be surveyed. But under what pretext? Such a pretext was ready at hand. His Gracious Majesty, the King of Great Britain was greatly pleased with the friendly overtures of the Punjab Ruler who had sent a Shawl-tent as a present to His Majesty in 1828 through Lord Amherst. (24) And he wanted to present the Sikh Ruler with one Stallion and four mares of the Suffolk cart horse breed in the erroneous belief that Ranjitsing was a great horse breeder. (25) The horses accordingly arrived at Bombay. Lt.-Col. Henry Pottinger suggested that it might allay the fears of the Sind Government if a large carriage were sent along with the horses as the size and bulk of it would render it obvious that the Mission could then only proceed by water. (26) And Sir John Malcolm, the Governor of Bombay, came forward to further the cause of His Government by giving his highly ornamented carriage, which he had received as a present from Lord Minto in 1810, for the purpose. (27) Thus an ostensible reason was at hand to undertake the navigation of the Indus. Some demur was anticipated on the part of the Rulers of Sind to allow this passage through their territories but it was assumed that the

Ameers situated as they were to Ranjitsing on the one hand and the British Government on the other would not readily incur the risk of offending both powers. Alexander Burnes, brother of Doctor James Burnes, who was at the time at the Bhooj Residency was appointed to undertake the journey. Upto 1830 the knowledge which the Europeans possessed of the Indus was 'vague and unsatisfactory.' (28) And so Burnes was expected to acquire full and complete information regarding the Indus. A better colour to the forthcoming venture was given by deputing Burnes on a political Mission to the Sind Courts (those of Hyderabad and Khairpur) also, though a Mission to these courts was hardly called for. (29) Once again Metcalfe deferred from the proposed scheme for cogent reasons. He wrote out a spirited note of dissent and earnestly appealed to the Government to consider fully the consequences of the scheme before launching it. He wrote, "the scheme of surveying the Indus under the pretence of sending a present to Raja Ranjitsing seems to me highly objectionable. It is a trick.....unworthy of our Government which cannot fail when detected, as most probably it will be, to excite the jealousy and indignation of the powers on whom we play it. It is just such a trick as we are often falsely suspected and accused of by the Native powers of India and this confirmation of their suspicions generally unjust, will do us more injury by furnishing the ground of merited reproach, than any advantage to be gained by the measure can compensate. It must be remembered that the survey of the Indus or any part of Sind country may give us the power to injure that state, may even assist in conquering it and in the course of the events is as likely to be turned to use for that purpose or any other. The rulers of Sind, therefore, have the same right to be jealous of our surveys of their river and their territories that any power of Europe has to protect its fortresses from the inspection of foreign Engineers." (30) This was however disregarded. All preliminaries were over and the British envoy received his final instructions and left Mandvi on the 21st of January, 1831, along with his little party comprising Ensign J. D. Leckie of the 22nd N. I., a Surveyor, a Native Doctor and a suitable establishment of servants. (31) Burnes and his party reached the Koree or the eastern-most mouth of the Indus on the 24th and surveyed the Sind coast for the next four days without being detected. (32) On the 28th instant the party cast anchor in the Pittee or Western mouth of the river. No intimation had been sent by the British authorities to the Ameers of Sind lest they should reasonably and flatly refuse permission for the advance of the Mission, as it was violating the treaties which affirmed that no whiteman would be

allowed to pass through their territories. But if the 'eternal friends' envoy had arrived within the Ameers' dominions they would have to deal with the matter differently. Therefore Burnes apprised the Ameers' Officers at the Indus Delta Port at Daraje of his plans when he had anchored some thirty miles up from the sea. (33) Here the impediments to the advance of the Mission began. The situation was hard to bear as the Ameers' Officers would not allow the Mission to move forward an inch without their receiving express orders to that effect from their masters. So Burnes was compelled to get back to sea and inform Pottinger of his fate. But soon he received a friendly letter from the Ameers who as usual could not oppose the entry of a guest however unwelcome but made the guest conscious of the impracticability of his plans. They enumerated the impossibilities of navigating the great river. They said, "the boats are so small that only four or five men can embark in one of them; their progress is likewise slow, they have neither masts nor sails; and the depth of water in the Indus is likewise so variable as not to reach in some places the knee or waist of a man." (34) This formidable enumeration of the physical obstacles was coupled with no refusal from the Rulers in allowing Burnes to undertake the journey. So Burnes made a second bid for the Indus on the 10th of February, but due to some natural causes he was detained from entering the Indus for about five days. He now entered the Piteanee mouth and addressed the Ameers' agent at Daraje putting him in the wrong for treating them in an uncivil manner but that officer no more enjoyed his office and the new man knowing his doom if he encouraged the English to enter the Indus refused the party not only landing but food and water as well. (35) Once again the Mission moved back to Mandvi Road. It was evident that the Ameers' conduct was unfriendly from the British point of view and yet they did not betray the feelings in their letters. The Ameers had merely magnified the difficulties of navigating the Indus and arrayed its rocks, quick-sands, whirl-pools and shallows and wounded by the fact that the voyage to Lahore had never been performed in the memory of man. (36) The Ameers were alarmed. They felt that this Mission was the precursor of an army and therefore no permission could be granted to the English to enter their dominions. The foreigners had known everything else about Sind excepting the Indus and its navigability and that they had never used the Ameers' territories for the passage of their army was due to their lack of knowledge about the river. Once the Feringee had known the Indus Sind would be a country lost to the Ameers. Col. Pottinger having received news from

Burnes had remonstrated with the Ameers for refusing 'so moderate a request' (37) and had apprised the Sikh Ruler through the British Agent of the despatch of the dray horses for his capital by the Indus. The delay caused had created doubts in the mind of the Maharaja and he asked the British Agent the cause thereof who at once narrated in the usual high flown language the impertinence of the Ameers of Sind in refusing a passage to the Mission. (38) Ranjitsing was roused. He interrogated the Ameers' Agents, who apprised him of the purpose behind this pretext of conveying his presents. They pointed out that the carriage which was supposed to be bringing the horses for him was really full of gold muhars for his enemy. Sayed Ahmed and the Ameers were collecting a lac of men to oppose the advance of this mischievous Mission. (39) But the Maharaja felt that the Ameers were insulting him by refusing a passage for his presents and at the same time their conduct was likely to injure British feelings who might launch an offensive against Sind and annex the territory which he so much coveted. He, therefore, ordered his French Commander Ventura to make a demonstration from the Frontier of Dera Gazi Khan against the Ameers. (40) By that time the Ameers had been conciliating with the British Resident in Kutch and assured him that the passage could not be allowed as it was in violation of the existing treaties between them and the British, but if the British Resident gave an assurance that this passage would not be taken as a precedent Burnes may well pass. Pottinger gave the required understanding. (41) The Ameers certainly did not desire to antogonise the Sikh Ruler. So both powers were informed that Burnes was permitted to go up the Indus to deliver the presents from the Royalty of Great Britain to Maharaja Ranjitsing of the Punjab. On 10th March Burnes and his party once again set sail for the Indus and now ascended the Hujamree, one of the central mouths of the Indus and after some higgle haggle the Ameers' orders were put into force a full and unqualified sanction to advance by water. The party proceeded to the capital, Hyderabad, on 12th April. (42) "Our fleet consisted of six flat bottomed vessels and a small English built pinnace which we had brought from Kutch." (43) As the little fleet went up the stream it was heartily cheered by the people. At one spot a Sayad gazing astonishingly at the newcomers shrewdly remarked, "alas! Sind is now gone since the English have seen the river which is the road to its conquest." (44) The utterance was indeed prophetic. Within barely a dozen years the British flag was seen flying in the once Ameers' dominion. The fleet moored opposite Hyderabad on 18th April. On the way the members of the Mission saw the fishing of the

Palla, the palatable dish of the Sindhis. The Mission was very cordially received at the capital and the son of the Chief Minister, in his father's absence, was appointed the mahmandar to the Mission. The Mission visited the Court and found that it had faded from its old grandeur. Meer Nasir Khan the second son of Meer Muradali, the reigning chief, assured Burnes that he was a loyal friend of the English and it was he who finally got sanction for his Mission to proceed by the Indus. Meer Muradali the Chief Ameer spoke in eulogising terms and welcomed the envoy. (45) The interview was followed by the British envoy sending some presents to the Ameers sent by his Government consisting of a gun, a brace of pistols, a gold watch, two telescopes a clock; English shawls and cloths, two pairs of elegant cut-glass candles and shades, some Persian works of Bombay Litho and maps of the World and India. (46) The Ameer on receiving the presents sent the moderate request that the clock and candle sticks may well be exchanged for something else, but it was rudely turned down. A second interview wounded up the Mission's stay at Hyderabad. On his departure the British envoy was the recepient of a handsome Damascus sword with a red velvet scabbard ornamented with gold from Meer Nasir Khan, the Chief Ameer sending a purse containing Rs. 1,500, since he had no mounted blade to present the envoy with. (47) On 23rd April the State barge carried the party due north. The Mission reached Sehwan on 1st May and stayed there for 3 days. A day after quiting Sehwan the party met the agent of the Ameers of Khairpur, Mahomed Gohur, who came to compliment the Mission on its safe arrival. Meer Rustom's hospitality began on the day his agent met the Mission. Days of feasting followed. Burnes wrote a complimentary letter to the Ameer for his fine reception of the Mission. The Mission reached Bukkur within ten days and went to pay a visit to the ruler of Khairpur. The Chief Vazir, Fateh Khan Ghoree, came to receive them and conducted them to the Court. (48) The envoy presented the Ameer with a watch, a brace of pistols, and a kaleidoscope along with various articles of European manufacture. The Ameer was highly delighted to receive these tokens of friendship. There was so much mildness in what the Ameer said that I could not believe we were in a Baluchee Court, wrote Burnes. (49) The Ameer requested the Mission to tarry longer in his dominion and accept his 'poor hospitality' so long as they stayed. This hospitality consisted of eight to ten sheep with all sorts of provisions for 150 people daily. (50) While the Mission was at Khairpur the Ameer sent twice a day a meal of seventy-two dishes consisting of Pillaos and other viands of the richest cookery. The

Mission had to regret to be leaving the Khairpur Darbar. On the Mission's departure Burnes received from the Ameer two daggers and two beautiful swords with gold ornamented belts, many cloths and Sind silks and a purse containing a thousand rupees. (51) By this time the Mission had had a good experience of Sind beggers. The British envoy complains of them in the following terms, "The beggars of Sinde are the most importunate and troublesome. They practice all manner of pursuasion to succeed in their suit for alms; tear up grass and bushes with their mouths and chew sand and mud to excite compassion." (52) Before reaching Bukkur the Mission had met the chief Vazier of the Hyderabad Court, Nawab Wullee Mahomed Khan Lagharee, who had hastened his departure from Shikarpoor to meet the Mission. He assured the envoy that his master had had evil counsel and so had unnecessarily detained them at the mouths of the river and on hearing this news he had urgently solicited the Ameer not to commit themselves to such a rude conduct. The English envoy was greatly impressed by the noble bearing of the Vazier and the grandeur of his retinue. 'He came with a splendid equipage of tents and carpets accompanied by three palanquins and 400 men. A set of dancing girls were also in his suite.' (53) On 21st May the Mission left Bukkur and arrived at Lahore on 17th July 1831. (54) Inspite of his cordial reception at the Sind Courts Burnes has little to commend the Ameers about. He felt that the Talpurs were tyrannous rulers and were very unpopular with the people. And as he points out 'he heard the people say that they (the English) were the forerunners of conquest!' In due course Burnes made out his report and expressed a favourable opinion regarding the navigation of the Indus.

Now it remained for the Government of India to take suitable steps in the matter. Though the Malcolm Memoranda had recommended the annexation of Sind, the political situation in the country made the step suicidal at the moment. It was deemed expedient for the time being that the Indus be opened for the purpose of commerce and through that commerce to the north-west, specially to the Kabul dominion, the British must substitute their influence for that derived by Russia. Such indeed was the desire of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company in London. (55) An immediate annexation was not only to draw the British into the politics of Central Asia, which they wanted to avoid as long as was expedient, but it would also annoy their old ally Ranjitsing, who was so keen to have Sind that after being free from the imbroglio of Sayed Ahmed, he had been concentrating his attention on

the conquest of Sind and had gone to the length of inviting the English to join in the expedition against the Ameers, over which proposal the English for their own interests wisely slept. (56) The British felt that if they could secure the necessary influence in the north-west through commerce and on the same score obtain free navigation of the Indus, their purpose would be served without a single life being lost. What they really wanted was a passage for troops to the north-west which they would secure through commercial navigation. If ships of commerce can ply on the Indus regularly, it would not be difficult for the English to sail ships of war on the same stream in an emergency, with the power they enjoyed in India. The Ameers of Sind would easily be over-awed by the hallow of British might. Such indeed were the views of Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General of India. And accordingly Missions were to be despatched to the Courts of Lahore, Bahawalpore, Khairpoor and Hyderabad to sue their rulers for 'natural justice.' Opposition was anticipated only from the Lahore and Hyderabad Courts, the rest being subordinate Courts. But it was believed that the Lahore Court could be managed and hence there remained the Court of Hyderabad whose policy it had been to enjoy a secure existence by the exclusion of all foreigners from its dominions. Apart from the above policy it had been brought to the notice of the British Indian Government that the Ameer of Hyderabad was seeking a marriage alliance with Persia and this it was feared, might develop into a political one to the detriment of British interests. The Governor General writing to Col. Pottinger, the prospective envoy to Sind, brought to his notice the fact that this matrimonial alliance might have been suggested by Russia with a view to a future political alliance and to the establishment of an immediate relationship through Persia with an Indian State by means of which, whether for intrigue or for actual attack, a ready access would be afforded to our Indian Empire. (57) Even the British envoy at Tehran advised the Governor-General to avert the alliance between Sind and Persia as by such an attempt the Sind ruler could solicit Persian protection against any measure that the coming events however unforeseen may compell the English to adopt against Sind. (58) So the Governor-General of India had to send an experienced envoy to Sind to fulfill 'an altruistic Mission,' to open the Indus for commercial purposes. The British had for once realised that a petty kingdom had no right whatever to shut up commerce by imposition of heavy duties or by any other impediments simply because the passage of the channel of commerce lay through the territories of that insignificant autocracy. And so a search was

ordered to select an envoy to Sind and who could be better fitted for the task than the British Resident in Kutch, Col. Henry Pottinger who had much previous knowledge of the Sind Court. The choice was indeed wise. The Governor-General informed Col. Pottinger of his intentions and suggested an outline of the way he had to argue out his case at the Ameers' Court. In case the Ameers objected to the opening of the Indus for commercial purposes by charging a fixed and moderate toll under the superintendence of the British Indian Government, the British envoy was to question the rights of Sind in this respect by having recourse to the principles of International Law and practice and prove to the Ameers the falsity of their stand that they or any other State possessing only a portion of a stream had a right either by prohibition or what is tantamount to it, by the imposition of excessive duties or by connivance at a system of plunder by their subjects on the trader, to deprive all the other people and States of an advantage which nature had offered to all and to show to the Ameers of Sind that they could not rightly assert that they alone had the right to seal hermetically the mouths of the Indus, to arrogate the sole and exclusive dominion of its navigation and to deny the right of an innocent use and passage of this great natural channel of commercial intercourse. (59) At the same time the British envoy was also instructed to beguile the Baluchee Chiefs of Sind in agreement by the enumeration of the advantages they would derive by the new scheme. (60) In case these cajolings proved ineffective the British envoy was to make most and bring home to the Ameers of the right possessed by the powers whose dominions bordered on the Indus to use this channel of commerce, but 'nothing like menace' was to accompany the admirable exposition of natural rights. (61) And in case the Ameers asked for certain conditions under which they may agree to the British demand, like protection against their avowed enemies, they were to be told that 'when there exists a natural right and power to enforce it, both justice and reason reject all title to concession or compensation.' (62) How modest indeed were the British demands! The English had conceived and taken on themselves by their own free will this humanitarian work of encouraging commerce in Asia. And nothing like menace was to be resorted to, though it was within British power and natural right to do so, against the parties involved, who were to come to a unanimous verdict in favour of the scheme. How grand a conception only if what was being proposed had no political motive behind it.

The preliminaries being over, on 10th December, 1831, Col. Henry Pottinger apprised the Ameers of Hyderabad of his intention to visit their Court with letters from the Governor-General for them. (63) In this letter Pottinger requested the Ameers for an officer of theirs to receive his Mission in the Sind territory. He also apprised the Ameers that 'as a part of the luggage which I have with me is of that heavy nature that renders its transportation by land extremely difficult,' they should authorize this part of the luggage to come by water *via* the Delta Port of Daraje. By the end of the month the Ameers had replied and welcomed the English friend to their Court. They appointed Mahomed Khan and Dost Ali Khan to meet the Mission on the Sind border. (64) The Mission was to consist of the following gentlemen:—

Lt.-Col. Henry Pottinger,	Envoy
P. Scott, Esquire,	1st Assistant
Capt. W. Pottinger,	2nd Assistant
Asstt. Surgeon I. A. Sinclair,	Surgeon
Lt. J. Morris	Commanding the Escort.

And E. P. Delhoste, Esq., Surveyor & Draftsman. (65). The Mission was provided with an escort by the 24th N.I. (66) The whole party made up a goodly number. "We mustered upwards of 400 souls" writes DelHoste. (67) The envoy carried with him the following stationery (68) for the use of the Mission to Sind:—

Foolscape paper	..Two Reams
Pott or King's Arm, in lieu of Foolscape	..One Ream
Demy or 3rd sort	..10 qrs
Thin post paper	..10 qrs
Portuguese paper	.. 3 Reams.
Letter paper	.. 2 ,,
Cartridge paper	.. 5 qrs
Blotting paper	.. 5 qrs
Quills	..500
Pen-knives	.. 2
Black Ink-powder	.. 2 dozen bundles.
Red ink-powder	.. 3 ,,
Wafers	.. 4 Boxes.
Sealing Wax	.. 2 lbs.
Pencils	.. 6

The Mission was also furnished with medicines, instruments etc. worth Rs. 911-2-0. (69) So, fully saddled, the Sind Mission reached Lackpat Bundar on 10th January 1832. (70) DelHoste was specially appointed on the personnel of the Sind Mission for collecting geographical information regarding Sind. (71) The Mission crossed into Sind on the next day and in just ten stages arrived at the Ameers' capital on the 25th of the same month. (72) It is necessary to advert here to the ready welcome afforded to the British Mission by Meer Murad Ali Khan, who had been so suspicious about Englishmen entering his territory. The Ameer seemed to think that the purpose of the Mission was to settle the Parkur affairs. (73) Parkur plunderers had so much inconvenienced the subjects of Kutch, under British protection, that the Ameers had been warned several times and it seemed that now a final settlement was to be effected and a policy was to be chalked out for rooting out this menace. In fact the question of Parkur plunderers was of so minor an importance in the present instance that the Governor-General had left it to the discretion of Pottinger to move the matter or not, for the main object of Indus navigation was not to be jeopardized under any circumstances. (74) But soon after the welcome letter had been despatched, the Ameers were informed by a brother of Ismail Shah, a minister of the Hyderabad Court, then at Bombay on a private Mission, that the Mission's main object was to seek permission for the passage of troops to oppose Russians in the north-west of India as also for the establishment of three political agencies in Sind, at Tatta, Hyderabad and Shikarpoor respectively besides an English envoy at Khairpoor. (75) And hence the Ameer despatched Mirza Zenloobdeen, son of Ismail Shah, to know in advance the real object of the English. In the meantime some other Talpur Officers also met the Mission like Hyderkhan Laghari, the Governor of Jatee Pargana and nephew to the Chief Minister; Mahomed Khan Talpur, brother-in-law of the Chief Minister; and Akhund Baka-ul-Shah, all men of rank. (76) The last named person sent word to the Ameer that the boats carrying the heavy luggage of the Mission were really laden with military stores. (77) On hearing this the Ameer grew thoughtful and forthwith despatched Kechee Khidmatgar to ascertain the truth. (78) It was on this account that the heavy luggage arrived five days later than the Mission at the capital, having been detained in the delta at Daraje for nine days. The Ameers' officers referred to above as also two confidential servants of Mir Muradali, Chotta Khidmatgar and Mirza Baki,

Georgian, met the Mission on the second stage of the march and very warmly welcomed the Mission on behalf of their master. (79) These officers proposed to pay Rs. 100 a day to Pottinger as mahmandari charges as ordered by the Ameer. Col. Pottinger felt that this was not fair and after much discussion with the Ameers' officers agreed to accept fire-wood and forage free. (79A) The Mehmandars also communicated to the British envoy the desire of Meer Murad Ali to allow him to follow the 'Balloch' system of hospitality by furnishing the Mission with ready dressed victuals on the arrival of the Mission at the capital. Pottinger found it inexpedient to refuse everything and therefore accepted this invitation. On the whole the reception of the Mission while it was still on its way to the capital was very hearty. Nothing could have been more attentive and friendly than Meer Murad Ali Khan's conduct to the Mission upto this hour, wrote Col. Pottinger to Government. (80) On their way the Mission passed through fertile lands growing rice, tobacco, barley and sugar-cane in great abundance. (81) Near Shahkapoor. the Mission came across an extensive fort Sind to have been the residence Dodo, a Summa Chief. The ruins were of pacca brick of enormous dimensions. (82) At Bulrey the Mission visited the tomb of Shah Kareem, the great grand-father of Shah Abdul Latif, the Sindhian Shakespeare. (83) 'The tomb is a beautiful building covered with lacquered tiles of various colours, which at a short distance appear like porcelain. There is a large melah here in March every year which lasts for three days. Goods coming to the melah pay no duty.' (83A) But all was not pleasant for the Mission on the road. The beggars of Sind greatly disturbed them. Delhoste complains of begging as a terrible nuisance in Sind. Capt. W. Pottinger corroborates what Delhoste asserts regarding Sind beggars when he points out.' 'Those who have no property or means of subsistance live by begging or rather demanding alms and there is nothing wonderful to see well-dressed and respectable looking men, sometimes on horse back, with swords and shields asking for charity and if denied, they give vent to the most violent and abusive language. (84)

The Mission duly arrived at the capital and encamped at a special camping ground situated nearly S. W. of the City. The British camp was marked out facing south, thus having the City and Fort on its left, the Indus on the right at a distance of 2½ miles, at its rear the Nalla having wells to supply water, beyond which on a rising ground stood the Tanda of

Wulee Mahomed Khan Lagharee. (85) The situation of the English camp was not very pleasant but it had the advantage of being free from the annoyance of beggars. (86) The camp was provided with a Sindhian guard to keep off the civilian population who would otherwise disturb the peace and quiet of the place. However out of curiosity many Sindhis came to visit the camp. (87) The large Durbar tent in particular was an object which appeared to strike the visitors as being wonderful—the chicks at the tent doors also appeared to amuse them very much and they were often heard having disputes among them as to what they were composed of. (87A.)

So now the Mission was ready to start on its errand in right earnest. The first visit to the Ameer's Court by the Mission was fixed for the morning of the 28th January (88) by which time the British Camp had been visited by the proteges of every Chief enquiring after the welfare of the members of the Mission and bringing presents of fruits. A little after sunrise on the morning of the 28th, a deputation consisting of Ahmed Khan Laghari the eldest son of the Prime Minister; Mahomed Khan Nizamani; Dostali Khan Talpur; Mahomed Khan Talpur and others conducted the members of the Mission to the Durbar. The Durbar had nothing in particular to commend itself except noise, if noise could ever be commendable. Nothing could be less decorous or worse arranged than the whole scene; one could hardly find room to sit as the people came squeezing into the Darbar, shouting, howling, and calling to each other all the time. (89) All the old grandeur seemed to have passed off except for the personal decoration and decorum of the Ameers themselves. Captain W. Pottinger gives a realistic and animating account of the reception of the Mission at the Ameers Court. He writes, "The reception of the Mission was most distinguished, but the Court and the style of everything connected with it gave us much disappointment. The dresses of the Ameers were alone handsome and the jewels costly. The Beloch system of hospitality was followed towards us and for some days (until the envoy peremptorily declined to receive any further contributions) supplies of every sort and in the greatest abundance were served out daily to all the followers and also the cattle—and a ready cooked dinner of 150 dishes sent daily for the gentlemen, accompanied with Cabool fruits, sherbet, sweets, etc. (90) After polite enquiries of welfare the visit terminated within twenty minutes and the Englishmen returned to their Camp.

After the first interview, the interviews with the Ameers became frequent as the purpose of the Mission became known to the Ameers through the envoy. Meer Moorad Ali Khan when he was made aware of the contents of the letter from the Governor-General objected to Englishmen entering his dominions as merchants because the Belochees knew them as soldiers and under no circumstances would they be able to discern their commercial purpose. (91) This was an objection to which the Ameers' Officers clung for long as they felt that it constituted a dangerous step by them. Captain W. Pottinger explains the point thus:—"To be in the most remote degree engaged in trade is looked upon by the Belochees of Sinde as the most complete degradation and when the envoy on the discussion of the Treaty mentioned that British merchants were often amongst the most respectable people of their country, the Chiefs who were present seemed quite astonished and hardly gave credit to the fact.". (91A) At the same time they pointed out that the entry of Englishmen in Sind was a violation of the understanding recorded on paper and given by Pottinger himself, that the British Government would not again trouble that of Sind with a similar request, as the one made for the passage of Sir Alexander Burnes by the Indus in 1831. (92) This the British envoy easily combated by saying that the Indus navigation as proposed now was quite different from the deputation of Burnes and at the same time pointed out that he had informed Zenaloobdeen, the receiver of the note, that the stipulations contained in the note were not binding on the British Government as he had no authority to give such an understanding, but hoped that his Government would accept the conditions agreed to by him. (93) This argumentation needs comment. If Col. Henry Pottinger had no final authority of his Government to settle the passage for Burnes by the Indus, he had no business to entertain the Ameer's Officer deputed for the purpose. He should rightly have sent him to the proper authority. Zenaloobdeen would never have accepted the terms from Pottinger had he the slightest doubt that Pottinger's proposals would be rejected by his Government. He acted on good faith and yet his good faith was paid back by the enumeration of a technical flaw in the document given to him. Indeed the ways of political friendship are varied and variable.

After a few days preliminary exchange of views on the subject, Moonshee Khooshiram on behalf of the

Ameers' Government proposed a treaty of nine articles. (94) The first two articles referred to mutual and eternal friendship, the third debarred all Europeans from entering Sind, the fourth provided for the entry of non-European merchants by the Indus. The fifth article referred to Shikarpoor. It was stipulated that on no account would Shikarpoor be seized by the British. The sixth one made the friends and enemies of the one as those of the other, the seventh stipulated that the Ameers would provide a large force on British requisition within 100 miles of Hyderabad, the eighth article referred to fixing and regularising payment of river dues, and the last one contemplated compensation to the Ameers for the above benefits. The British Government was expected to compel those of Kabul and Punjab to treat Sind as an independent power like the British and cast no covetous eyes on it. Col. Pottinger having heard the Ameers' proposals read to him refused to accept the terms. (95) He felt that many articles of the proposed treaty were uncalled for. But in order to expedite the Mission's work he himself sent a draft treaty to the Ameers on 2nd February consisting of four articles. (96) The first referred to friendship, the second stipulated that the navigation of the Indus be made free and as the Ameers had many doubts against Englishmen, it was provided that no Englishman was to settle in Sind and no armed vessel was to enter the river without the previous sanction of the Ameers. The third article referred to the fixing of the river toll and the last one referred to the other articles of the previous treaties in a modified form. The Ameers conveyed their objections to Pottinger's proposals through their minister Sayed Ismail Shah (97) who pointed out to the English envoy that the Ameers under no circumstances were prepared to allow Englishmen to visit their dominions freely and frequently even on commercial errands. The Ameers, it was pointed out may allow a few Englishmen in their dominions but they must return as soon as their goods were sold and they would be allowed entrance only once a month. After Sayed Ismail Shah had argued on behalf of his masters, Col. Pottinger presented the point of view of his Government. He pointed out to the Ameers' Minister that it looked rather strange that a treaty of friendship was to debar one of the parties from entering the dominions of the other. After some hesitation the Ameers instead of accepting Pottinger's draft submitted another draft for his consideration. (98) In this draft great stress was laid against the seizure of Shikarpoor by the English. This was ridiculed by Pottinger for being included in

a treaty of friendship. The new draft made no mention of Military stores coming up the Indus. Pottinger felt that a clause referring to it should be included and it was to be stipulated that it depended upon the Ameers to grant permission for the same or not. This is indeed a clever ruse to commit the Ameers on paper, for once the English thought of bringing troops they would do so and in case of refusal of permission a forcible entry could be made when once such a permission was allowable by the treaty. The draft fixed a period for the residence of English merchants in Sind which was easily combated by the British envoy with the argument that none could tell when one's goods would be sold out and a stipulation fixing the period of stay of English merchants would act so adversely against them that it would deter them from coming to Sind. However Pottinger assured the Ameers that he was sending their draft to the Governor-General for his sanction and hoped that the final terms of the treaty would be based on their stipulations as far as possible. The officers connected with the negotiations on the part of the Ameeers of Hyderabad were Moonshee Khooshiram, Sayed Zulfikar Shah, Sayed Ismail Shah, Ahmed Khan Laghari, Mirza Zenaloobdeen and others. While the Mission was at Hyderabad news was received on 16th February that Kharaksing had proceeded to join General Ventura to settle the affairs of Derajat, but in reality to attack Shikarpoor. The Ameers made hot preparations for opposing the enemy. But the news soon arrived of Kharaksing having retired to Mooltan. This greatly relieved the Ameers and set their mind at rest. (99)

Col. Henry Pottinger had already on his arrival expressed his intention of going to the Khairpoor Durbar on the same errand as had brought him to Hyderabad, but it was strongly opposed by the Hyderabad Ameers. (100) The Ameers said that the Khairpoor Mirs were their subordinates and it was really not necessary to take the trouble of going thither. They even proposed that Pottinger may settle the Khairpoor treaty with Meer Mubarak, the brother of Meer Rustom, who was at Hyderabad on the occasion of the marriage of Shahdad Khan, son of Noor Mohamed and grandson of Meer Mooradali—a Hyderabad Ameer. But Pottinger preferred to go to Khairpoor, since he had heard of the friendly overtures of Meer Rustom to Burnes. The reason why the Hyderabad Chiefs did not like that the British Mission should proceed north was their fear of the English

capturing Shikarpoor 'the apple of their eye.' (100A) But soon their fears were allayed and Pottinger was allowed to proceed to Khairpoor. (101) Pottinger had sent Delhoste in advance to Khairpoor to get reply from the Ameer to his letters. The Ameer at once wrote back to Pottinger and Pottinger left Hyderabad on 21st February for Khairpoor where he arrived on 21st March. (102) He was very cordially received at the Court of Khairpoor where he found more regularity and order than at Hyderabad. (103) The people here were very civil. Here the negotiations did not take long. Pottinger found that the Ameers of Hyderabad were correct in denominating this Court as their subordinate. He sent in his draft of four articles stipulating friendship, free navigation, equitable duties on the river and mutual visit of Vakils. After some little higgle haggle the draft was accepted. On the night previous to their departure the Mission was favoured with several sets of dancing girls. The Ameer also supplied the Mission with his dogs and huntsmen to provide some sport for the party before it started on its return voyage on 11th April. The Mission arrived at Hyderabad on 16th April. (104) The Officers connected with the negotiations at Khairpoor were Deewans Dulpatrai and Lakhmichand as also Fateh Mahomed Ghoree and Ghoharali. The Mission was not detained for long at Hyderabad and left the Sind Capital in State-barges on 20th April, reaching Moghurbee on 5th May. Then the Mission proceeded by land to Lakhpat where it arrived on the 11th instant. (105)

The general tone of the negotiations at the Sind Courts had been conciliatory on the part of the Ameers. There was hardly any stiffness experienced by earlier British Missions to Sind. This was due to the peculiar position in which the Ameers stood. The British wanted only the commercial navigation of the Indus. The Ameers knew the proximity and power of the British in India. If they opposed the English demands they were threatened to be left to the tender mercy of Ranjitsing. But if they assented British authority was a sufficient guarantee against any invasion of their country. So the Ameers consented to the British plan of opening up the Indus for purposes of navigation simply because they were the weaker party and knew fully well the consequences of a refusal. But the Chiefs of Sind were shrewd enough to take advantage of the cartload of good they were doing to the British by asking for a little pittance. It is significant that almost all the princes of the ruling family vied

with one another in establishing a good reputation in the British Camp. The reason was not far to seek. Meer Moorad Ali Khan was the last of the four brothers who initiated Talpur rule in Sind at Hyderabad. At his demise a fight for the *Masnad* was inevitable. Meer Mooradali had two grown-up sons each of whom sought the throne, Noor Mahomed by the right of being the eldest son and Nasir Mahomed by being the favourite of his father. Mir Sobdar the son of the eldest of the Charyars felt that the most legitimate opportunity for him to bid for the throne would be on the demise of Meer Moorad Ali, he being the son of the eldest brother. Similar designs were uppermost in the mind of Meer Mir Mahomed: the son and surviver of the second brother of the Charyars. Meer Moorad Ali went to the extent of opening the topic of succession to the Hyderabad throne with the British envoy but the envoy was clever enough to evade any definite reply and switched on to another matter. It was clear even to the members of the British Mission (105A) that if Meer Moorad Ali had been nice and good to them it was mainly because he wanted the British to intervene in the Sind succession on behalf of his choice Noor Mahomed. Even at Khairpoor a similar state of affairs was noticeable. There Meer Ali Moorad wanted to supercede his elder brothers. He made frantic efforts to alienate the English envoy against his brothers but met with ill-success. All his overtures met a cold and non-committal return from Col. Pottinger who found Ali Moorad quite a dangerous party to deal with. Hence the changed attitude of the Ameers and their acceptance of the British offer, thus recognising the virtual superiority of the British.

It would not be out of place to refer here to the presents sent by the Governor-General to the Ameers and the return presents given to the British envoy. As usual Col. Pottinger had brought some presents for the Ameers. And the Ameers also expected them. So much so that the Chief Ameer of Hyderabad, before the British envoy had not even thrown a hint regarding them, informed him that he should not make any presents to any of his children, nephews, relations or Sardars as they would only excite more jealousy and ill-will than at present existed among them. (106) Though his behaviour was out of etiquette, the Ameer was justified in his action by the fact that there really existed bitter jealousies among the princes. But that was not all. Meer Mooradali in anticipation of receiving presents informed the English envoy through his minister Ismail Shah that he had learnt that he was going to receive some chandliers and a clock along with

other presents and requested Pottinger not to send the articles enumerated above as 'the former were calculated to be for boys and men of sensual pleasures to hang upon in their apartments and the clock got soon out of order and cost more than its worth in sending it for repairs to Bombay.' (107) This was indeed too childish a request and was hardly expected from a ruling Chief. Col. Pottinger sent to the Ameer a suitable reply to his request. He addressed Ismail Shah thus, "I am perfectly lost in amazement at this message, that whatever presents I had for Mooradali were not sent to him by the Governor-General on account of their value but as tokens of His Lordship's regard, that it would have been only becoming in His Highness to have received them as they were meant, that he might have disposed of part or all of them amongst his children, relations or servants". (108) For Col. Pottinger himself wrote to Government to sell off some of the presents received by him from the Ameers as they would not serve any useful purpose. (108A). Col. Henry Pottinger was hardly pleased by the progress of the negotiations at Hyderabad but he could not detain sending the presents to the Ameers much longer as he did not wish the Ameers to imbibe the impression that he was keeping them back from doubts as to the success of his Mission. So Muradali received presents worth Rs. 7,100, consisting of mirrors, chandliers, and other glass-ware along with cloths of English manufacture and some guns and fowling pieces. The Ameer hardly liked the glass-ware and asked his minister Ismail Shah to get the glassware exchanged but the minister failed in his Mission. In a conversation with Col. Pottinger the Ameer referred to the fondness of the English in presenting articles of glass. To this Pottinger replied that the English rejoiced in making presents of articles of English manufacture and since Englishmen excelled in this manufacture, glass-ware stood prominent in their presents at all Indian Courts. But the Ameer had liked the guns and rifles sent to him and he showed his appreciation to Pottinger for them. The envoy also made presents to Meer Noor Mahomed, the eldest son of Meer Mooradali, worth Rs. 550. To Nasir Khan, the second son of the same Ameer he sent a flannel piece worth Rs. 30. To Hyderkhan Laghari, the Governor of Jatee he gave presents valued at Rs. 192, while Nawab Mahomedkhan Laghari the Chief Mahmandar of the Mission received presents amounting to Rs. 165. Thus the Mission bestowed Rs. 8,037 worth of presents on the Hyderabad Court. (109) The Khairpoor Court was not left behind by the British envoy. Meer Rustom Khan received from the envoy

presents valued at Rs. 7,670, consisting of Clocks, Watches, Guns, Pistols, Chandliers, Mirrors etc. The Ameer was extremely pleased with this courtesy. Meer Mubarak, his brother, also received presents worth Rs. 777, whereas the Chief Minister of Khairpoor, Fateh Mahomed Ghoree, got presents of the value of Rs. 300. Thus the Khairpoor Durbar received English presents worth Rs. 8,747. (110) The Khairpoor Ameer sent to the envoy a horse and a camel with gold and silver trappings, match locks and swords, Kashmeer shawls and cloths of Sind, 'as some trifling green leaves of friendship to add to the verdure of the garden of amity between the Governor-General and himself.'. (111) And the Hyderabad Ameers also did not lag behind in this respect. From the Hyderabad Court the Mission received 9 horses, one riding camel, two couples of Sind dogs, one very valuable sword with bejewelled belt and the best blade,—originally received by Meer Mooradali Khan from the Shah of Persia as a present—two other swords, one battle axe, four pairs of shawls, 12 pieces of silk, cloths of Punjab and Sind, some Sind loongees, four richly mounted match-locks, two saddles and two bridles mounted with gold, silver and turquoises. (112)

Up to this time the knowledge of the English about the Ameers of Sind was so limited that they were considered semi-barbarian. But on this occasion most of the members of the Mission had enough opportunities to see how shrewd the ruling Chief of Hyderabad was. The British envoy himself must have been impressed by the Ameer's ready wit when on one occasion the Ameer asked him what was the purpose of the British opening communications with all the neighbouring States. In answer the envoy replied that the British undertook these missions for mutual benefit and friendship. To this the Ameer returned a quick rejoinder that the English had taken the whole of India by mere negotiation. (113) Delhoste and W. Pottinger also record their opinion of the Ameer. Capt. W. Pottinger while referring to Meer Moorad Ali remarks, "He is by far the most sensible and ablest man in Sinde.' (114) to which Delhoste adds, "Meer Mooradali Khan is decidedly a shrewd and sensible man. As a proof of his quickness I may here mention that previous to his signing the Treaty, he read it over twice, most carefully pondering on the sense of each phrase and word. At last he came to the word 'Resident' at which he stopped and begged to have the meaning of it explained to him fully. This was done after which he sealed the Treaty.....Anyone witnessing the scene would have at once decided that H. H. was a good man of business." (115)

Thus at long last by the treaty dated 19th June, 1832 and 4th April ,1832, with supplementary articles between the East India Company and the Ameers of Sind as also by similar treaties with Bahawalpore and Lahore Governments the Indus was opened for commercial navigation at fixed and reasonable river toll collected under the superintendence of British agents—a Native agent at the mouths of the Indus and an Englishman stationed at Mithankote. The toll was fixed at Rs. 570 per boat whatever the nature and weight of the cargo, of which Rs. 240 were to be given to the Sind Ameers, Rs. 160 to Hyderabad and Rs. 80 to Khairpore and the rest was to be divided proportionately among the other parties. Navigation passports were provided without which no boat could either enter or leave the Indus. And since there was a likelihood of further intercourse with Sind, Col. Henry Pottinger was appointed Agent on the part of the Governor-General for the affairs of Sind in addition to his duties as Resident in Kutch. So now the Indus was opened to commerce and both commerce and politics came to thrive by it to the great detriment of the Ameers of Sind.

INDEX TO NUMBERS.

	Pages.	Nos. Referred in the article.
Basu—Major B. D.		
Rise of Christian Power in India (One Volume)	784–85	20, 21, 22, 30
Burnes—Sir Alexander.		
Travels to Bokhara, Vol. I.	2	28
	3	26, 29
	5	31
	7	32
	13	33
	17	34
	18	35
	20	36
	25	42
	32	43
	33	44
	39	45
	40–41	46
	42	47
	54	52

	Pages Nos.	Referred in the article.
	57	48; 53, 54
	59	48A, 49
	60	50, 51
Burnes—Dr. James.		
A Narrative of a visit to the Court of Scinde	10	1, 2, 3
	11	4, 10
	40	11
	42	12, 13
	51	14
	53	15
	56	16
	76	17
	121	18
Cunnigham—		
History of the Sikhs, 1st Edition ..	205	19
Del Hoste—E.		
Memoir on Sind, 1832. (Imperial Record Deptt.)		68, 115
Del Hoste—E.		
Journal kept during the stay of the British Mission in Sind, 1832 (Printed Selections from the Pre-mutiny Records of the Commissioner-in-Sind)	185	65
	188	70
	194	81
	195	82
	197	83, 83A
	200	85
	201	72, 86, 87
	202	87A, 88
Pottinger—Capt. W.		
Memoir on Sind 1832 (Imperial Record Dept.)		23, 23A, 84, 90 91A, 100, 100A 101, 114.

	Pages	Nos. Referred in the article.
Prinsep—		
Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab	152	24, 25
	154	27
Selections from the Records of the Commissioner-in-Sind File No. 300	89	74
	115	67
	369	66
	409	69
Selections from the Records of the Commissioner-in-Sind File No. 301	..	91, 102, 103, 104, 105, 111, 112.
	11	63
	11–13	64
	20	71
	25	73
	28	79A
	26–34	80
	37	75, 76
	39	77, 78
	54	79
	71	89
	77	106
	92	94, 95
	119–120	41, 92, 93
	143–144	108A, 109,110
	171–172	104, 107, 108
	176	78, 96, 97
	180	98
	235	113
	263	99
Khera—P. N.		
British Policy towards Sind ..	7	6, 7, 8, 9
	Do.	
	(Footnote 17)	5
	11	37, 38
	12	39,40
	14	56
	16	55
	18	57,58
	19–21	59, 60, 61, 62

Sind in 1809: Extracts from Henry Ellis' Account.

By B. D. Mirchandani, I.C.S.

Read before The Sind Historical Society on 25-2-43.

Crow wrote his "Account" of Sind in 1800. After him, the next contemporary account of the province is by Henry Ellis. Ellis was First Assistant to Nicholas Hankey Smith, the E. I. Company's envoy to the Sind Court, who in 1809 concluded a treaty of friendship with the Amirs, the object of which was to prevent the settlement of the French in Sind rendered necessary by Napolean's designs on India. After the return of the Mission, Ellis prepared a report containing "a short and general account of the resources and political strength of the State of Sind" based on personal observation which was submitted through the envoy to the Governor-General in Council. This report has never been published before. It is an important contemporary document which throws considerable light on the internal state of Sind and the external relations of the Amirs' Government at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The following extracts from the report, it is hoped, will prove of interest to the students of Sind history.

"Although the country of Sind has been since the Treaty of Cession concluded between Nadir Shah and the King of Delhi nominally a tributary province of the Kingdom of Cabul yet the obedience paid by the Rulers of Sind to their Paramount has been extremely remiss and the advance of an army has been generally required to enforce the payment of the tribute. The present Rulers relying on the distracted state of Cabul openly declare themselves independent of the Monarch of that Kingdom and confine their demonstrations of respect to retaining a Wakeel at his Court."

"The internal government of Sind is, like that of most other countries in Asia, a military despotism and the supreme authority is vested in a triumvirate composed of three brothers of the Talpooree family whose names are Meer Ghulam Ulee, Meer Kureem Ulee and Meer Murad Ulee; the eldest has the title of Hakim or Ruler of Sind and is considered as the head of the Government by foreign states, but he enjoys no greater degree of actual authority than what is procured by the larger share of the revenue that was assigned to him at the demise of his elder brother, the late Meer Futteh Ulee."

"There are two other members of the reigning family Meer Sohrab and Meer Thara who, although not ostensibly partakers in the supreme authority, possess large tracts of territory in Sind, exercise every function of government within their respective limits and are rather to be considered as federative branches of the State of Sind than as feuderatories of the principal Ameers."

"The Mahomedan inhabitants constitute the military strength of the country in war and are employed as husbandmen, artificers and menial servants during peace, while the foreign and inland commerce of the country is almost exclusively carried on by the Hindoo part of the population."

"The Sindian armies are composed of levies from the military tribes which form the majority of the population of the country; there are forty two tribes under their respective chiefs who hold their lands on a military tenure from the Ameers at whose requisition they are compelled to bring their quotas into the field."

"The Ameers of Sind when assisted by Meer Sohrab and Meer Thara are able to bring an army of 36,000 men into the field. The army is composed of irregular cavalry armed with matchlocks, swords and shields and intended to act as infantry whenever circumstances require it; it is not unusual for the whole of the Sindian army to dismount and to engage the enemy on foot; the Balochees are generally considered as good marksmen but do not enjoy among other nations a high character in point of courage or discipline; the pay of a Sindian soldier including his provisions is five pice per diem; during peace he only receives a daily allowance of one seer of rice."

"The revenues of Sind amounted during the Government of the Caloree family to 80 lacs of rupees, but are now reduced in consequence of the oppression and ignorance of the present Rulers to 42 lacs and 78 thousand rupees which amount is divided among the members of the Talpouree family; the annual tribute of 12 lacs due to the King of Cabul, the payment of which is liable to be enforced, must be deducted from the above amount."

"After the death of Meer Fateh Alee his three surviving brothers, the present Ameers, divided the revenues and territorial possessions of their branch of the family into four shares

of which two were assigned to Meer Gholam Alee as the ostensible head of the Government and the remainder in equal proportions to Meer Kareem and Meer Murad Alee. The sum thus divided amounts to 34 lacs and 13 thousand rupees; in return for this larger share Meer Gholam is bound to defray the permanent civil and military expenses of the state, the former however under the present reduced establishment are inconsiderable, and as during peace very few soldiers are maintained at the public charge and their pay is so trifling the actual expenditure of the elder Ameer cannot be considered to exceed in a great degree that of his brothers. Meer Gholam Alee is also bound to pay a double share of the tribute due to the King of Cabul in the event of payment being enforced."

"The policy of the Sind Government and the private inclinations of the individuals composing it are directed to the accumulations of money as the best security for their usurped authority against the attempts of foreign hostility or internal disaffection, the amount of the specie deposited in the different forts throughout the country is supposed to be considerable as a very small proportion of the annual revenue is expended."

"The obvious necessity of union and the ties of the relationship have not prevented amongst the Umeers the existence of the dissensions and jealousies generally attendant upon a division of the supreme authority; on the contrary the general causes of disunion have been aggravated by the particular defects of their characters which are remarkable for the absence of almost any moral virtue."

"The river Indus runs in nearly a diagonal direction through the Sindian territories and affords in its course the means of successful cultivation to the husbandman and of secure and easy communications with the most distant countries to the merchants; for even under the pressure of an oppressive and ignorant government whose barbarous policy by seizing an undue share of the profits of the native trader, and by levying an exorbitant duty upon imports paralyzes the exertions of the mercantile speculator and destroys the sources of future revenue, commercial adventurers from all parts of Asia are still to be seen in Sind."

"Commerce and agriculture rapidly decrease under the rapacious and ignorant government of the Ameers, the duties levied upon foreign and domestic trade are estimated at two-thirds of the capital of the merchants and mechanic, and the unjust monopolization of grain which the Ameers compulso-

rily purchase from the cultivators at low price and retail at an exorbitant rate combined with the effects of their inordinate passion for hunting, which has induced them to enclose large tracts of land on the banks of the Indus for the purpose of preserving the game, have converted fertile and well cultivated districts into desolate wastes and impervious forests."

"The reduced amount of the customs levied at Carachee (the only seaport in the territories of the Ameers) which do not at present exceed 1,10,000 rupees is a sufficient proof of the decline of the maritime commerce of Sind; the scarcity of rain that has prevailed in Sind during the last three years has prevented the usual exportation of rice from the port of Carachee to India and large quantities have been imported during that period to meet the consumption of the country."

"The City of Tatta, formerly the seat of government of commercial industry, has rapidly decreased in population and revenue under the present government; the sum received by Meer Gholam Alee from this city under the heads of land revenue and customs is estimated at 1,45,000 Rupees. The Sindian cloths exported to India, Persia and Chorasan are manufactured at Tatta."

"Hyderabad the residence of the Umeers and the present seat of Government yields a revenue of 60,000 rupees. Although no encouragement is given to industry by the Umeers, the artisans of Hyderabad are numerous and workers in leather are particularly celebrated for the excellence of their workmanship."

"The customs and the revenue of Sind in general are farmed by private merchants; as the Umeers, with a view of increasing the competition, annually remove the farmers of the revenue the latter have no interest in the general improvement of the country and direct their attention exclusively to receive the greatest possible profits within the period of their control; and the Umeers frequently avail themselves of the extortions committed by the contractors in attaining that object as a pretext for confiscating their property conscious that no class of society will sympathise with their misfortunes and that the rapacity of individuals will still obtain purchasers for the revenue contract."

"The principal articles of home produce exported from Sind are rice, ghee, hides, sharkfins, potash saltpetre, assafetida, delium, madder, frankincense, Tatta cloths, horses, indigo oleaginous and other seeds; alum, musk, saffrons and

horses are imported from Multan and the countries to the northward for the foreign market; the other imports are tin, iron, lead, steel, ivory, Europe manufactures, sandal and other woods from India, swords and carpets from Chorasan and Candhar and silk and other articles from the Persian Gulph. The Mooltanee merchants settled in Sind are the principal shroffs (Bankers) and constitute the wealthiest part of the monied interest of the country."

"The intercourse between Sind and the countries to the northward is chiefly carried on by means of the Indus which is navigable for small vessels to a considerable distance from the sea. It does not appear that caravans proceed regularly from Sind to Multan and Cabul; although the route is frequented by travellers and merchants."

"The relation of the State of Sind to the kingdom of Cabul has been already noticed; the other neighbouring chiefs with which the Umeers maintained a political intercourse are the Rajah of Joudpore the Nawab of Bhawalpore, the Jumedar of Cutch and Meerkhan Lais, the chief of the petty state of Somnuany."

"The Ummers appear anxious to cultivate friendly relations with the Raja of Joudpore of whose designs upon the eastern frontier of Sind they entertain the greatest apprehension; the treacherous attempt made by the Wakeels of the former Raja of Joudpore upon Meer Bihjur, the uncle of the Umeers, appears to have been forgiven."

"The recent death of Bhawalkhan and the tender age of his successor have induced the Umeers to contemplate the seizure of the territory of Bhawalpore; as however Meer Sohrab conceives that the proximity of his provinces to Bhawalpore gives him a superior claim to avail himself of the present favourable opportunity, the prosecution of the schemes of the principal Umeers will probably be attended with a rupture between them and Meer Sohrab."

"An intimate and friendly connection has subsisted for some time between the Nawab of Kelat and the Umeers; during the life time of Nusseer Khan, the late Nawab of Kalat who was distinguished by superior military talents and could command the services of the numerous hordes of mountaineers subject to his government, the connection with Sind rested upon principles of equality and mutual advantage; but since the

death of Nusseer Khan the Umeers have succeeded in acquiring a degree of influence in the councils of his successor Muhmood Khan that will probably terminate in the subversion of his independence. The dominions of Gholam Muhmood Khan are situated on the north western frontier of Sind and extend to the borders of the Cabul Monarchy."

"Futeh Mahmed, the Jumadar of Cutch is of Baloochee extraction and has uniformly endeavoured to secure the friendship of the state of Sind as a support to his usurped authority; the Umeers have encouraged this disposition in the hope of obtaining his consent to the intended annexation of Lucpaut Bunder to the Sindian territories.

"The territories of Meer Khan Lais occupy the sea coast to the northward of Carachee; he is a tributory of the Nawab of Kelat and is very inimical to the Umeers whose encroachments he justly apprehends."

"The progress of the connection between the King of Persia and the Umeers commenced at the instigation of the French and directed to the obtaining of their co-operation in the invasion of British India has already been brought under the notice of Government and as no change has taken place in the relations of the Sind Government to those powers, it would be superfluous to repeat the information upon the subject contained in the public despatches."

"A Wukeel from Jeswant Rao Holker has lately arrived at Kitee, the residence of Meer Thara, for the purpose of proposing an union between his Master, the King of Persia, the French and the Ameers against the British Government; the Umeers do not appear to have received the proposition with any degree of satisfaction. The Wakeel is eventually to proceed on a mission to the Court of Persia."

"The natural resources of Sind are considerable and would render an improved system of government, enable its Rulers to annex the petty states in the vicinity to their dominions; no increase of territory or augmentation of political strength is, however, to be expected while the present-timed parasitous and ignorant Rulers possess the management of public affairs; on the contrary the sources of revenue are rapidly diminishing and the misery and discontent of the people in general have reached a height that must soon terminate in the subversion of the existing Government and the horrors of civil war."

DID THE BRITISH INTRODUCE CHRISTIANITY INTO SIND.

By Rev. Achilles Meersman, O.F.M.

It is an error to state that Christianity was first introduced into Sind by the British. Actually Christianity came to Sind, before it went to Britain. In the first century of our present era St. Thomas, one of Christ's Apostles came to India, converted King Gondophares of Taxila (near Rawalpindi) who at that time was ruler over the Indus Valley. Therefore Sind had a Christian King, long before Britain had one.

Later as more and more people in Iraq, Iran and other neighbouring countries embraced Christianity, and these travelled along the trade-routes to the Indus Valley, there grew up a Christian community in Sind. There are indications that such was the case, but succeeding invaders have destroyed the manuscripts and monuments, which might have contributed towards a better knowledge of this first Christianity.

This first Christianity was, however, completely wiped out at the time of the Mahomedan invasions and it was only later, chiefly after Akbar had instituted a policy of, what we may term, tolerance and the Portuguese had acquired a goodly amount of power in the Indian seas that Christianity returned to Sind. In the beginning there were some Christian settlers, chiefly merchants and military in the Mogul army, but later priests arrived and chapels built. Later when the policy of tolerance was no longer followed the priests were obliged to leave Sind and the chapels they had erected at Tatta, Lahribander, Bhakkar were demolished.

Later Christians returned once more to Sind. When this took place, we have not been able to ascertain. All we know is that it was necessary for a priest to come from time to time to Sind in order to hold services for the Christians. This was done at least up to a few years before the arrival of the British. Thus we read that at least upto 1835 a Catholic priest of the Augustinian Order came to Kara hi for this purpose. (1) Then in 1840 a priest was stationed at Hyderabad and since then there have always been Christians in Sind with own churches and regular services. They have fur-

ther contributed to the development of Sind chiefly through their educational work, which they initiated almost a century ago. (2)

(1) N. de Figueiredo, Os Religiosos Eremitas de Santo Ogostinho no Oriente, Boletim Eclesiastico da Orguidiocese de Goa, I (1942) 57.

(2) Regarding Christianity in Sind see our articles: Christianity in Sind and Baluchistan in Pre-Portuguese times, J. S. H. S., 1937; Christianity in Sind and Baluchistan. From the Portuguese invasions to the British Conquest, J. S. H. S., 1938. The Discalced Carmelites in Sind, J. S. H. S., 1941.


PLAN OF THE
BATTLE OF MEANEE
fought on the 17th February 1843.
between the British Force under Maj. Genl. Sir C. J. Napier K.C.B.
and the
Beloochee Army of the Ameers of Scinde.
By
Major C. Waddington.
Bom. Engr. with the British Force
Scale
Fooleilee River
The Ameers Camp
British Camp
After the Battle
Water

THE SIND BATTLES, 1843.

I.— MIANI. *(with two illustrations.)*

By H. T. LAMBRICK, I.C.S.

With the attack on the British Residency near Hyderabad on February 15th, 1843, by some 8,000 Baluchis led by Mir Shahdad Khan, the last faint hopes of a peaceful settlement of the affairs of Sind, till then cherished in spite of all probability by Outram, were finally dispelled. The force which attacked the Residency was detached from the host of the Mirs' feudatories which had already, on learning of Napier's preparations to advance from Syedabad to Hala, moved out from Hyderabad and encamped on the Fuleli to bar his path, Mir Nasir Khan, the senior Talpur Prince, following them on the evening of the 14th. On Shahdad Khan rejoining him next day, Nasir Khan moved his camp to Lunar, and on the 16th the whole force of the Balochis was in position at Miani.

Outram had reached the British camp at Matiari from his steamer that morning, and persuaded Napier to allow him to descend the river again a short distance, to create a diversion by burning the jungles to the left and rear of the Baloch position, taking with him two hundred convalescent sepoys for the purpose. He estimated the strength of the Mirs' lashkar at 18,000 men, and warned Napier that the battle would be desperate. Napier had other sources of information. he had spies who went into the Baloch camp that very day*, and returned with a tale of 30,000. The Mirs' munshis§ and cossids, who had constantly been in motion between Hyderabad and the General's camps on his advance, must have given their masters an exact account of his little army: he could bring into line of battle 2,800 men, with twelve guns. This force was made up of four weak battalions of infantry; Her Majesty's 22nd Foot, the 1st (Grenadier), 12th, and 25th Bombay Native Infantry: two weak Regiments of Cavalry, the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry and the Scinde Irregular Horse, with a detachment of the Poona Irregular Horse; the 2-2nd Bombay Foot Artillery and 3rd Company Golandaz, with twelve guns: and C. Company Madras Sappers and Miners.

---

*Life, III. p. 92.
§e.g., Moolram, (Nasir Khan's statement, Sind Blue Book, supplementary, 1844, p. 128.)
†Life, Vol. II, p. 323.

The disparity in numbers was in any case very great: but with every day it was likely to be increased by the arrival of further contingents of the Baloch tribesmen, who were known to Napier to be on the march towards the rendezvous at Miani. It was in the light of this knowledge that he had precipitated hostilities by continuing to advance on Hyderabad, in spite of Outram's protests: and whatever judgment may be passed on Napier's earlier proceedings in Sind, he would have risked his army had he given the appearance of hesitation in these last three days. It was a relief to him to end the period of suspense. "Not to be anxious about attacking such immensely superior numbers is impossible; but it is delightful anxiety." Hardly were the words written when Jacob, whom he had sent out that evening to locate the Baloch army,* returned to report that he had found them eight or nine miles away. Less than three hours remained for sleep; for at four o'clock in the morning of the 17th February, reveille sounded in the British camp and the little army got on the move for its last march. The Advance Guard was led as usual by the Scinde Horse, under John Jacob: with him were the Madras Sappers under Captain Henderson, and a working party of 100 sepoys, to prepare passages through the numerous canals and nullahs for the guns, of which two nine-pounders proceeded with Jacob.

An hour was spent in forming a road across two large canals not far from the camp, but thereafter the march proceeded without diffioulty for about seven miles when, not long after sunrise, the Advance Guard came on the dry bed of the Fuleli, a dry branch of the Indus adapted for irrigation, here running almost due south. The troops followed a track which led along the left bank for a mile or more past several small villages embowered in trees; as they reached the second of these the sound of a distant cannon was heard. The General, who was now with the Advance Guard, formed up his infantry behind a small canal and unlimbered his two guns, shortly afterwards ordering Jacob to detach one squadron to skirt round a dense shikargah enclosed by a mud wall on the further bank of the Fuleli, and to proceed himself to the left front with the rest of his regiment so as to reconnoitre beyond another shikargarh, the wall of which stretched away obliquely across the previous line of march.

Jacob soon ascertained that the Mirs' army was in front of him, and sent back word to the General, who moved forward

*Jacob's letter to his father, dated February 23rd, 1843.

and somewhat to the left with the remainder of the Advance Guard, until he too came in sight of the Baluch position, at about a mile's distance. Here he halted to await the arrival of the main body of his army, and from the top of a small sandhill scanned the front through his glass: with his Staff he calculated the visible strength of the Balochis at 8,000 foot and 3,000 Horse. Meanwhile Jacob pushed briskly on over a little plain dotted with low sandy hillocks and camel bushes, bounded on the left by the shallow green bed of a watercourse, beyond which were low brushwood and trees, and on the right by the shikargarh wall, which after extending to about 700 yards from the watercourse turned away to the south nearly parallel with it. The narrow corridor thus formed led directly to the Mirs' position. On reaching a point about opposite the angle of the shikargarh wall, Jacob formed line from column, and halted his regiment about 500 yards from the foremost Baluchis, while he moved on himself to reconnoitre. Their main body was obvious enough, between two conspicuous flags, and filling the space between the wall, and a grove of trees with enclosed ground, to the left front. Several pieces of artillery were in position in front of the line on each flank, and in rear a large body of horse moved about, behind whom again the tents and flags of the Mirs' camp could just be seen through the dust. As Jacob walked his horse forward, he came under matchlock fire both from the shikargarh and the enclosures on his left front, which, he discovered, concealed a village. The Baluchis had thus occupied positions on each flank in advance of their main line. It was very difficult to judge their strength, for any number might be hidden in the wood and enclosure: and though Jacob approached to within two hundred yards from the centre of their line, he could not see that between their guns and the masses visible in rear of them ran the bed of the Fuleli, here at right angles to its former course, concealing large numbers of the Baloch tribesmen. Mir Nasir Khan tried to stop his people from firing, in the hope that a parley was intended. But he soon saw the officer and his escort turn and trot back to their corps; whence Jacob despatched a note to the General, telling him what he had seen.

The Mir therefore gave the order for his cannon to open fire on the Scinde Horse, who preserved their formation in line, which was soon made more imposing by the arrival of Fitz Gerald's squadron. He had seen no enemy, but had ascertained that the shikargarh on the right bank of the Fuleli extended down stream for several miles; that it was free from the enemy, and impracticable for troops. The General therefore decided to engage the

Baloch army in a frontal attack. But a long hour dragged away without a sign of the main body of his own army: it was delayed by accidents to the ammunition waggons in the nullahs. Meanwhile the Scinde Horse remained exposed to the fire of the Baloch artillery at little more than point-blank range, and the right of their line was annoyed by matchlock fire from the shikargarh wall: many Baloch horsemen too came here and there to the front, and dismounting fired on them with deliberate aim, and from time to time there was some appearance of a general advance being made; but on Jacob moving his line forward also, they returned to their former position and resumed their artillery fire. Though this was kept up intermittently for over an hour, and the guns were, in Jacob's opinion, "really not badly directed."—Mr. Howell, the Mirs' English artilleryman, was forced to point them, with eight matchlocks put to his head—only six of Jacob's horses were killed by the round shot: the first casualties on either side. The regiment remained perfectly steady under the ordeal.

At last the head of the main column of the British appeared, and the General moving forward as it closed on the Advance Guard, the whole wheeled left, and, when sufficient ground had been taken up, countermarched to the right, halted, and turned left into line, some three hundred yards behind the Scinde Horse, which Jacob now formed in squadron close column, to allow as much room as possible for the infantry, whose right flank was at about the same distance from the shikargarh wall, which was studded with matchlock men. The line was now carefully dressed, skirmishers thrown out, and some brushwood in front of H.M.'s 22nd cut down. Napier now gave orders for the men to have their breakfast, while he continued to examine the position and more particularly the shikargarh, through his telescope, and consider his plan of attack. In view of the reports of Jacob and FitzGerald, nothing but a frontal assault was possible: but he was anxious for his flanks, and his rear. The Balochis continued their cannonade, but the range was long, and only an occasional round shot pitched close to the ranks: the matchlock men had gradually disappeared from the top of the Shikargarh wall, and by the time the General was ready to advance only one was left, sitting astride, and firing matchlocks passed up to him by men on the other side.* The British Artillery were now brought up on the right of the line, the Company of Madras Sappers flanking them, and Napier gave orders for the advance in echelon of battalions from the

*Life IV, p. 111.

right, H. M.'s 22nd leading, and in succession the 25th, 12th and 1st Grenadiers. Napier ordered some men of the 22nd to shoot the Baloch on the wall as they advanced, and he fell. After two hundred yards were covered, the halt was given, and the gunners opened fire with round shot. It was nearly eleven o'clock, and the day was becoming very hot. The range was found too great for the practice of the artillery to be effective, and Napier advanced another 250 yards; the guns again unlimbered, and under their fire that of the Baloch cannon was observed to slacken. Again the British line, still in the same formation, was moved to about 300 yards from the Mir's position, and halted: and now at point blank range the artillery began such a fire as silenced the enemy's guns, four of them being withdrawn into the bed of the Fuleli; the howitzers also plied the shikargarh with grapeshot. But Napier was still anxious for this flank. He had passed close to a gap in the wall about a hundred yards beyond its first angle, and though a near view confirmed what he had seen through his telescope, that the wall was not loopholed, or provided with any banquette to enable men to fire over it, there remained the danger of a sortie on his rear. The line was now being dressed under a heavy matchlock fire, and the baggage brought up as close as possible behind it. Napier had ordered the kit to be gathered together and surrounded by the camels in a circle; and under the shelter of the infantry line this was done, the animals being made to sit with their heads pointing inwards, and bales in between them: and the troops detailed for the guard, four companies of the Bombay Grenadiers and the detachment of the Poona Horse, took up their stations. At the last moment it occurred to the General to engage the enemy within the shikargarh, and he detached Captain Tew with the Grenadier Company of the 22nd, with orders to defend the opening till the last.§ By now their comrades had begun to reply to the Baloch musketry, and at length the bugles sounded for the final advance: Napier sending word to Jacob to protect the left of the line, while he kept the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry in reserve behind the right.

The infantry moved briskly forward, and now came the word to charge: the 22nd sprang forward up a slight slope at the line of matchlock men whose heads showed just above it, thinking to break them at once; but eager for close combat though they were, they wavered in astonishment as their eyes fell on the unsuspected bed of the Fuleli, and the host that awaited them there, whose thousand tulwars flashed in the sun.

§Life IV., p. 111.

The Balochis had indeed awaited them in perfect confidence, their front rank posted on a rough firing step cut in the northern bank of the canal; and masses clustered behind and below them: with all their burning fanaticism, they had not revealed prematurely their strength of numbers and position. But now the time was come: the 22nd fired a volley, and closed with the foremost Balochis, who rose to meet them, throwing down their matchlocks, and dashing forward with sword and shield: after a sharp melee they were thrust back over the edge, yet the 22nd did not plunge down among them, but came to a stop on the brink. And now the British line recoiled slowly, resorting to a rolling fire, the front rank kneeling and retiring to reload, as the rear rank took their place. They thus avoided the matchlock fire of all but those of the Mir's men who climbed up the bank to take aim, and these they steadily shot down. The 25th and 12th Bombay Native Infantry, coming into action successively on the left of the British regiment, soon followed their comrades' example. The troops in fact settled down to fight the battle in their own fashion despite the exhortations of their officers: and their instinct was right. Until the numbers of the enemy had been greatly thinned, and their morale in some degree impaired, it was hopeless for the thin red line, innocent of infantry reserves, to engulf itself in the Fuleli.

Meanwhile on the extreme right the Madras Sappers were well performing their duty of helping to get the artillery into position. This was made more difficult by the fact that the ground here was broken and encumbered with the cannon abandoned by the Balochis: moreover, the space left between the 22nd on their final advance, and the shikargah wall, which here bent outwards at a slight angle, was insufficient to allow of all the British guns being brought up into line. Only four could be unlimbered at all: the leading horses were shot the moment they showed their heads at the bank of the Fuleli, but Captain Hutt got a twelve pounder howitzer run up by main force, *and though at first the Balochis swarmed about him, they were driven back, and three more guns manhandled into position. Many tribesmen were now moving into the shikargah, with the obvious intention of turning the British right: some approaching under cover of the wall opened a galling matchlock fire on the Sappers, Artillery, and the right of the 22nd. Those of the Sappers who were armed replied with their fusils, while those with tools started breaking down the wall.§ As soon as the gap

*Jacob's letter.

§Captain Henderson's report.

was wide enough, Hutt trained a howitzer obliquely backwards into the shikargah, another gun fired across the muzzle of this one, while of the other two, one enfiladed the Fuleli bed and the fourth plied the Mir's horsemen in the rear. By his management of the first two guns, Hutt, in Jacob's opinion, saved the right of the line: for Tew had been killed at the head of the company of the 22nd, which had advanced into the shikargarh some distance through the brushwood, and could hardly have sustained a heavy attack without support: but Hutt's grape kept the Balochis back in the dense jungle. As for the guns which enfiladed the bed of the Fuleli, nothin could have been more effective: yet the Balochis made no attempt to capture them, though their muzzles were only a few yards from the foremost of the brave men who filled the river bed close as a field of corn, through which each discharge cut a bloody swathe. Well was it for the British that no such concerted rush, as a handful of Marris had made with fiery impetuosity at Naffusk, was launched against Napier's guns by the Mirs' far more numerous lashkar.

The contracting front, which had crowded the artillery out of the right of the line in the final advance, had proved even more awkward on the left. Napier's object in adopting the échelon formation was to refuse this flank, on account of Sultan Shah village* and its enclosures being occupied by the Balochis in front of their main position: he intended that the Grenadiers should attack, and force the Balochis out of it: and Jacob, with his Regiment drawn up in squadron close column immediately to the north of the enclosed ground, found that the advance of the infantry line was bringing the Grenadiers up straight behind him, while the 12th N. I. passed on, coming up into line with the 25th. Concluding that the task of carrying the village had been allotted to the Grenadiers, he moved left, to fulfil his own orders to protect the flank, which it seemed might be most effectively done by making a diversion beyond Sultan Shah, and trying to find a way round it. But the Mirs' commanders had foreseen and prepared for such a move. Every nullah, hole, and watercourse had been scarped and lined by numerous matchlock men, firing through thorn hedges; the ground was also quite "blind," uneven and covered with jungle. Advancing at a gallop over these obstacles so many falls occurred that over fifty horses and men were on the ground at once; the

*In all previous accounts, the name of the village is shown as Katri. But this is what the surrounding country is called, not the village itself: the name which is correctly given on Waddington's plan.

fire from the village 60 yards on the right was very heavy, and casualties among Jacob's men and horses began to mount, with no corresponding gain. His own charger was shot dead under him, and in another instant the whole regiment, its formation sadly disorganized, was brought to a stand by a deep and wide cut from the Fuleli, strongly manned by matchlockmen, and utterly impassable for cavalry. Jacob accepted the inevitable and ordered the Retire, extricating his men as rapidly as he could.

Meanwhile Major Clibborn, commanding the 1st Grenadiers, had made no attack on the village. He had only 200 bayonets at his disposal, the baggage guard having absorbed twice that number of his men; and to launch such a small force against a village carefully prepared for defence, and held by perhaps five times his strength, may well have seemed to court disaster, which would not be confined to his own unit. He felt bound to maintain contact with the 12th N. I., which had advanced right up to the Fuleli bed, and to do so had had to take up a position "en potence"—facing almost Eastward while the main line faced south. Here he kept up a skirmishing fire on the village and enclosures.

Far different was the action on the brink of the Fuleli. Over it now hung a pall of dust and smoke, through which the flash of matchlock and musket and cannon lightened, and battling forms appeared now clearly, now dimly, as the advantage swung to and fro; the roar of the musketry seemed continuous, almost drowning the staccato thud of the artillery.* It was now past noon and still fresh Balochis pressed forward to fill the places of those that fell under the musketry, whose bodies began to pile thickly on the ledge below the bank. Ever and anon, driven to desperation by the incessant torment of grape and musket-balls, a band of dedevoted swordsmen stormed up it and hurled themselves upon the bayonets; but though the British line several times gave ground under the sheer weight of the charges, it remained unbroken; and lapping round their assailants from each flank sepoy and soldier roughly handled them with the bayonet, and drove the survivors back into the river bed. But the troops could not yet be made to counter-attack: as soon as their ranks were back in their old position, six or eight paces from the brink, they halted, the men only advancing to deliver their fire into the dense masses of the enemy, and

*Jacob's letter of 23rd February, 1843.

returning to load. Many of the men were constantly engaged in wiping blood or sweat from the pans of their muskets, or adjusting their flints, defending themselves with their bayonets the while: yet they maintained a rate of fire which gradually beat down that of the matchlocks, for the "old hands" now loaded without the ramrod; the cartridge fitted "Brown Bess" so loosely that the weight of the ball, with a smart tap of the butt on the ground was sufficient to send it home.*

The General, well up in the front with the 22nd, never ceased to urge the men on; and the Queen's and Company's Officers vied with each other in intrepidity. Major Teasdale, commanding the 25th N. I., and Major Jackson, second in command of the 12th N. I., fell gallantly in the midst of the Baloch swordsmen: Lt.-Col. Pennefather, commanding H. M.'s 22nd, was badly wounded: and of those who took their places, few were unscathed, whether rallying their men, or sacrificing themselves in setting an example to engage the enemy more closely. Mir Nasir Khan, for his part, sent word to his commander in the field, Mir Jan Mahomed Khanani, to lead a general assault. The Sardar made a valiant effort: but just as he had made his way to the front rank and was encouraging his men, Lieut. McMurdo, Napier's Aide-de-Camp, who, on his horse being killed, obtained permission to fight with his old regiment, dashed down into the river bed, with a handful of men, hoping the rest would follow: meeting Jan Mahomed, he killed him and another, fighting hand to hand; but finding himself and his few companions unsupported and all but surrounded, forced his way back, amazed at the conduct of the 22nd, who still kept their ground just behind the brink. In vain he ordered, objurgated, and implored them to charge; a man shouted "Mr. McMurdo, if you don't leave off we'll shoot you." Up till this moment, in spite of their far heavier casualties, the Mirs' troops had a fair chance of victory: for Mir Jan Mahomed, as a member of one of the senior collateral branches of the Talpur house, known and respected for his bravery by the tribal sardars, might well by his example have got all to combine in a simultaneous onset. However, he fell; Mir Nasir Khan ordered Ghulam Shah Talpur, of the Shahwani clan, to take command in his place, but this chief was also killed shortly afterwards. Had the Baloch tribesmen possessed the elements of discipline, and their sardars been kept under effective control, with cool and resolute direction, their host must have prevailed: but all three were wanting: the clans mustered toge-

*General McMurdo, quoted in Bruce.

ther shoulder to shoulder along the bed of the Fuleli looked only to their own front. And so, undirected, the desperate valour of the Mir's feudatories spent itself in vain: their rushes were uncoordinated, mere individual efforts of tribal sardars leading a knot of devoted clansmen.

Even so, the slender line of the British was hard put to it to repel these repeated onslaughts: and while the fight was at its hottest the old General had ridden forward through the ranks of the 22nd, and, followed by Majors Waddington and Wyllie, passed slowly down the front of the line; an extraordinary apparition, bareheaded, with spectacles on eagle nose, grey whiskers singed by the wilder firing of his own men, and stirred by the wind of matchlock balls, waving his jockey cap in the air, yelling and blaspheming. Twice he rallied the 22nd, but he could not make them charge; and he passed on to the 25th N. I. Here he was almost alone in front of the line when a Baluch came over the bank, and came straight towards him: Napier had sprained his wrist, punching the head of a delinquent camel man at Daulatpur, nine days before,* and could hardly have defended himself: but Lieutenant Marston springing forward attracted the eye of the oncoming Baloch, and received his first cut on his brass epaulette: a return blow was parried by the Baluch with his shield, but a sepoy advancing plunged his bayonet into his side, and Marston at the same time got over his guard with a final cut, being saved himself by another sepoy engaging a second Baloch warrior who was about to cut him down from behind. Napier remained where he was, moving down the narrow lane between two fires, and thrice rallied the 25th before returning to his old position. He had recognized that the crisis of the battle had come, and for a final effort sent three successive staff officers to order the cavalry on the left wing to charge.

During the course of the action the 9th Bengal Cavalry had moved over to the support of this flank from their first position behind the right of the line, and they were now about thirty yards behind the Grenadiers. While Sir Charles' messengers were yet on their way, this latter regiment fell into some confusion. Whether some order of Major Clibborn, commanding, was misunderstood, or whatever the reason, is obscure: but a bugler was sounding the "retire"—and said he took it up "from someone else." Most of the sepoys went to the right about, and it was only by great exertions of their officers that they were

*Life Vol. II, p. 298.

rallied and faced the foe again. The Balochis manning the enclosures and Sultan Shah village, encouraged by the appearance of a retrograde movement, following Jacob's retirement from his attempt to pierce the line on the other side of the village, showed themselves in numbers, as if about to attack. Captain Tucker, commanding the third squadron of the Bengal Cavalry, which was close behind and to the left of the Grenadiers, urged Napier's second-in-command, Lt. Colonel Pattle, to allow his squadron to advance and drive the Balochis back.§ The Colonel, a brave but somewhat unintelligent man, hesitated for sometime to give permission, not wishing to involve his regiment, that day commanded by Major Storey, deeply, without orders. But Tucker persisting that a forward movement was essential to restore the fight on that flank, and that Sir Charles would certainly order it if he were aware of the position, Pattle at length acquiesced, and the left (3rd) squadron advanced at the trot and began to force the Balochis back into the village. The Colonel himself rode towards the infantry line, and was met by Captain Thompson, coming hot foot with his message from the General. "How are you getting on?" asked Pattle: the Orderly Officer however ignored the query and communicated Sir Charles' orders.† It seems that Pattle who was rather deaf, could not hear what was said in the din of battle, or thought that Thompson might just as well deliver the order to the Officer Commanding the Regiment as himself and replied: "Tell Storey." Thompson rode on, and communicated the order to Major Storey, who at once put the second squadron, under Captain Garrett, in motion. On his way back he met Major MacPherson, Napier's Military Secretary, who had just delivered the orders to Pattle a second time. One or other of them, still unsatisfied that Pattle realised that the order comprehended the whole of the cavalry, rode up to Jacob, who was endeavouring to reform his men after his abortive attack on the left, still under fire from the village, and on ground which hardly permitted any formation, and shouted that he was wanted in front, and that the 9th had refused to charge"!—or "would not charge" so the words sounded.*

This was an exaggeration which did scant justice to the Bengal Light Cavalry: for their first squadron had now followed the third and second, and while Colonel Pattle, taking command of the two latter, gallantly attacked the enclosures of the village, the first, under Captain Wemyss, filed

§Captain Tucker's letter in Waddington's account.
†Captain Thomson's letter (Life, IV. p. 114-115)
*Jacob's letter of 23rd February 1843.

between the Grenadiers and the 12th N. I., and descending into the Fuleli began to disperse the Balochis on its further bank.

Jacob, advancing in column at the trot, passed one squadron of the 9th dismounted and firing pistols into the village, while the remainder were driving the Balochis in rear of it down the river bed to the left. Filing between the Cavalry and the left of the infantry line, Jacob led his men straight across the Fuleli, and deploying into line on the further bank, charged full on the Mir's camp half à mile behind it. The camp was strongly manned by foot soldiers, who with sword and shield stood their ground and fought sternly: but the vigour of the charge was irresistible, and in the subsequent melee the sabres and carbines of the Scinde Horse wrought havoc among the defenders; not till they were almost annihilated did resistance cease, leaving the camp, and Mir Nasir Khan's own standard, in the victors' hands.

The capture of the Mirs' camp was decisive. Not only did their horsemen, some 4,000 in number, who had been mustered in reserve under the Talpur Chiefs, quit the field without striking a blow; but the gallant tribesmen who had fought so devotedly in the river bed, not flinching under the ceaseless scourge of grape-shot and musketry for more than an hour, still thrusting themselves on the bayonets to strike home with their swords, began to look over their shoulders as the direful news spread along their line. They hesitated; and with a shout of triumph the British, followed by the Bombay Infantry, swept down into the river bed. Here the struggle still raged hand to hand; no quarter was given or asked; but the Balochis were giving ground and losing cohesion.

The 9th Bengal Cavalry succeeded in their task—one more appropriate for infantry and artillery—of clearing Sultan Shah and its enclosures, and completely cutting off the right of the Baloch line; but at no light cost to themselves: among their officers, Brevet Captain Cookson was killed, and four others wounded, of whom Captain Tucker was shot in five places; many of their troopers also fell. The first squadron, having chased the retreating Balochis far down the river bed to the left, now crossed over to join the Scinde Horse in the Mirs' camp: and just at that moment Major Waddington

rode up to recall Jacob, who was rallying his men after dispersing the shattered garrison of the camp, to repel an alleged attack on the baggage in the rear. The trumpets sounded the "retire," but FitzGerald, second in command of the Scinde Horse, could not or would not hear them, continuing in pursuit of the Mirs' retreating horsemen with one squadron, hunting and cutting them down for several miles. The news of the baggage being attacked proved a false alarm, and now the whol British line joined in a final advance. Mirs Nasir Khan a: Shadad Khan, who had lingered in the field with a few atte dants, saw that the day was lost, and made for Hyderaba but even now the Baloch swordsmen did not take to flight, b gathering in knots some hundreds strong retired slowly, glari back on their foes, and daring them to come on. Their rig wing, which remained almost unscathed, also showed son disposition to re-occupy Sultan Shah and renew the struggl and now at last some guns were trained on the village ar enclosures to dislodge them. *Napier also ordered up tl rest of his artillery, which crossed the Fuleli; and as the gra began to play on them once more, the Mirs' levies, broke as a military body, but their individual spirit unquelled, r linquished the struggle. The field of Miani was lost and wo

2. *Previous Accounts of the battle.*

The best known accounts of the battle of Miani in published books are, in the chronological order of their appearance, those by General William Napier, in "The Conquest of Scinde"; by Mr. Napier Bruce, in 'Life of General Sir Charles Napier": by Mr. Rice Holmes, in "Four Famous Soldiers" and "Sir Charles Napier"; by Sir William Butler in "Sir Charles Napier": by Sir John Fortescue, in "History of the BritishArmy," Vol. XII; in various Regimental Histories; and by Sir Patrick Cadell, in "History of the Bombay Army."

Of these, the first is prized for its picturesqueness and vigour of style, so characteristic of the author; but it is inaccurate in many respects. Mr. Napier Bruce practically reproduced it, but added some interesting details which he was given by Sir Montagu McMurdo. Rice Holmes, by making use of Major Waddington's account, of which more below, and consulting other survivors of the battle, drew a much truer picture of the battle, at the sacrifice of some of its romantic colouring; and his account has been the basis of those given by Sir John

*Waddington's Account.

Fortescue and Sir Patrick Cadell in their works on the British and Bombay Armies. Rice Holmes notes, with some complacency, that when he read his final draft over to Sir Montagu McMurdo, the veteran declared that he was unable to detect a mistake. But no single officer present in the battle could see everything that was going on, and McMurdo was at first close to Sir Charles, and thereafter with his Regiment, constantly engaged, throughout the day. Rice Holmes, a most conscientious historian, also consulted other survivors, General Petrie of the Bombay Artillery, and General Phayre of the 25th Bombay N. I.; but other important sources of information, though available, do not seem to have been tapped by him. These will be mentioned below; and of course there may still be first-hand accounts of the battle, in ephemeral publications and scarce volumes of memoirs, or buried in family correspondence, which have so far escaped the notice of authors. But so far as I have been able to ascertain, the available sources on the British side which may be called original are as follows:—

(a) Sir Charles Napier's despatch, with the subsidiary reports of officers commanding units engaged in the action.

(Reproduced in "The Conquest of Scinde" Vol. II., Appendix VI, and "Records of the Scinde Irregular Horse," Vol. I.)

(b) Major Waddington's account of the battle, and subsequent reply to the strictures upon it published by Sir W. Napier. (Royal Engineers professional Papers, Vol. IX, 1847, etc.)

(c) Numerous references by Sir Charles Napier in his Journal and letters, reproduced in "The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier" by Sir W. Napier, (Vol. II., pp. 320-330, 341, 345, 406, 417, 437-38, 442-3; Vol. III., pages 7, 16-17, 21, 30-31, 40, 80-82, 92, 189, 288, 314, 456; Vol. IV, 108-114.)

(d) Captain Henderson's report to the Adjutant, Madras Sappers and Miners, Bangalore, reproduced in Madras Artillery Records, Vol. VII, Miscellaneous.

(e) Captain John Jacob's account, in two private letters to his father dated 19th and 23rd February, 1843.

Of these, the first three were made use of by Rice Holmes, and his successors; and Sir Patrick Cadell drew my attention to No. (d). But Jacob's second letter, written less than a week after the battle, supplies much information that no other source gives; for instance, the details of his reconnaissance, of his attempt to turn the Baloch right flank and capture of the enemy's camp: and also gives a fresh view-point for the general picture —particularly the long interval between the arrival of the advance guard and the British attack, and the events on the left wing. He also seems to have obtained from his friend Hutt, of the Bombay Artillery, clearer details of the management of that Arm in the battle than figure in any other account. The original letter, in manuscript, was some years ago presented by the late Major General A. Le G. Jacob, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., C.B.E., D.S.O., to the officers of the Scinde Horse, of which Regiment he was Colonel. The Regiment also possesses a fine picture of their charge at Miani.

Jacob's plan of the battle, which is given in the "Records of the Scinde Irregular Horse," is also valuable in that it shows the position of the Mirs' guns, and the direction in which the four British guns fired; and it seems to be more correct than Major Wadington's in regard to the position of the Mirs' right wing ; and the extent to which he (Jacob) had penetrated on that flank. I have, however, reproduced Waddington's plan to accompany this paper, as it gives more details of the battle-field as a whole.

Jacob's account is in fact indispensable for an accurate appreciation of the battle; and it was because he had not read it that Rice Holmes fell into the two real errors that mar his description: one, that Jacob "rode up" and told Sir Charles that the ground on the further side of the "grove" was impassable, when he only found this out after the battle had begun: and secondly, that it was when beginning their charge on the Mirs' camp that the men of the Scinde Horse suffered numerous falls, galloping across the nullahs; which in fact took place when Jacob was attempting to get through the impossible country on the further side of the village. Jacob's letter makes this latter point clear, though in his report the occasion of the contretemps might have been either.

3. *The battle as seen from the Mirs' side.*

And what of Miani from the Baloch point of view? British authors have been content to build up their nar-

ratives from purely British materials; and for the purpose of a biography of Sir Charles Napier, or the History of a Regiment or an Army, this is natural enough. We have brief anecdotes of Mr. Howell, the Mirs' gunner, and of Abdul (Abdullah?) Shah, who fought in the Fuleli bed with his men, and afterwards took service under Napier, in the latter's journal. Sir Richard Burton recorded the opinion of one Ibrahim Khan on the ineffectiveness of the Baluch artillery, and this finds a place—as a footnote—in Rice Holmes' biography of Sir Charles. And that is all.

In truth, there is no very detailed or scientific description of the engagement itself from the Baloch side; the interest of their chronicles lies mainly in the narrative of the events immediately before and after the battle. Of the actual fighting, their accounts in prose are brief, and are significant mainly in the confirmation they afford of particular incidents observed by British officers. The descriptions in verse are fuller, and of interest as recording the conduct of the various tribes engaged; but, as might be expected, are concerned chiefly with the deeds of particular warriors.

For these reasons I have not attempted to embody much of the available material from these sources in my own narrative of the battle: but they deserve to be put on record, if only from the fact that these accounts appear to have been almost completely ignored heretofore.

I have referred to the following:—

(a) Mir Nasir Khan's letter to the Court of Directors, dated Sasur, September 22nd, 1843. (Sind Blue book, supplementary, 1844: p. 128).

(b) Mir Yar Mahomed Khan's "Frerenama," written in 1857, and embodied by Mirza Kalich Beg in his History of Sind, Vol. II., Part II.

(c) Munshi Awatrai's Memoirs in "سعد جا ميرو" recorded by Rai Saheb Udharam Chandumal and Mr. Parmanand Mewaram.

(d) Seth Naomal Hotchand's Memoirs, edited by Sir Evan James.

(e) Syed Ihsan Ali Shah's poem:

(f) The blind Manghanhar's poem on Miani.

جنگ نامو میر اصیر خان ۽ انگریز سرکار

(g) Notes of conversations with Mir Ali Bakhsh Khan Talpur, and other descendants of men who fought in the battle on the Mir's side.

Of these, (a) (b) and (d) and are available in English. Mir Nasir Khan was the only one of the authors actually present in the battle, and his account is of the briefest. Its interest is chiefly in his mention of Jacob's reconnaissance, and his hopes that at the eleventh hour a collision might be averted.

Mir Yar Mahomed Khan, Nasir's younger brother, also mentions the reconnaissance. He gives the names of the commanders of the Baloch army as Ghulam Mahomed and Yakhtiar Lagharis, and Ghulam Shah and Jan Mahomed Talpurs, and declares that they declined to obey Nasir Khan's order that they should beat up Napier's quarters at Matiari on the 16th February. The ruling chiefs present in the battle on the next day were Mirs Nasir Khan, Shahdad Khan, and Husain Ali Khan of Hyderabad, and Mir Rustom Khan of Khairpur. Yar Mahomed gives the Baloch strength as 17,000 men and 11 guns.

Seth Naomal, who was in Karachi at the time of the battle, writes: "The Talpurs collecting their men advanced with an army of 30,000 strong to Miani, about four koss distant from Hyderabad, to check the progress of Sir Charles Napier, who had by that time arrived at Hala. Sir Charles commanded a force of 2,500 fighting men only, but they were all well-disciplined and well-trained, while the army of the Amirs was a crowd of hastily collected and ill-experienced Balochis under unskilful generals, unacquainted with the tactics of war. The battle of Miani followed, in which the army of the Talpurs was defeated, and it fled. The Baloochis fought well and used the sword bravely, but they were all untrained otherwise."

The Memoirs of Munshi Awatrai, the Minister of Mir Sobdar Khan, are of extraordinary interest for the brief period in which the tragedy was played out; as he was an important actor in it, though not present in the battle, which he describes as follows:—possibly from first hand information

given by Hosh Mahomed Kambrani, a fellow-servant of Mir Sobdar:—"The Mirs' armies stationed themselves in the bed of the Fuleli canal where Napier Saheb launched an attack. This, however, proved abortive, as the bunds afforded full protection to the Balochis against the bullets. Napier Saheb saw that he would not prevail that way, and that his efforts were in vain, and ordered his Risaldar, Jacob, who had about 1,000 cavalry under his command, to charge the Balochis from the mouth of the canal. The Balochis at once faced them, but all of a sidden the sowars of Risaldar Jacob purposely beat a retreat. The Balochis cried "They run! they run!," and pursuing the sowars stood on the bund, where they were taken by surprise by the troops of Sir Charles Napier, who was only waiting for the chance. Many Balochis were killed, and others took to their heels."

This is interesting confirmation of Captain Tucker's statement, that the Balochis appeared about to launch an attack on seeing the confusion in the ranks of the 1st Grenadiers, which we know took place at about the same time as Jacob's retirement from his attempt to penetrate the Baloch position to the East of the village; and agrees with the British view that the result of the battle was doubtful—Jacob says, "worse than doubtful,"—upto that moment.

Syed Ihsan Ali Shah, the author of the longer and better of the two poems, voices the Baloch opinion that they were winning up to the time when Jan Mahomed Khan Talpur fell:—

پهرين حمله ۾ هٽائي ڪياه فرنگي خسته جان
تير باران چؤ طرف ميدان ۾ ڪيا پهلوان
ڇٽي وڃي لشڪر مڙي ڪمڪ ڪري ٿي جان نشان
فتح هئي اسلام جي لشڪر جي بيشڪ بي امان

I am indebted to Mir Ali Bakhsh Khan Talpur, of Tando Nur Mahomed Khan, for so much information explanatory of the poem, with additional details, that these remaining sources may be discussed together.

The Balochis usually call the battle of Miani, "Jan Mahomed's fight." His descendents, the Khanani Talpurs of Tando Jam, told me that he was shot in the neck by a pis-

tol, though his death in the English accounts is ascribed to the swordsmanship of Montagu McMurdo. The chief who was then ordered to take over the general direction of the battle, Mir Ghulam Shah, of the Shahwani Talpurs of Tando Mahomed Khan, was the same who had torn up the treaty in the tumultuous durbar of the Baloch chiefs on the night of the 14th February. After his death, which soon followed that of Jan Mahomed, it does not appear from the poem that any other commander was appointed; but when the lashkar was giving way, Mir Shahdad Khan is said to have urged his uncle, Mir Nasir Khan, to lead a final charge; and the courtly writer describes great deeds of arms thereafter performed by Shahdad Khan. But a cannon ball killed Suleiman Khizmatgar, who was in attendance on Mir Nasir Khan; and Mir Ali Bakhsh Khan informs me that both Nasir Khan and Shahdad Khan were struck by spent balls, which failed to penetrate the chain mail armour that they were wearing. Nasir Khan nevertheless lingered in the field till among the last, with twenty horsemen: young Hussein Ali Khan quitted it about an hour earlier.

Of the minor branches of the Talpur House, the Chakranis Shahwanis, and Khananis were well represented, the former attending on Mir Rustom Khan: but the Bijaranis and Mahomedanis were absent, the latter saying afterwards that they had lost the way to the rendezvous. The Manikani Talpurs of Mirpur took no part.

Among the other Baloch tribes, the Nizamanis won the greatest renown; the Marris (Bagranis), Jamalis and Changs all fought bravely, the chief of the last named clan, Miro, being killed. Others who played their part well, were the Korais, Jatois, Gopangs, Chhalgiris, and Lasharis: but the Rinds, Lagharis, Thoras and Bhurgris are all considered to have been disgraced. The Lagharis and Thoras were the first to break the line: and Bahawal Khan, Sardar of the Rinds, a little later snatched the "Banchi," a sort of standard, from Sumar, one of the Mir's Khizmatgars, and fled, followed by Ahmed Khan Laghari. As to the Bhurgris, the blind "manghanhar" who sang of Miani says that they should be given a basket of fish: meaning that they acquitted themselves more like Muhanas than Balochis.

Of the non-Baloch tribes taking part, the small body of the Mirs' paid troops, the Khatian Pathans, fought stoutly, as did many of their khizmatgars, particularly Hosh Mahomed Kambrani. Several well-known Syeds and Pirs also fell honourably

in the battle, for instance Fateh Mahomed Shah Lakhiari: and the Sumra and Khokhar tribes both did well.

4. *Anecdotes.*

The poets of Sind were not alone in celebrating the courage of individual heroes of the fight in hyperbolic strains. Sir Charles Napier himself, though over sixty years of age when Miani was fought, was in some ways a boy at heart, and took the keenest pleasure in the deeds of arms of his officers and men. He had once written a Historical romance ("Harold": published after his death by his brother); and one suspects him to have been an enthusiastic reader of Sir Walter Scott.

Captain Keith Young, who arrived in Sind in September 1843, wrote after dining at Napier's table "the conversation, during and after dinner, struck me to be a great deal too much about the late actions in Scinde, as to what this man and the other did, and how many Beloochees were cut down. I understand that the Scinde heroes are very much given to this kind of thing, and that Sir Charles is weak enough to be flattered with this 'Beloochee hunting,' as it is facetiously called here."[1]

In Napier's journal, this propensity breaks out once or twice: in a letter to his brother William, the skull-splitting feats of Wilkinson, Nixon, McMurdo and FitzGerald are retailed with evident gusto, and from the hands of the magniloquent Historian received fresh colour, in "the Conquest of Scinde."

Of the officers of the Scinde Horse at Miani, William Napier wrote: "Captain Jacob, though slight of person, meeting a horseman at full gallop, passed his sword with such a foin through shield and body, that the hilt struck strongly against the former. But the exploits of Lieut. FitzGerald of the Scinde cavalry made all who saw him in the fight marvel. Three or four had fallen beneath his tempestuous hand, when a Balooch, crouching as their custom is beneath a shield, suddenly stepped up on the bridle hand and with a single stroke brought the horse down dead. FitzGerald's leg was entangled by the fall, and twice did the elated Balooch champion drive his keen blade at the prostrate warrior: each time the blow was parried, and then, clearing himself from the dead horse, the strong man rose. The barbarian, warned by the herculean form and countenance, instantly cast his broad shield over his head, which was

[1] "Views and Opinions," p. 227.

likewise defended with a thickly rolled turban of many folds, but Fitz Gerald's sword in its descent went sheer through shield and turban and skull down to the teeth!"

We know from Richard Burton that there was endless joking among the officers in Sind about these tales of the paladins; and FitzGerald himself is said to have disclaimed the stories of his exploits at Miani and Dubba.

Jacob, whose own anecdotes of swordsmanship at Miani —the cutting off of a mounted Baluchi's head at a single blow by one of his sowars, and the cutting in two of the lower jaw of another sowar's horse by a Baloch lying on the ground—were told years afterwards, simply in support of his opinion that the curved sabre was far more effective in the hands of cavalry than the straight thrusting sword, has some amusing comments on Sir William's stories. "Those anecdotes of FitGerald and myself at Meeanee are unmixed invention. FitzGerald's horse was never killed or wounded (unless you call a scratch in the skin about 2 inches long a wound), and never fell with him; the fact is that FitzGerald cannot ride a bit, in fact he is an awful stick on a horse, and fall off his saddle in the affray on the *top of a Belooche* on foot whom he was endeavouring to smite; they both rolled over together after which Fitz Gerald got up, remounted, and went on, not knowing to this day whether the man was hurt or not. Contrast this with the description in the General's *History*. As to my slaying a horseman as described it is about equally true. I *have* had lots of fights with Belooches on divers occasions, and did once slay a fellow who was cutting at me, something in the manner described, but the man was on foot—and it so happened that at the battle of Meeanee I never struck a blow; indeed I do not think it to be at all the duty of an officer to go about seeking for personal encounters, and think there is little merit shown by any amount of success in them. The value of an officer is shewn by his skill and success in leading and directing the efforts of others, not in displaying his own personal prowess. But General Napier appears to suppose his whole merit to consist in cutting and thrusting."

But there was one individual officer's exploit at Miani, the merit and glory of which cannot be gainsaid, and that was the saving of Sir Charles Napier's life by Lieutenant Marston. Sir Charles bade his brother "Remember in your work to mention Lieut. Marston" and gave a vivid description of the incident. But this must have reached William Napier too late

for inclusion in the book, in which his mention is of the briefest. As the account in the "Life and Opinions of Sir Charles James Napier" is available to all to read, I shall give here that by the late Mr. Charles Marston of Nasik, son of Lieut. (afterwards General) Marston, who kindly allowed me to take a copy from his unpublished memoir of his father's life, written for his nephews, grandsons of the hero.

After describing how Marston cut down one Baloch in single combat in front of the line not far from the General, he proceeds: "At the same moment he saw another burly fellow come over the bank and look at Sir Charles, who was alone, and made for him with long strides—but grandfather said he never looked again. He ran and intercepted him just as he was going to cut at Sir Charles, and engaged him, and cut with all his might at his head; but he brought up his shield and guarded the blow, and then he cut at grandfather and he guarded it, and they exchanged one or two cuts: and grandfather then got over his guard and cut him hard on the shoulder, and he staggered and 'opened up,' and then he ran him through the heart and as he fell Sir Charles' remark was 'gallantly done!'; but another man had already come up from behind and had a clean sweep at grandfather's head—missed his head and the blow fell on his shoulder, but fortunately his epaulette saved him, for it deflected the sword blade, he turned round to find a friendly soldier who came out of the ranks of the 22nd Regiment pushing his bayonet through his assailant's side, and at the same time he ran his own sword through his heart, and as Sir Charles Napier said 'the sword and bayonet shared the honour'. The only damage done to your grandfather on this occasion was that the sword grazed his elbow and cut the cloth of his uniform coat, so he escaped lightly."

Mr. Marston records that after the battle, the henchman of the Baloch Chief whom he had killed "brought the fallen hero's sword to grandfather and laid it at his feet and said: 'You slew my Sardar, this is his sword'—it bears the words 'Sarkar Mir Mahomed Nasir Khan Talpur' in inlaid gold on the blade. The hilt is of inlaid gold leaf."

This is not the only sword, won that day by the gallant Marston, which is preserved by his descendants. He was presented with one of the regulation pattern by Sir Charles, with the following letter:

"My dear Marston,

Had you not stepped in front of me and engaged the Beloochee warrior who was about to charge me when I had too much to think of to engage in single combat I should probably have been cut down, and I think so able a wordsman as yourself ought to have a good weapon, one which, like your courage, will never fail in any trial. May you long cut and thrust with it, is the prayer of

Your affectionate and sincere friend,

C. J. Napier."

Nine years later, Marston's father wrote to Sir Charles, then in retirement in England, asking for his help to obtain promotion for his son. The following is an extract from the old General's reply, dated Oaklands, 23rd September, 1852:

"There is one claim, that your son has, and I should say that it is a strong one. He saw a huge Belooch with sword raised to fall on me, and attacking the man, received a blow on his shoulder; fortunately his grenadier wings saved him. The same blow falling on me would have probably killed me, as I had less protection, and but one hand. Now had I been slain in the middle of the battle, when victory had favoured neither side, I may say without disparagement to the second in command, that the result might have carried misfortune. Therefore I must say that in my opinion to have saved the life of his commander in the middle of a battle, or if not, that at all events to have prevented the commander from being disabled or unable to direct the troops, is a deed of gallantry which gives a man strong claims on the Government for the extra rank, a claim of no ordinary nature, and one to which this letter testifies....'

One of Sir Charles Napier's greatest claims to fame was his constant care of the interests of the Private soldier. Fortescue rightly says: "it was no mere accident that made Charles Napier the first general to mention the names of private soldiers in his despatches."* Those published after Miani by Lord Ellenborough, on 15th March 1843, reproducing reports from the officers commanding every unit in the little army, contain many instances of heroism which in these days would have been recognized by decorations. Among many Indian Officers

*History of the British Army, Vol. XII, p. 301.

and soldiers mentioned was Subadar Russall Singh of the 25th N. I., who shot three men, cut down one, and showed great zeal in encouraging and leading on his men: and Napier strongly endorsed Captain Hutt's recommendation of the unarmed drivers of his battery. We read also that Drummer Martin Delaney, of H. M's 22nd "shot, bayoneted, and captured the arms, of Meer Whullee Mahomed Khan, who was mounted, and directing the enemy in the hottest part of the engagement." This was probably a Khanani Talpur Sardar, brother of the Mirs' commander, Jan Mahomed. Sir Charles also wrote: "Three times when I thought the 22nd could not stand the furious rush of the swordsmen, Delaney sounded the Advance, and each time the line made a pace or two nearer the enemy." Sir William Napier adds: "Here be it recollected that the fighting was hand to hand, that each advance was under a descending sword, and that to sound his bugle Delaney resigned all self defence."

A lighter touch is supplied by Colonel Pattle of the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry, who like his General was over sixty years of age at the time. Sir Charles writes: "He is as brave as a lion, and has all the quaint humour of Munchausen:—for example, he said to Mrs. McKenzie, Madam, at the battle of Meeanee I perpetrated such destruction that Sir C. Napier rode up and said: 'Colonel Pattle, deliver your sword! I cannot allow of such slaughter, even of an enemy.' I did deliver my sword, but continued to do as much execution with the scabbard.§" The old humourist was afterwards immortalised by "Aliph Cheem" as "Colonel MacMurther;" but as a slight disguise of the prototype's identity, the scene of the incident was transferred in the poem to the Indian Mutiny.

Napier paid high tributes to the courage of the Baloch warriors. "A 22nd soldier, bounding forward, plunged his bayonet into the breast of a Beloochee; yet the firm warrior did not even reel: seizing the musket he writhed onwards, and with a blow swept his destroyer's life away: they fell dead together!"—"No quarter was given on either side, the wounded Beloochees fought as they lay on the ground"—"They cannot indeed escape when beaten, but as to running,—devil a bit!—they lounge off, as at Meeanee, slowly and indifferent to your musquetry, though vollied into their backs at five yards' distance! They are most determined fatalists, and most terrible swordsmen; they cut through everything."

§Life, Vol. IV, p. 113.

Sir Montagu McMurdo also wrote:*"The dexterity of the Belooch in parrying with his shield the point of the bayonet; the difficulty of thrusting it home when it did take effect, because of the ample folds of the cummerbund protecting the body almost to the armpits (in some instances the bayonets were twisted by the resistance) and lastly, the quick swinging cut of the sharp curved sword: these made the Belooch no mean antagonist for the single soldier; but in the melee of a charge, or even where two or three soldiers were together, the superior it of the bayonet was unquestionable." Captain Henderson also complained that his men found it impossible to make the bayonet-knife on the end of their fusils penetrate through the clothes worn by the enemy. §

According to the late General Marston, "the 17th February 1843 was an abnormally hot day: so much so that many of the European soldiers died of sunstroke." They fought in their winter uniforms. He and the other officers wore forage caps, and he put two pocket handkerchiefs inside the crown of his cap to save himself from sunstroke." Sir Charles Napier wore a turban wound round his helmet. Twice during the battle the troops cheered him when he emerged through the thickest of the fight unharmed.

5. *Controversies about Miani.*

Controversy has raged over almost every act of Sir Charles Napier in Sind, and the battle of Miani has not escaped. Sir William Napier wrote of the Sind battles as reviving the glories of Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt; while at the other end of the scale an author whom I have not been able to identify, but who was probably present in the battle refers to Miani as "a dispersing of what was little better than a vast mob."† "They had no discipline" he continued, "and bands of twenty men rushed out at a time with no order or method, only to impale themselves on the bayonet, or to be swept away by grape." The writer could hardly have been Jacob, for even in the height of his bitter controversy with the Napiers, he did not, so far as I am aware, disparage the battles. At the time he wrote to his father, "No one gave the Scinde warriors credit for so much pluck!" and speaks of Miani as "one of the severest battles on record in Eastern history" and "Altogether it was an honest hard stand up fight, and will not soon be forgotten on either side."

*Bruce, p. 206. §Madras Artillery records, Vol. 7.
†Quoted in Sind Gazetteer, 1907, p. 131.I.§

The Mirs' horsemen, indeed, were worse than ineffective: as has already been described, they fled, to the number of four thousand, without striking a blow; though they may have suffered somewhat from Whitlie's guns. The bolder of those who came mounted to the rendezvous picketted their mares in the river bed, and fought on foot.

The quality of the Talpur Artillery at Miani can be guaged from the description given of each piece in the Return of captured Ordnance.* Seven of the fifteen guns measured less than three feet in length, and the bore of five of these was under two inches. Moreover, it is noted that the whole of the carriages of these canon were in such a state as to render them useless. Four years before, when Kennedy had seen them in the Fort at Hyderabad, in the days of Howell's Greek predecessor, they had appeared as likely to harm the gunners as the enemy, when fired. Mir Ali Bakhsh Khan Talpur tells me that they were brought out piecemeal, slung on camels like "chakis," to Miani: and there rigged up in position as well as possible. Considering in addition Howell's unwillingness to fire at his countrymen, the Mirs' Artillery was more effective in the battle than could have been expected.

I am also informed by Mir Ali Bakhsh Khan that comparatively few of the tribesmen had any experience in firing matchlocks, which were given out to them from the Mir's armoury. They had been told to bring their own swords, the true Baloch weapon; and these they used effectively. But the same number of Afghans assembled at random would probably have done far more damage with their matchlocks.

Sir Patrick Cadell has well said, that the Balochis lacked almost every military virtue except the great one of undaunted courage: and we need not quarrel with Sir William Napier for classing Miani with the English triumphs in the Hundred Years' War. The latter were fought on the defensive: but they, like Miani, were won by superior fire-power and discipline, over clumsy, unco-ordinated hosts of individually brave men. On the other hand, the Napiers were in error in instituting comparisons between the comparatively bloodless Sind vistories, and the "butcher's bill" of Gough's hard-won fights that followed in Gwalior and the Punjab. The Marathas and Sikhs brought into the field European-trained infantry, powerful artillery, and most effective cavalry.

*Records of the Scinde Irregular Horse, Vol. I

(a) *Numbers engaged.*—Outram, in his "Conquest of Scinde—a commentary," refrained from criticising Napier's conduct of the battles, in which he was not present: but the progressive increase in the numbers of the Mirs' army at Miani in the brothers' writings, " a la Falstaff," provoked him. In a letter to his friend Jacob written on May 2nd, 1845, he says: "By the way, how many of the countless host were actually engaged against our troops on that occasion? Cressy!!! Agincourt!!!" and again, on October 2nd, 1847, he speaks of "a little numerical superiority (for the rabble looking on from the other side of the Fullailee ought not to be counted, only the "Tuggaras' and few others who occupied the Fullailee, who alone fought)." This statement is somewhat wide of the mark: but so was Sir Charles' assertion, adopted by his brother in "the Conquest of Scinde," that his actual order of battle mustered only a seventeen hundred and eighty sabres and bayonets.§

Taking the British troops first, Jacob, writing to his father only two days after the battle, says: "Our force was composed as follows, the strengths mentioned are very nearly those of the Corps actually in the fight, after deducting-baggage guards, etc:

2 Comp. foot artillery	..	12 guns.
H. M. 22nd Regt.	..	526
N. I.; 1st Grenadier	..	250
N. I.: 12th Regiment	..	487
N. I.: 25th Regt.	..	300
9th Bengal Cavalry	..	406
Scinde Irreg. Horse	..	483
Total	..	2,452

These figures he subsequently revised, in the notes on the plan drawn by FitzGerald from a survey by himself, which was published by Jas. Wyld, Charing Cross East, and figures in the Records of the Scinde Irregular Horse, Vol. I:—

C. Coy. Madras Sappers and Miners	..	46
H. M. 22nd Foot	..	606
1st Regt. Bombay N. I.	..	256
12th Regt. Bombay N. I.	..	540
25th Regt. Bombay N. I.	..	318
Bengal 9th Light Cavalry	..	385
Scinde Irregular Horse	..	395
Total	..	2546

§Life Vol. III, p. 16 and Conquest of Scinde, p.308.

It should be mentioned that only ten of the British guns are shown in this plan, as drawn up in the first èchelon position of the infantry line, in the following order from the right:—two nine-pounders; two twenty-four pounder howitzers; two nine-pounders; two six-pounders; and two twelve-pounder howitzers. There is nothing to show where the other two were, nor are the numbers of the artillery men included in the order of battle

Waddington's estimates, admittedly approximate, give the number of bayonets in the line as 1350, to which had to be added Artillery and Sappers, about 150, and 700-800 Cavalry.

It is therefore evident that the strength of the British actually engaged could not have fallen below 2,200, and much more probably reached 2,500.

As to the Mirs' forces, Napier's despatch gives them as 22,000. Jacob's letter of 19th February, 1843, gives the figures 21,000, and he adheres to this in his notes on his plan. Sir Charles declared that after the battle he obtained "Belooch returns of close upon twenty-six thousand warriors, signed by the Chiefs; each stating his force, and they all try to reduce their numbers to reduce the disgrace."* I do not think that such returns were ever published, but Napier in a letter to Lord Ellenborough dated July 1st, 1843, gives the figure 25,862§ Meanwhile "evidence received from the family of the Ameers" —perhaps the statement elicited by Captain Rathborne from Pir Budrudin, Sobdar Khan's confidential servant †—gave 35,000 as their numbers at Miani, which, Sir Charles triumphantly declares, is what the best of his spies reported at the time. Nevertheless, the figure given in his despatch—22,000—may well be adopted as most likely to have been correct.

(b) *Losses on each side:*—The casualties on the side of the British are, of course, exactly known. They amounted to 62 killed and 194 wounded, the total of 256 being a little more than one-tenth of the numbers actually in the fight. Six British officers were killed, and thirteen, with three Indian Officers, wounded. The losses in officers were heaviest in H.M's 22nd, the 9th Bengal Light Cavalty, and the 12th Bombay N.I. Among the other ranks, the 22nd had 23 killed and 49 wounded: the 9th Cavalry 3 killed and 29 wounded; the 12th, 12 killed and 45 wounded (it is interesting to note that Jacob, writing on

*Life III, p. 16. §"Conquest," Vol. II, Appandix II, p. 482. † do. p. 511.

the 23rd February, says: "The 12th suffered most severely of any, and indeed are said to have borne the brunt of the fight," and the 25th 16 killed and 28 wounded. The Scinde Horse suffered 17 wounded; Jacob in the letter already quoted, says that several had subsequently died. The 9thCavalry had nine horses killed and 35 wounded; the Scinde Horse 23 killed and 21 wounded. The difference between the losses of the two cavalry Regiments may be ascribed to the assault by the 9th dismounted on the village, and the slower speed, compared with Jacob's, of their mounted attack.

The losses of the Mirs' host were fearfully severe. Th names of nearly twenty chiefs who were killed occur in the poem mentioned above: and at least six of these were Talpurs. Othe could probably be found in the "History of Alienations," amon the Jagirdars' families. As to the rank and file of the tribe men, Sir Charles Napier in his despatch says the casualties we generally supposed to be five thousand, but later, in response t further inquiries from his brother, he wrote "all the Beloochee said, and still maintain, that eight thousand were killed an wounded."* Sir William gives the figure as six thousand, i The Conquest of Scinde," and so does Jacob in the notes t his plan. The latter, writing on the 19th February, says tha 1,400 of the Mirs' men were left dead on the field, and that they had about four times that number wounded. Four days later, he writes: "We now know from the Ameers themselves that including those carried away and those who have died since of their wounds, not less then 5,000 were *killed.*" Jacob says he actually counted two heaps of the Baloch dead in front of where the 22nd had fought, of 80 and 50 bodies. This agrees fairly well with the observations of "two officers, I think Pelly and Fitz-Gerald" quoted by Sir Charles, who adduced the gruesome details to confute Major Waddington, whose estimates in his published memoir of the battle were much more modest. Waddington speaks of 400 dead in the bed of the Fuleli, "and probably as many more in different parts of the field and the shikargarh, killed by the artillery and cavalry," and adds that as quarter could not be given (the Balochis, not expecting it, defending themselves to the last, and making it impossible to spare them) the number of wounded did not probably much exceed the number of killed. He admits that the Balochi accounts made their loss much greater, and that it was possible that some bodies might have been removed during the night after the battle. Rice Holmes, Fortescue, and Cadell have

*Life, III, p. 289.

inclined to Waddington's opinion, taking 2,000 as the probable figure of the Baloch casualties; and we may dismiss the subject with the hope that the lowest estimate may have been the truth.

It must be recorded, to the eternal credit of the Mirs' feudatories, that according to Mir Nasir Khan, ten thousand, including many survivors of Miani, rallied to him that very night§: and we know that many who had survived the ordeal joined Mir Sher Mahomed, to fight at Dubba.

(c) *Napier's orders to the Cavalry*:—In adhering, in my account of the battle, to Waddington's version of the order of events, which was the question most keenly disputed between him and Sir William Napier, I may be incorrect in ignoring what Rice Holmes calls "evidence which proves that the order was delivered to Pattle before Tucker addressed him."* I rely upon the letters of Tucker and Thompson, and the fact that Sir Charles himself declares that he sent three officers with the same order, Thompson being the first of the three.† It is clear that the effect of Thompson's communication of the order to Major Storey was to put the 9th Cavalry as a whole in motion: the squadron commanded by Captain Garrett, which is particularly mentioned, being the 2nd Squadron. It is equally clear from Captain Tucker's letter that he obtained Pattle's permission to advance with his own squadron—the 3rd—before any other part of the Regiment moved.

But be the facts as they may, we may agree with Waddington's remark: "I cannot understand how Sir C. Napier is robbed ....of 'all the merit of the conception of that brilliant movement'; for he gave the order in complete ignorance of its having been already partly carried into execution." He held that credit should be given to Tucker for seeing the crisis simultaneously with the General.

In his despatch, Napier accorded the honour of having decided the battle to "the Cavalry of the left wing." Jacob, in his letter of the 23rd February, says, in reference to his own Regiment, "Our charge decided the battle: the General told me so on the ground." It does seem probable that the capture of the Mirs' camp and the dispersion of their numerous mounted reserves by the Scinde Horse were what finally shook the reso-

§Supplementary Blue Book, p. 128.

*Rice Holmes, p. 164. †Life, Vol. II, p. 116.

lution of the Balochis in the Fuleli, rather than the penetration of their line, and consequently isolation of their right wing, by the advance of the Bengal Cavalry. But as it was the latter who began the movement, and were the first portion of the British Force to break into the Baloch position, it is but just that they should share the honour equally with the Scinde Horse.

The Napiers' later commendation of Fitz Gerald at the expense of Jacob is an instance of spite overcoming judgment: while Jacob, with the assistance of his Adjutant, Lieut. Russell, reformed the greater part of his Regiment after charging through the Mirs' camp, when his men were excited to the highest pitch, and so was ready when required to repel an expected attack on the rear guard, FitzGerald, not hearing the trumpets, went on in pursuit for several miles, until coming on a large body of Horse who had not been engaged he was obliged to retire. It was the difference between Cromwell and Prince Rupert over again.

(d) *Duration of the battle*:—Sir William Napier says that the struggle continued for four hours: and Sir John Fortescue, writing his account after the publication of Rice Holmes' work, adheres to this figure. But Waddington's calculations are irrefutable: considering the battle to have begun when the British Artillery opened fire, at about 11 a.m., it lasted for two and a half hours, the close fighting being from 12 noon to a little after 1 p.m. These times have been adopted by Sir Patrick Cadell.* But taking the time from when the Mirs' army opened fire on the Sind Irregular Horse, on whom they inflicted casualties, four hours would be an under-estimate: for the British infantry line was formed at 9 a.m., and Jacob and his men were in position and under fire for at least an hour before that. But this would hardly amount to "three and a half hours of rugged battle."

(e) *Class Composition of H. M's 22nd Regiment*.—William Napier says: "This battalion.....was composed entirely of Irishmen,"—a statement perhaps based on a remark of Sir Charles' in a letter to Captain John Kennedy written just before the battle: "I have one British Regiment; the 22nd. Magnificent Tipperary! I would not give 'the specimens' for a deal just now." The Napiers' predilection for Irish troops is well known, and Sir Patrick Cadell drew my attention to an instance of even greater perversion of the facts by Sir William, in Vol. VI of the Peninsular War.

*History of the Bombay Army, p. 184.

Rice Holmes speaks more correctly of "the 22nd, half of whom were Irish." This Regiment having had a local connection with Chester since 1781, naturally attracted a comparatively large number of Irish recruits. With regard to their proportion in 1843, the only evidence I have is in the names of the men of the 22nd killed in the Sind battles, inscribed on the monument at Miani. Out of 65, 25 names are prima facie Irish. Incidentally, the casualty returns of the two battles give only 46 dead, so 19 more must have died of wounds. I may add that it is evident from the names of the Indian soldiers on the monument that the great majority of the men of the Bombay Infantry Regiments were Marathas, with a few "Purbias," the Cavalrymen being "Purbias" and Muslims.

6. *Criticisms of Napier's Conduct of the battle*:

Sir Charles Napier, in his final estimate of his battles,§ considered that he deserved credit for four things as a commander at Miani:—

"1st: The formation of my enormous baggage as a fortress, by which it defended itself and my rear at the same time.

2nd: Stopping the gap, and thus paralysing a great force of the enemy in the shikargah.

3rd: Making the Cavalry charge as they did.

4th: My formation in square after victory, as a precaution against a renewed attack with overpowering numbers, which was in the enemy's power and with the most terrible effect, as we were on a plain where his whole force could reach us."

The justice of this estimate will not be gain said. In addition, of course, was his inspiring personal leadership. It is not usually sound for a General to expose himself like a battalion commander, but there are times when it is not only desirable, but decisive, as Napoleon proved at the bridge of Lodi. It is unreasonable to speculate on what would have happened had Napier fallen, or whether the battle could have been won without him cheering on his men in front of the line. Napier himself declared: "In the battle I rallied the 22nd twice, and the 25th N.I. three times, when giving way under the terrible pressure; all the officers behaved well, but had I left the front one moment the day would have been lost: many know this. Had I not been there some other would have done the same, but being there, and having rallied them, to have gone to another point would have lost all."* It is cur-

§Life, Vol. IV, p. 108. *Life, Vol. II, p. 327.

ious that, considering what he and his officers owed to the troops' instinct of how to fight on the edge of the Fuleli, he should have added: "We ought to have gone slap over the bank, and had the 22nd been old soldiers they would have done so: but such young lads were amazed, they knew not what to do....." However, Ellenborough's opinion, given in a brief demi-official letter dated Agra, 5th March, 1843, which I believe has not been quoted before, has not been departed from by subsequent writers:—

"General :

The victory of Meeanee is thoroughly your own. Brave as the conduct of your officers and troops was, they would have failed without your example, as well as your directing hand. ...."

But there is one aspect of Napier's management of his troops which cannot escape criticism: his failure to make due use of his artillery. After the preliminary cannonading, two-thirds of his guns took no part in the action until the resistance of the Balochis had been broken. This was noticed by Outram, as appears in two private letters to John Jacob:— "Show me why the artillery was of *no* service at Meanee.... and how they could have been brought into effective position....." (28th May 1846) and, referring to the British losses at Miani "which Sir Charles might have won without the loss of a man, scarcely, had he turned his guns down the Fullalie as he might have done by a little management, and then slipped his cavalry at them when cannonaded out of their position." (21st October, 1847). There is, of course, some exaggeration here. But Sir Charles himself felt some explanation was required; in a letter to Lord Ellenborough about a week after the battle, he wrote§ "All the guns were on the right to meet a rush, if the Beloochees in the wood should overpower Tew; but all could not be brought into action; the camels turned restive, and some guns were dragged up by the soldiers, but there was not room for more than four. We had but three officers, instead of the ten which twelve guns ought to have: the Company will never give full effect to their troops unless more regimental officers are with their Corps."

§Life, Vol. II. p. 341.

Jacob in a rough sketch-plan enclosed with his letter to his father dated 23rd February shows the guns which could not be brought up to the front drawn up one behind the other along the shikargah wall. A few of them would have been of infinite service on the other flank, where Napier expected the 1st Grenadiers, with less than 250 bayonets, to storm the village and enclosures strongly occupied by the enemy. This was fit work for artillery preparation, and with four guns so employed the battle might certainly have been won sooner, and with less cost to the British infantry and cavalry. But even if Napier had wished to make such dispositions, the paucity of artillery officers was an obstacle: and once the three of them were with their four guns on the brink of the Fuleli, there was no time to think of improving a position which taxed all their energies and skill to maintain.

Napier fully recognized his debt to the Artillery and Sappers. Writing to Lord Ellenborough on September 15th, 1843, he says: "Let me now point out that there are, still unpromoted, to the great regret of everyone Captains Hutt and Henderson. The first, with great resolution, and difficulty got his guns on to a perilous little rise of ground at Mecance, the Belooch mass being in a hollow a few yards off: Henderson with his Madras Sappers fought desperately to protect these guns while being so placed. These officers were conspicuously cool and courageous, and very terrible to the enemy, but Hutt was the most conspicuous from the great destruction he dealt. Captain Whitlie's two guns dealt with the enemy in front, but Hutt's guns swept the columns endeavouring to turn our right flank and Henderson's sappers broke down part of the park wall, under cover of which the Balooch columns were getting round us, and through that breach Hutt checked their progress."

Napier has also been criticised for walking into a trap at Miani. Sir John Fortescue, basing his account of the battle on that of Rice Holmes, goes further than that author in his assertions that Sir Charles completely mistook the real nature of the Baloch position.* He says "How far Napier was to blame for this it is not easy to say. It seems strange that no guide should have told him of the course of the Fuleli, and considering that he mistook the reserves of the Balochis for their front line, it is not quite clear why a staff officer or, two or even a line of skirmishers, should not have been pushed

*History British Army, Vol. XII, p. 292.



The battlefield of Miani, looking West ftom Sultan Shah (Katri) village.
Jan Mahomed Khan Talpur's tomb in the middle distance;
Katri Forest bund (the Shikargah wall) beyond; the Fuleli on the left.
October, 1942.

forward to examine the ground over which he purposed to advance." This last remark is made obviously in complete ignorance of the fact of Jacob's reconnaissance. But what information did Jacob send back? McMurdo says positively that Sir Charles "was not aware of the existence of the loop, nor even of the exact situation of the Fullaillee in front—till the line got close enough to see the heads of the enemy above the bank"§—and this was when the British line was committed to its final advance. The question therefore is, was Jacob at fault? From the letter to his father of February 23rd, 1843, one would infer that he had realised that the main position of the Balochis was in the bed of the Fuleli. But this may have been wisdom after the event. He says: 'I went myself to within about 200 yards of their line, upon which they fired matchlocks both from the village and shikargah, showing both to be occupied and their dispositions complete; having well observed their position and strength I sent a note back to the General about them."

It should be remembered that the Mirs' cannon were grouped at intervals along their front, and probably had men clustered round them: and though in cutting their firing-stop in the northern bank of the Fuleli the Balochis probably threw up the earth in front, this channel, being originally a natural branch of the Indus, had not the high spoil-banks which at once indicate the line of an artificial canal. Its line at this point is not, and doubtless was not at the time of the battle, distinguishable from a few hundred yards' distance. We do not know the contents of Jacob's note: but he could not be blamed if he did not see that there was the deep bed of a canal across the front behind the guns. He certainly could not have made a closer reconnaissance. On the other hand, one must agree with Fortescue that it was strange that Napier's guides did not tell him of the bend in the Fuleli.

7. *Topography of the field of Miani, a hundred years after the battle:*

It is a matter for satisfaction, considering that the battlefield of Miani is in the alluvial plain of Sind, which has been developed so much by improvements in irrigation during the century of British Rule, that comparatively few topographical changes have taken place since the battle was fought, although no calculated efforts have been made, so far as I am aware, to preserve its character.

§Rice Holmes, pgs. 152-53.

Two pillars have been erected to mark the right and left of the British attack. The shikargah on the right was happily retained as a Reserved Forest—Belo Kathri—and its boundary, a trench and raised bank, follows exactly the line of the shikargah wall. The pillar on this flank is, of course, where this meets the Fuleli, and the ground where the artillery were brought into position is still somewhat raised above the general level of the plain.

The loop of the canal in which the Balochis took up their position was eliminated by a chord nearly a mile to the south, as long ago as 1857, when the first improvements to the Fuleli were undertaken: its bed has been raised considerably by a century of cultivation, but it is still perfectly distinguishable.

The pillar on the left is on the high bank of the Nao Kamal Wah "karia," now superseded by the Barrage system, to the S.S.E. of the village. This must mark the point to which the 2nd squadron of the 9th Bengal Cavalry advanced down the Fuleli.

The actual infantry front along the Fuleli bank measures a mere 700 yards, between the village and the shikargah: a convenient length for the 1,400 bayonets which Napier brought into line.

The most conspicuous landmark is the tomb and mosque of Mir Jan Mahomed Khan Talpur, which his family erected "with a warlike vanity, not where he fell in the bottom of the Fullaillee, but sixty yards beyond the British lines, where he never penetrated." The British monument is an obelisk "Erected by Major-General Sir C. J. Napier, G.C.B., and the Officers, N. C. Os, and soldiers of the British Army under his command, in memory of their comrades, who fell in the battles of the 17th February and 24th March 1843, fought with the Ameers of Scinde." It is a little to the West of the position where the British encamped after the battle, south of the Fuleli, and bears the names of all who fell in the two battles. Here those who were killed at Miani are buried.

The "shallow green bed of a watercourse" which bounded the field to the Eastward is still much as it must have been at the time of the battle. Till recently, the Nao Kamal Wah karia followed it. The jungle and broken ground beyond it are just as impracticable for cavalry now as then with the addition of a perennial Barrage canal, running from North to South to the East of the village: this roughly follows the line of one of the scarped channels surmounted by Jacob in his abortive attack.

Sultan Shah village is surrounded by some magnificent old Nim trees, which must have been in existence in 1843. In fact, the descendent of the owner of the village of those days, one Ali Shah, showed me a mark on the huge trunk of one of the trees which he declares was caused by a cannon ball—presumably when Napier turned part of his artillery on the village to clear it of the last of its defenders, at the end of the battle. There are two more small villages to the north of Sultan Shah, which is now known as Pahilwan Shah, which did not exist a century ago: but with the jungle round them they roughly coincide with the enclosures and jungle shown on Waddington's plan.

Nowadays there is a certain amount of cotton cultivation near the villages, and Jan Mahomed's tomb, and wheat is grown in the bed of the Fuleli: but the ground over which the British approached the scene of the struggle is exactly as described by Waddington: "a narrow plain, dotted with low sandy hillocks and camel bushes." I have stood on what I believe to be the very sand hill from which Sir Charles Napier took his first survey of the Baloch position, at about a mile's distance: and hard it is to make out much distinctly, looking into the sun, as one must at that time of day.

The shikargah on the right bank of the Fuleli, where it runs north to south parallel with the original line of advance, is now Miani Forest Reserve: and here, in the Hatri Forest bungalow, originally a hunting lodge of the Mirs, is preserved a plan of the battle, by Captain Henderson.

For those curious in matters of detail, I may add that the two canals which delayed the march of the main army from Matiari were the Sarfaraz Wah and the Gurk Wah, now both superseded by the Barrage Canals: and the village where Napier first formed up the Advance Guard, on hearing the sound of the Mirs' cannon—probably a signal to their men to assemble and take up their positions—was Tando Syed Khan Laghari.

To the country people, the battle is known as Jan Mahomed's fight.

Concluding observations:

Most of the units engaged on the British side at Miani still remain in the Army Lists, and all added to the laurels won on

that memorable day. The 22nd is better known as the Cheshire Regiment, while the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, beloved by Sir Charles, has become the 5th Battalion (Napier's) 6th Rajputana Rifles. These two Regiments, which fought side by side in Sind, have ever afterwards exchanged annual congratulatory messages on Miani day. The 12th Bombay Native Infantry, after various changes in designation, became the 5th Battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers in 1922, but was disbanded next year. The 1st Grenadier N.I., are now the 1st Battalion, 4th Bombay Grenadiers. The present titles of the Scinde Irregular Horse and the Poona Auxiliary Horse are the 14th Prince of Wales' Own Scinde Horse, and the 17th Queen Victoria's Own Poona Horse. The 2nd Company 2nd Battalion Bombay Foot Artillery are represented by No. 6 Medium Battery, Royal Artillery, but the 3rd Company 3rd Battalion Golandaz was reduced, with similar units, in 1870. The Madras Sappers and Miners remain, as Queen Victoria's own Madras Sappers and Miners.

The honours accorded to Sir Charles Napier and the officers who fought at Miani also recognized their conduct at the battle of Dubba, or Hyderabad, and will be more appropriately noticed after giving an account of that battle. So far as the Corps are concerned, the Governor General's despatch of 5th March 1843 authorises the bearing on their appointments, standards, and colours, of the battle honour "Hyderabad, 1843" (subsequently changed to "Meeanee") by all units except the 1st Grenadiers. This omission may have been due to some unofficial letter from Sir Charles: in his despatch he merely said: "The Grenadiers under Major Clibborn, owing to a misconception of orders, were but slightly engaged." The omission seems unjust, considering that the Poona Horse, who received the Honour, were not engaged at all, while the Grenadiers suffered five casualties. In the same order, Ellenborough directed that the Regiment of Scinde Horse on its existing establishment, should be permanently attached to the Army of Bombay.

The same Corps received further honours specifically for Miani, when in separate orders, dated 8th March and 13th March respectively, Ellenborough appointed John Jacob as his Honorary Aide-de-Camp, and requested Napier to present to the Regiment the standard they had taken from the enemy.

This is not the place to consider Miani in its relationship to Napier's diplomacy and Ellenborough's policy. Its glory is the military glory of the General who dared huge odds, and of the troops who met them with unbending resolution. And though defeated, the Baloch Sardars and their men partake in the glory of courage and endurance. More than this:—Whoever Napier's correspondent was who wrote "I wish you had not been opposed to men fighting for their independence," was right; though Napier declared that he fought for the liberties of the people, and that even the Balochis were glad to get a good master for a bad one. They found, in the event, that their Jagirs were secured for them: but it was not only to preserve their lands that they drew the sword. They fought for the honour of their Race; to right the grievous wrongs inflicted on the aged Mir Rustom Khan; to break the galling yoke of foreign domination. When the call came, at the eleventh hour, they flocked to their Rulers' standards from far and near: and the loyalty and devotion that evoked such a response is no more to be belittled than the unflinching valour with which they vainly fought. Requiescant omnes in Pace!

Darang, 12th December 1942.

THE LION'S LAST ROAR

BY A. B. ADVANI, M.A.LL.B.

(*Read before The Sind Historical Society on* 25-2-43).

If a straight line were to be drawn from Hyderabad (Sind) in eastern direction for a distance of forty miles, it will end in a town called Mirpur Khas. In the beginning of last century, this was the capital town of the Mirpur branch of Talpur Mirs and had been founded by Mir Ali Murad, son of Mir Thara Khan in 1806. (1) In 1783, when the Talpur Chiefs wrested power from the Kalhoras, Mir Fateh Ali Khan Talpur had divided Sind in three parts and given Mirpur and some other places to the east of Hyderabad to Mir Thara Khan who ruled over his territory up to 1829. After his death, he was succeeded by his son Mir Ali Murad. Mir Ali Murad ruled for seven years and on his death in 1836, his son Mir Sher Muhammad Khan, popularly known as the "Lion," ascended the "*gadi.*" (2) The British Government had concluded a separate treaty with Mir Sher Muhammad Khan in June 1841, on the latter promising to pay an annual tribute of Rs. 50,000 to the British Government. (3) Mir Sher Muhammad Khan, in the beginning had kept aloof from the political intrigues in which the Talpur Mirs of Upper and Lower Sind had got entangled, but not for long. When the war with the Mirs of Upper and Lower Sind had become unavoidable in the beginning of 1843, Mir Sher Muhammad secretly started collecting a large force of Baloches and on 17th February 1843, when the Battle of Meeani took place, he was only six miles away from the battle-field with 10,000 soldiers. (4) With the defeat of the Talpur Mirs of Hyderabad, on 17th February, 1843, the Baloch mercenaries rallied round the standard of Mir Sher Muhammad, who engaged the British troops under the command of Sir Charles Napier on 24th March, 1843, in the famous Battle of Hyderabad. Four hours of sharp fighting decided the battle in favour of the British troops. Mir Sher Muhammad however escaped successfully to Mirpur and from Mirpur to the desert fort of Umer Kot. Some troops under the command of Major Woodburn marched on to Umer Kot and took possession of it without any trouble, but the wily Lion was no longer there. Sir Charles Napier was by now getting worried about Mir Sher Muhammad Khan, who was successfully

1. Ross, David, *The Land of the Five Rivers and Sindh*, p. 33.
2. *Alienations in Sind*, Vol. II, pages 120 and 137.
3. *Ibid*, p. 150.
4. Napier, Sir William, *The Conquest of Scinde*, page 324.

playing his hide-and-seek game with the General. The General wanted the surrender of the Lion for obvious reasons. In his observations to Captain John Jacob, dated 4th June, 1843, Sir Charles Napier wrote thus:—

"I suspect the movement of troops will produce either a *surrender* or a *dispersion*. If a surrender, the job is done; if a dispersion, we shall be bothered." (5)

For this purpose Chamberlain's Horse were directed to move from Rohri and intercept Mir Sher Muhammad, should the latter attempt to escape to the Punjab. Thus any attempt on the part of Mir Sher Muhammad Khan to break forth to the north was well provided against. (6) At the same time Colonel Roberts was ordered to move down the right bank of the Indus, from Sukkur to Sehwan, with 1,500 men and a battery, and to seize all the boats on the river as he descended. This move was ordered with two objects. Firstly to prevent Mir Sher Muhammad Khan from crossing the right bank, and secondly to prevent the western hill tribes from going over to join him on the left bank. Captain John Jacob was at Mirpur with 400 infantry, 2 guns and Scinde Irregular Horse. (7) Thus the Lion found himself hemmed in on all sides. On 9th June 1843, Captain John Jacob received orders from Sir Charles Napier to advance. In his letter to Jacob, Sir Charles Napier wrote:—

"I think you may as well advance as soon after this reaches you as you can, say tomorrow night.

We have a story that the Ameer is at Hala; if so, he is dodging out of Robert's reach, and yet cannot make up his mind to quit the river.

Now, he must have one of the two following motives for this, because it is the worst position he can take:—

1st:—His family are on the opposite bank and he wants to get to them.

2nd.—He has not water enough in the desert.

---

5. *Record Book of the Scinde Irregular Horse*, Vol. I., page 36.
6. Napier, Sir William, *The Conquest of Scinde*, page 419.
7. *Ibid.*, page 420 and ff.

If he wants to join his family he will escape alone and his people disperse. If he is pushed for water, he has no choice, and must remain between Robert's column, yours and mine, and will inevitably be destroyed, as far as military calculation goes. ....I would try to force him to the desert, but stronger reasons make me prefer pushing him towards the river; if he gets into the desert he may perish for want of water, or disperse and assemble in our rear, or any other convenient place; but if I get him down on the river, I shove him into it, and finish the war at a blow! I do not want to drown him if he and his people surrender, but I would rather drown them all than let them escape, which would produce a much greater loss of life in the long run.. Between you and Roberts, Sher Muhammad had a good chance of being picked up." (8)

On receipt of this letter Jacob with the force under his command, marched from Mirpur, reaching Shahdadpur on the 13th June, 1843. At this place Jacob received information that Mir Sher Muhammad Khan had marched from Hala to a small fort at a distance of 16 or 17 miles to the south-east of Hala. Late in the night, a servant of Mir Sher Muhammad Khan came to Jacob's camp and informed him that a force of 8,000 or 10,000 Baloches would attack him soon. Mir Sher Muhammad Khan had intended to surprise Jacob's detachment by attacking it before daylight. But Jacob was on guard, and left his camp on the night of the 13th June, 1843, to meet the Lion. At 3 o'clock in the morning of the 14th June, the British picquets found the enemy coming on in large numbers. The advance however was very slow, which enabled Jacob to send several parties to reconnoitre. Leaving a troop and company to protect the camp, Jacob went forward with the rest of his force. The Baloches had formed on the bank of a *nullah* in considerable strength, both horse and foot. The number of Baloches present for this battle was about 4,000, and the Lion had brought 3 guns. As soon as Jaoob advanced the Baloches opened their guns on his force. The ground in front of Jacob's force was a rugged one, intersected with deep ravines. Jacob formed his line and ordered the guns to be fired. It was an extremely tame show, unlike the one at Meeani where no quarter was sought and none given. The Baloches moved off and on the Scinde Horse advancing they broke and fled in every direction, leaving behind their guns and standards. It was not a retreat but a route. The country being covered with jungle and sand dunes, and intersected with deep ditches full of water,

8, *Record Book of the Scinde Irregular Horse*, Vol. I., pages 35-37.

effective pursuit of the Baloches was not possible. In the general disorder Mir Sher Muhammad fled with ten horsemen and Jacob had the consolation that although he had been unsuccessful in his attempt to capture the Lion, he had succeeded in preventing his flight to the desert. All the 3 brass guns, mainly 3" bore, complete with limber and ammunition were captured in this action. (9) Mir Sher Muhammad fled and crossing the Indus, escaped in the mountains, taking refuge with the hill tribes there. (10) After this he became a fugitive and was no longer a power to reckon with. The Sind Campaign ended with the Lion's last stand at Shahdadpur. The Lion roared, but it was such a feeble roar, that one is filled with pity for him, for the Lion was a brave foe and even Sir Charles Napier acknowledged this he when wrote to Jacob on 4th June, 1843:—"I like this fellow, for his resolute resistance." (11).

---

9. Record Book of the Scinde Irregular Horse Vol. I, pages 38-39.
10. Napier, Sir William, *The Conquest of Scinde*, pages 440-41.
11. *Record Book of the Scinde Irregular Horse*, Vol. I, page 35.

THE 50th ANNIVERSARY OF MEANEE.

The conquest of Sind was effected by Sir Charles Napier just half-a-century ago, and on the 17th instant, the fiftieth anniversary of Meanee, the members of the Sind Club entertained at a banquet Major-General Marston, the only surviving officer of Sir Charles Napier's small army supposed to be now residing in India. Between sixty and seventy guests assembled to meet the veteran, and had not Colonel Sartorius, C.B., and the Karachi Eleven been starting for Lahore that night to play Lord Hawke's team, and H. E. Sir George Greaves, on tour in Sind, had not been detained by accidents both by river and road, the Assembly would have been still larger and more brilliant, the more so as many district officers were kept prisoners in their camps by rain having made the roads impassable. The chair was taken by Brigadier-General Boyce Combe, C.B., Chairman of the Club Committee, on whose right sat the guest of the evening and on his left the Commissioner-in-Sind, who had come a long distance expressly for the occasion. The Services mustered in great force, all in uniform, and the Civil community, with the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, Mr. James Currie, at their head, was no less eager to do honour to their gallant fellow-citizen. At the end of the great hall was the word MEANEE (spelt according to ancient not Hunterian spelling) in letters of gold, surrounded by a wreath of laurel, and below it were draped the colours of the 1st Belooch Battalion, guarded by the stalwart Beloochis. The Band of the Regiment played during dinner. Under any circumstances, a community of Britons might be expected to show some mark of respect to an old soldier on the 50th anniversary of a great battle in which he took part, but when that soldier had by his own personal prowess contributed materially to the battle becoming a victory—that victory in its turn resulting in the annexation to the Empire of a fine province—and when he had for 30 years been conspicuous in reducing that province to law and order and eventually after a brief further space of military duty had returned there to reside permanently, an entertainment was felt to be more than usually appropriate. In France a public meeting would have been held, addresses read, and the Governor or Commissioner would have kissed him publicly on both cheeks, but Englishmen adhere to the time-honoured, if less romantic, institution of a feast. The proceedings were most enthusiastic throughout, every allusion to Major-General Marston being loudly applauded. The most striking incident was the General's own speech. No one present, writes

one who was present, will ever forget the sight of the grey-haired warrior, his powerful frame as erect as a boy's, his presence commanding, and his eyes as keen as hawk's, but with a cheery kindliness marked in every line of his face, telling for the benefit of the hearers, few of whom were born while he was already fighting for his country, in simple but stirring words the account of the memorable fight. Seldom, indeed, does it fall to the lot of any one to hear a brilliant episode of history rehearsed modestly and graphically by one of the principal actors in it fifty years before. The audience hung breathlessly on the speaker's lips, occasionally breaking out into an irresponsible cheer, and at the end the enthusiasm of the audience was unbounded. A synopsis of Major-General Marston's service may be given here. He joined the army on the 18th February, 1839, and was posted to the 25th Bombay Light Infantry. The same year he was sent on field service against the Raja of Satara, and in 1841 took part in the first Afghan War. He accompanied Sir Richard England's force to the relief of Kandahar and was present at the second engagement at Hykalzye in 1842. At Meanee in 1843 he saved Sir Charles Napier's life and was mentioned in despatches. He was also present at the battle of Hyderabad and the taking of Umerkot. After the annexation of Sind, although a lieutenant of only 4 years' service, he was appointed by Sir Charles Napier to raise the Karachi District Police, and later in 1848, was made commandant of all the Police in Sind, that force which was the model of all other forces of the kind in India. In 1855 he received the thanks of Government and of the Court of Directors for personal gallantry in an encounter with Afghan robbers. In 1857 he was made a Brevet-Major for distinguished service. After the mutiny he was again thanked by Government for the conspicuous services rendered by the Sind Police in suppressing mutinous outbreak at Karachi, Hyderabad and Shikarpur, at which places the police pursued, arrested, and brought to execution the sepoy-mutineers. In 1864 his appointment was abolished on re-organisation, and at his own request he was appointed, without loss of pay, to his original post of Superintendent of Karachi Police. Granted in 1869 a special extension of 3 years, in 1872 he reverted to military employ, and the Commander-in-Chief posted him to the command of the 13th N. I. Ultimately, at the conclusion of 37 years' service he accepted a bonus and retired.

It is a singular comment on the manner in which England rewards the bravery of her sons, that, as observed by General

Combe, amidst the showers of stars and ribbons distributed twice a year, or after a campaign, none should have reached him yet, and the trophies he has to show are confined to the medal and clasp for the Sind War, and the sword presented by Sir Charles Napier for saving his life. In his prime he was a man of powerful physique, a renowned horseman, and a splendid shot. Even if he no longer scales the mountains in search of ibex with the same light foot as of yore, he is still heart and soul in sympathy with all manly sports, and at the Karachi Meetings, where he always fills the post of Judge, no figure is better known or more welcome.

To return to the dinner—we will not call it a banquet—Brigadier-General Combe, after proposing the health of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress and observing that though the toast was one that had been heard many years even before Meanee, and would, all present hoped, be drunk for very many years to come, rose amid loud cheers to propose the toast of the evening. In an appreciative speech he referred to the manner in which Major-General then Lieutenant, Marston saved Sir Charles, and quoted from the latter's letters to his brother, to Lord Ellenborough and to Lieutenant Marston himself, to show how grateful Sir Charles was for the same. At the end there was loud and long-continued cheering, which was renewed when General Marston rose to reply. He described in simple words the manner in which the battle was won—the march, the reconnoitre, the forming of line, the defence, the attack, and his own part in the victory.

As soon as the cheers which followed had subsided General Combe proposed the memory of those who fell at Meanee, which was drunk in solemn silence.

Mr. Currie then proposed the health of the visitors, alluding in humourous terms to the causes which had kept some away, and especially expressing regret that the son of General Younghusband, who was on the Staff at the battle, could not attend from Sukkur. He coupled the toast with the name of the Commissioner-in-Sind, who had come all the way from Sibito to attend that evening. The toast was well received, and in reply Mr. James spoke of the importance of the occasion and mentioned that he had received a telegram from the Governor of Bombay, wishing General Marston long life. His speech was very long but very interesting. It was a historical review of the war with the Amirs. Mr. James also spoke of the great

results of the conquest, the foresight of Sir Charles Napier in suggesting the making of a mole from Bunder to Kiamari as a first step towards the "making of Karachi;" the water works and other works of utility which have since been carried out, though very tardily. Finally he referred to the pacification of the province in which General Marston played a very important part by organising a very efficient Police force. Allusion was also made to his services in pursuing and capturing the mutinous sepoys at Karachi during the great Indian mutiny.

The speaking over, two or three vocalists entertained the company with songs, and the proceedings concluded with singing Auld Lang Syne, Rule Brittania, and God Save the Queen.

Reprinted from "The Sind Times", dated February 26, 1893:

N. M. BILLIMORIA.

Digitized by M. H. Panhwar Institute of Sindh Studies, Jamshoro.